

The Political Conditions of Allied Success

**A Plea for the Protective Union of
the Democracies**

By

Norman Angell

Author of "The Great Illusion," etc.

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America and The New World-State

A Plea for American Leadership in International Organization

By Norman Angell

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The object of this book is to show that the present situation furnishes to America an opportunity to take a real world-leadership, by placing herself at the head of the union of civilized states, by organizing a real world-state, and especially by initiating the definite organization of the economic, social, and moral forces which might act as sanctions. In other words, its object is to show that, however America may attempt to hold herself free from Europe, she will very deeply feel the effects, both material and moral, of upheavals like that which is now shaking the Old Continent; that, even though there be no aggressive action against her, the militarization of Europe will force upon America also a militarist development, and that she can best avoid these dangers and secure her own safety and free development by taking the lead in a new world-policy.

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PREFACE

THE most serious obstacle which the argument of this book has to encounter is a temperamental one—the emotional condition of most of us in war time. That mood is apt to lead us into one of two misunderstandings in considering recommendations such as those here urged: either to the decision that they are presented as an alternative to the active prosecution of the war, and are thus, in however elusive or disguised a form, counsels of surrender; or, if we escape that misunderstanding and realize that the arguments favour the active waging of the war, to the decision that they are superfluous for those already convinced of the need of victory.

In attempting to forestall both of these misinterpretations, I have risked the reader's weariness and irritation by an insistent itera-

tion of these things: The policies here discussed are not put forward as an alternative to the active prosecution of the war, but as the indispensable condition of its success; not as a substitute for the military power of the Alliance, but as the means by which that power can be made effective, now and in the future.

Perhaps it would help to indicate more clearly the angle from which the problem is approached, to state that the present writer happens to have been in the past an earnest advocate of American participation in this war, and that there is nothing in the argument of this book which runs counter to the following assumptions:

The destruction of Prussian military power is essential to the future peace and freedom of the Western World.

No peace tolerable to free men can be secured by negotiation with a government that defends the character of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

No reliance can be placed upon any under-

taking given by such a government with reference to the autonomy of peoples within its power, and guarantees accorded by it to that end would be utterly untrustworthy.

No League of Nations can be workable or reliable so long as the Prussian military system is predominant in Europe.

Nor does the argument call for any form of negotiation which involves the cessation of military operations; nor for any statement of terms involving territorial undertakings likely to be embarrassing at a later stage.

The present author would not necessarily accept all these assumptions in all their implications; but there is nothing in the scope of the present argument which would prevent his doing so.

Categoric as that is, I have not much hope that it will suffice to prevent the misinterpretations already indicated. For the temperamental obstacle goes deeper than an intellectual misinterpretation. It is rooted

perhaps in an elemental desire to give emotions free play, and to escape the discipline and responsibilities—and uncertainties—of intellectual decisions. And the very first question we have to answer is this: Can an Alliance of democracies wage war successfully if its public opinion yields to this desire for emotional indulgence and discards the spirit of political rationalism? Can patriotic feeling be a substitute for reasoned discussion?

In the early stages of a war, the moral issues of which are as clear as they are in this, it generally seems to most of us self-evident that the only public opinion which matters is the public determination to go through to victory. To be convinced of the justice of our cause, to feel so intensely about it that there shall be no danger of any failure of national unity, these are assumed to be the moral essentials of success. You are for your country, or you are against it. As to war aims, the easiest definition is M. Clemenceau's: Victory. "Realizing the issues of the war" means understanding fully the perfidy of the enemy,

and the righteousness of our own cause. Patriotic propaganda is conceived in those terms. Intellectual qualifications of any kind, or any attitude of enquiry, are taken as clear indication of defective patriotism. It is felt that the surest foundations of national solidarity and the safest guide to policy are to be found, not in discussion and argument, but in intense feeling; not in complex ideas but in simple emotions. As the movie advertisement of the war play says: "You can't put up a good fight until your blood boils. This film will make it boil." We feel that boiling blood is the best moral assurance of success. Such is the state of mind of most nations on first entering war.

There are very many situations in life, of course, in which this general attitude is essentially sound. A decision having been taken the part of wisdom is certainly not to go on discussing it; but to concentrate all energy upon carrying it through; and for that purpose the driving force of a fierce uncomplicated emotion may be invaluable.

But the experience of the last year or two has shown us¹ that in wars fought by democracies, and particularly by democracies forming an alliance, new situations involving new decisions are repeatedly presenting themselves; and for making those decisions emotion is no guide. Emotion will carry you along the road when the road is chosen; but it will not necessarily help you to determine which is the right road. It may indeed be a most serious impediment to a sound decision. And even in the simpler kind of fight there is a degree of heat which may be disastrous. It is a recognized method in prize fighting to make your opponent lose his temper. The resulting hot-headedness may off-set superior strength or ability. The toreador manages to reduce an opponent twenty times his own strength by making that opponent literally "see red." And we have found that a war waged by a democracy, or, still more by an alliance made

¹ The plural first personal pronoun is used throughout in this book to include America and her co-belligerents. It avoids cumbersome distinctions to assume that "we" now form a collective entity.

up of a group of different democracies, is by no means as simple as a prize fight. The "boiling blood" of an emotional public opinion may be at certain junctures a very disastrous handicap.

We make that discovery first in the matter of the various administrative problems of the war. Is the government doing the right thing in the matter of finance, munitions, ships, labour, conscription, food transportation, fuel; or the strategy of war itself. There may grow up an "eastern" party and a "western" party. We have all the same object about these things, but we find ourselves in sincere—and generally violent—disagreement about them. The people who in the early stages of the war were in favour of a "truce to discussion," who reminded us that the time for words had passed and the time for action come, who disparaged "talk" and demanded the *union sacrée*, are generally the first to depart from their own rule. The very intensity of conviction which goes with "boiling blood," the quick and violent resentment of opposition,

make the objuration to "stop talk and get on with the war" a slogan not of union but disunion. For each faction is certain that their way is the only way to get on with the war, and that it is the others who must stop the talking. Meantime, while demanding that talk stop, they not only talk a great deal, but with the very highest patriotic motives organize newspaper agitation and engage in congressional or parliamentary campaigns against their rivals. We saw the same thing, of course, in the administrative problems of the Civil War, but the matter is very much more complex now because the administrative problem touches not only this government but those of the Allies as well, and finally involves the political relations with those Allies.

Experience shows that the political relations between the Allies become very rapidly a second great group of problems in which decisions are quite impossible in terms of mere patriotic feeling. What should be our relations to the Russian revolutionists? Ought we to support Kaledines? Ought we to re-

cognize the Bolsheviks? What of Irish conscription? What power should be given to the Versailles Conference? What is the wise attitude with reference to Japan? Ought she to be encouraged to go into Siberia or not? And these questions bring up certain others. How far is pressure upon Greece or Holland expedient? Is it wise to differentiate between Austria and Germany? Should war be declared upon Bulgaria and Turkey? What should be the American attitude to Allied Labour and Socialism? Quite obviously all these questions demand something more than "boiling blood."

And they themselves involve a third group of questions: ultimate war aims and peace terms. Our relations with the Russian Revolution—to saying nothing of those with Japan, Italy, and the Jugoslavs—turned really upon the nature of our aims and what the Alliance was standing for. The whole Russian problem demonstrated that aims and methods cannot be separated; that opinions concerning them may work almost unconsciously in the public

mind and effect the direction of policy and the unity of our alliance. Even definite military success might be undone at the peace table if we should there disagree as to our future aims: for the enemy would know that his temporary defeat could later be "corrected" as against a Europe hopelessly divided against itself. The position of Russia alone might decide the future in Germany's favour.

We are faced by this overwhelming fact: that while, during three years we have been impatiently disparaging "political strategy," the enemy has been using it to such good purpose, that he has been able, by virtue of it, completely to offset the inferiority of the sum total of his resources; and if we could imagine his winning it would be a political success, based mainly on the alienation of Russia from our Alliance.

The history of the past four years suffices to show that we shall again and again be faced by situations in which wise action will depend, not upon our feelings but our judgment. To "remember the *Lusitania*" does not help us

to decide whether it is wise for Japan to occupy Siberia; the appeal to "stop talk and get on with the war" really does not answer the question whether Mr. Gompers should or should not identify his organization with the policy adopted by the British Labour party.

Take one incident in the tragic story of our relations with Russia to illustrate the danger of making decisions in a state of "boiling blood." When Mr. Henderson, then of the British Cabinet, was in Petrograd, he telegraphed urging strongly that Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (whose views on the war he did not share) might be sent to Russia. Mr. Henderson had found that of all the British Labour leaders Mr. Macdonald at that time happened to be, in Russian Revolutionary circles, the best known and most trusted, and the one most likely to have influence in checking the Russian tendency to a separate peace. That, in the interests of the retention of Russia within the Alliance, Mr. Macdonald's influence should be used seemed to be the opinion of most of those best acquainted with the

circumstances. The British Government granted his passport, and then a British Trades Union, out of the intensity of its patriotism called a seaman's strike to prevent his going. Had the Union weighed the pros and cons in terms of sound policy of Macdonald's going to Russia? They did not even pretend to have done so. They just didn't like Macdonald, whom they regarded as a pro-German. For a year or two there had been an intense newspaper campaign against him on that score. He was a red flag to most patriotic Englishmen. Consequently, when it came to the question as to whether, whatever his personal views, it might not for a special purpose be wise to use him—as the government were prepared to use him—the state of public temper made sober judgment impossible. The action of the most intensely patriotic Trades Union in Great Britain was undoubtedly of immense service to the German cause.¹

¹ The ebb and flow of these feelings is illustrated significantly by the relations between American and British organized labour. Early in 1916, Mr. Gompers sent to a British Trades Union Congress a proposal that after the conclusion of peace an Interna-

Emphasis has been placed upon the Russian situation in these pages because it is evident that we have not learned its lesson. The forces which produced the Russian Revolution—a striving of the mass after entirely new social and economic conditions—are at work in all the European countries. Any one who cares to study the report of the sub-committee of the British Labour party will realize that it expresses the same motives of determination to bring about deep and fundamental change that wrought the upheaval in Russia. The process of change in England will not, of

tional Labour Conference should be held at the same time as the Peace Conference of the belligerent governments. The British Labourites refused to consider the proposal for a moment. "Shall we consent," asked one of the delegates "to shake hands with the pirates and devils who have murdered our mates?" (It was overlooked that at the proposed period of the meeting—that of the *official* Peace Conference—representatives of the British Government would be "shaking hands" with the representatives of the German Government in any case.) The proposal was snowed under.

Just two years later these same British Trades Unionists pronounce in favour of meeting with German Radicals *during the war*. And it is Mr. Gompers who then turns down the proposal, and American Labourites justify that course with exactly the argument and language used by their British comrades two years previously.

course, be marked by what we have witnessed in Russia. The ferment will work differently; but it will work.

What is the attitude of the American democracy as represented by organized American Labour towards that widespread European movement? It is pretty much the attitude which British public opinion, as a whole, took towards the Russian Radical groups, a year or two ago. American Labour seems disposed to take the ground that the British Labour party is "pro-German" and "defeatist," and for that reason to refuse real co-operation. In just such a way were the most powerful forces in Russia misunderstood and alienated.

We may hope that any deep rift between the American and European democracies in this matter may be avoided. But in this, as in other respects, it is evident that we have not yet laid firmly the foundations of our Alliance, in the sense of deciding its common purposes: whether or not, for instance, the purposes of Great Britain are those of the Labour party, and France and Italy those of the Socialists.

What is to be the American relation generally to the conflicting claims of the various parties in Allied—to say nothing of enemy—countries? The decisions in these problems cannot wisely be made by intense emotionalism, a public violent-mindedness; nor can the problems they imply be solved by hiding them or pretending that they do not exist.

The expectation that, despite all prefatory caution, the main thesis of this book will be misread, is based on some considerable experience of the ease with which the issues it raised can be distorted. •

In a previous book the present author, approaching this subject from another angle, attempted to clear the road towards a workable internationalism by showing the fallacy of many of the conceptions upon which opposition to that policy rested, particularly the fallacy that nations are condemned to inevitable conflict by biological need, by “the struggle for bread.” He attempted to show that conquest, extension of territory, was not

necessary for the welfare of an expanding people in the modern world; that economic needs could be met by co-operation without sacrifice of vital interest on either side, and that only assumed conflict of interest stood in the way of substituting for the old wasteful scramble for power and territory an agreed international system.

The book explicitly warned the reader that its arguments did not point to the conclusion that war was unlikely, still less impossible, if policy remained unchanged. (It was mostly written while a great war was raging.) It devoted a chapter to showing why the futility of war would not of itself stop war; why, even in that sphere of behaviour where self-interest may be considered the actuating motive of men, it is not their interest but what they believe to be their interest—which may be an utterly false belief—that determines conduct. While explicitly and emphatically opposing any reduction of armament in the face of the German danger, and taking the ground that armaments were necessary for the maintenance

of justice and order in the international field, the book urged that those purposes could not be achieved by the mere arming of individual nations one against the other, without relation to any agreed code of rights or common aims; that such methods of anarchy could neither prevent wars nor give us security, even against a common enemy, since such might have a chance against a world quarrelling within itself, none against an organized world. All of which, it was very carefully pointed out, was not an argument against arms, but for a new international policy. Failing such reform, conflict was pronounced to be inevitable. The first paragraph of the first chapter forecasts the likelihood of war with Germany; the last paragraph of the last chapter the likelihood of a continuing series of wars as the price of adherence to the old polity.

In so far as the book reached the larger public at all it did so indirectly, of course, by what they read about it, not by their reading of it. And the widest impression left by that process seems to be this: that it attempted to

show that war was impossible; or would not take place because it was futile; and that armaments were useless! The fact of the present war is frequently cited as complete disproof of its thesis.

The incident illustrates the extreme difficulty of avoiding confusion and misunderstanding in the discussion of this subject. The whole debate of war and peace, and nationalism and internationalism, is still overlaid with certain monstrous prepossessions. In the prevailing view there can only be two parties to it. You must be either on the side of the "pacifist" who, so most of his critics would have us believe, merely wants to leave his country defenceless, and is such an enemy of militarism that his object is obviously to become the helpless victim of German militarism; or, you must be on the side of the preparedness patriot who insists that his country will be safe if only it has all the armaments that it can bear, however much that arming may provoke counter arming, and whatever the country's relations of enmity

or alliance to the rest of the world. You must belong to one side or the other. The fact that both policies are rank nonsense does not permit any mugwump qualification; and woe betide the writer who attempts to state the issues other than in terms of these preposterous alternatives. Him will both sides belabour. He has not observed the rules of the game. He has introduced complications into a contest which seemed so simple; and, most reprehensibly, put onlookers to the trouble of readjusting familiar ideas and the easy decisions of partizanship.

Looking back it is difficult to see what more—short of some such device as printing on the margin of every page the true conclusion from the facts—could have been done to prevent the misreading of that earlier book. To have put greater emphasis on the need for armament might well, in the temper of the time, simply have strengthened the all but universal feeling that mere increase in the military power of each individual nation would ensure security—the very misconcep-

tion which it was the object of the book to destroy. A similar risk is inherent in a book of this kind. Because it deals with the more neglected aspect of the problem and leaves the purely military side to those best fitted to handle it, it runs the risk of appearing to suggest that international machinery is an alternative to military power. In the same way, because it does not, in dealing with the moral factors, denounce German wickedness, it runs the risk of appearing to minimize it. But that denunciation has been omitted, first, because there is not much danger that we shall be allowed to overlook German crimes, and because the denunciation has been rather plentifully done by others; and, secondly, because it is the strength of Prussianism, not its weakness, which is the real menace for us. And its strength consists, not in its evil cruelties, oppressions, and lusts, but in the loyalties which, notwithstanding, it somehow manages to attach to itself. If it were nothing but crime and cruelty, it would not greatly menace us, for it would perish of its

own weakness. Its real danger is that men die gladly for it, and as a mere matter of political effectiveness we shall try and understand how that is possible. To refuse to do that—to refuse to approach the thing other than in a mood of blind emotionalism—does not diminish the evil, it makes it more dangerous, for it leads us sometimes to spend our strength upon what is good and indestructible in our enemy, instead of upon that which is evil and destructible. Certain it is that these confusions are at the bottom of very bad mistakes which we have made in political strategy, and one is sorely tempted sometimes to ask whether they come really from an overpowering sense of responsibility to our cause, or from the sheer desire to satisfy strong emotional appetites at any cost whatsoever.

The times are too serious for looking upon our politics either as entertainment, or as the means whereby we may feed our emotions. The situation is serious enough to demand some moral and intellectual self-discipline.

Whether half the youth of the western world shall have died in vain, or to some purpose, will depend upon the understanding which those who remain can manage to bring to bear upon our international problems. That perhaps indicates the main obligation of the civilian to the soldier. It is an obligation which the present author attempts to discharge.

N. A.

NEW YORK, May, 1918.

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The Political Conditions of Allied Success

PART I

**SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS**

I

LOGICAL symmetry in the presentation of the subject matter of this book has been made subsidiary to the purpose of bringing into the foreground the policies and constructive proposals which, in the view of the writer, the conditions call for.

This must not be taken as indicating any profound belief in the efficacy of political machinery as such. The main factors in the problem which faces us are moral—certain ideas, traditions, aspirations, emotions, a certain sense of values—"public opinion" in the largest meaning of the word. But political machinery in the form of consciously created institutions is itself a factor in the development of public opinion, as well as a form of its expression. An idea or feeling—a religious belief or emotion, or the aspirations of a nationality—capable, it may be, of many

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forms of development, may express itself in the creation of an organized church or a national state, and then be transformed by those institutions, which thus become perhaps the main factors in the subsequent shaping of the idea which created them.

The thesis here developed is very simple, almost a truism. Yet events show that we are ignoring it.

It is this:

The survival of the western democracies, in so far as that is a matter of the effective use of their force, depends upon their capacity to use it as a unit, during the war and after. That unity we have not attained, even for the purposes of the war, because we have refused to recognize its necessary conditions—a kind and degree of democratic internationalism to which current political ideas and feelings are hostile; an internationalism which is not necessary to the enemy, but is to us.

For the Grand Alliance of the Democracies

is a heterogeneous collection of nations, not geographically contiguous, but scattered over the world; and not dominated by one preponderant state able to give unity of direction to the group. The enemy alliance, on the other hand, is composed of a group of states, geographically contiguous, dominated politically and militarily by the material power and geographical position of one member who is able by that fact to impose unity of purpose and direction on the whole. If we are to use our power successfully against him in such circumstances, during the war, at the settlement, and afterwards (which may well be necessary), we must achieve a consolidation equally effective. But in our case that consolidation, not being possible by the material predominance of one member, must be achieved by a moral factor, the voluntary co-operation of equals—a democratic internationalism, necessarily based on a unity of moral aim. Because this has not been attained, even during the war, disintegration of our alli-

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ance has already set in—involving military cost—and threatens to become still more acute at the peace. The enemy group shows no equivalent disintegration.

No military decision against the unified enemy group can be permanent if at the peace table it becomes evident that the Western Democracies are to revert to the old lack of consolidation, instability of alliance, covert competition for isolated power and territory, and a national particularism which makes common action and co-ordination of power cumbrous, difficult, or impossible. If there is to be a return to the old disunited Western Europe the parties which among the enemy favour a policy of aggression will realize that, however much their purpose may temporarily be defeated, the greater material unity of their Alliance will enable it sooner or later to overcome states which, though superior in the sum of their power, have shown themselves inferior in their capacity to combine it for a common purpose. And

that inferiority might arise less from the pressure of any active agent of disruption than from passive hostility to abandoning the old national organization of Europe, sheer lack of habit and practice in international co-operation, political, military or economic.

We have ignored in large part even the more obvious aspects of this truth. It was evident that in the case of a war fought by a large alliance, success would depend, not merely upon the military force of each constituent state, but also upon the capacity to combine those forces for a common end; upon, that is, the political solidarity of the group. If one member had one object, and another a different one, so that they did not create a "single front" or so that disagreement set in and forces were turned one against another, it was obvious that the enemy group, with inferior forces but more united purpose, might well have the military advantage. In other words, the policies and ultimate aims of the mem-

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bers of an alliance have everything to do with its unity and permanence, and these with its military success during the war, and effective use of that success at the peace table. Yet the need for that unity has been consistently minimized in our political strategy.

The lack of moral and political unity has been shown in such things as the dissension between the Tsarist government and the Russian democracy, between that democracy and the Allied governments, between large sections of the democracies of the Allied nations and their governments, between the foreign policies of Italy and the Southern Slavs, Italy and Greece, Roumania and Serbia, Japan and certain members of the alliance; and this condition has already involved disastrous military results and threatens to defeat the objects of the war.

The factors of disintegration in the Grand Alliance are of two kinds: conflicting territorial claims by the component

states (illustrated by the demands of Tsarist Russia, Italy, Serbia, and other Slav groups, Roumania, Greece, and, more obscurely of Japan) and conflict of economic interest and social aspiration within the nations (illustrated by the struggles of the bourgeois and socialist parties in Russia, less dramatically by the revolutionary unrest in Italy, and even in France and England). These latter factors are more dangerous with us than with the enemy, because our historical circumstances have rendered us less disciplined or less docile, less apt in mechanical and de-humanized obedience.

The general truth we are here dealing with is of far greater importance to us than to the enemy. He can in some measure ignore it. We cannot. His unity, in so far as it rests upon moral factors, can be based upon the old nationalist conceptions; our unity depends upon a revision of them, an enlargement into an internationalism.

The kind and degree of internationalism indispensable for the consolidation of the

western peoples if they are to use their force effectively—an internationalism which must take into account the newer social and economic forces of Western Society—is impossible on the basis of the older statecraft and its political motives. For these assume as inevitable a condition of the world in which each nation must look for its security to its own isolated strength (which must derive from population, territory, and strategic position), thus making national interests necessarily rival. The capacity of each nation to feed its population and assure its economic welfare is assumed to depend upon the extent of its territory. A whole philosophy of “biological necessity,” “struggle for life among nations,” “inherent pugnacity of mankind,” “survival of the fit,” is invoked on behalf of this old and popular conception of international life and politics. Such an outlook inevitably implies an overt or latent rivalry which must bring even members of the same alliance sooner or later into conflict.

The only possible unifying alternative to this disruptive policy is the form of internationalism outlined by President Wilson, based on the assumption that the vital interests of all western nations are interdependent, and call for some "permanent association of nations" by which the security of each shall be made to rest upon the strength of the whole, held together by the reciprocal obligation to defend one another.

The greatest obstacles to such a system are disbelief in its feasibility and our subjection to the traditions of national sovereignty and independence. Were it generally believed in, and desired, it would be not only feasible but inevitable. Our governments could aid in the modification of old ideas through bold and definite projects of change, compelling public imagination to take stock of current conceptions.

Such references as have been made by Allied statesmen to these projects have carried the implication that they do not

concern the actual waging of the war; or are put forward as an alternative to its continuance. And that of itself has sufficed to prevent any real consideration of them. Yet the internationalism of which President Wilson has shown himself to be the most consistent advocate is not a substitute for military power, or an alternative to the active prosecution of the war; it is an essential part of the political means by which the military power of democracies and the actual prosecution of this war may be made effective. It is not some remote aim of the future, but the policy which must be made the basis of our own Alliance, for the purposes of the war itself, and to the end that we may use our victory effectively by coming to the Peace Table a united and cohesive League. If this is not already an accomplished fact when we do come to the settlement, the disruptive tendencies within the Alliance may well be intensified, and our problems of justice and security become insoluble. Return to the old relation-

ships after the war will sooner or later doom the democratic nations, however powerful each may be individually, to subjugation in detail by a group, inferior in power but superior in material unity—a unity which autocracy achieves at the cost of freedom and human worth.

The term “democratic internationalism” as the condition of Allied success is not a mere playing with words. Any understanding between nations, even for the purpose of a temporary alliance or war co-operation, is, of course, “internationalism” of a kind. But the term used here means more than that; it means that as a condition of our success we must abandon the international relationship which has generally wrecked Alliances formed for the purposes of war in the past, and substitute for that relationship a different one, in which certain of the prevailing conceptions of neutrality, national sovereignty, and independence must be modified.

The newer policy can only become opera-

tive as the result of an "act of faith"—the conviction, that is, on the part of statesmen and public that the risks involved in the new are less than those involved in the old. So long as nations do not believe in the possibility or reliability of a new system, they will fall back upon covert or overt competition for preponderant power, territory, and strategic position which of itself creates the disruptive rivalry, anarchy, and suspicion, that destroy reliance upon agreement. By our own act in such a case, we create the very conditions which we urge as justification for the act. The one thing which alone will enable us to break the vicious circle is the general conviction that though the proposed system may fail, the old certainly will. Upon the moral courage to act on that faith depends the survival of the Western Democracies.

The history of the Grand Alliance during three and a half years of war abundantly illustrates the thesis just outlined. The secret treaties published by the Bolshevik government sufficiently reveal the nature of the

statecraft upon which that Alliance from the first was based.¹

Let us note the process of disintegration inherent in a statecraft which puts all the emphasis on territorial aims.

Italy was to be allowed to convert the Adriatic into an Italian lake by annexations in Dalmatia, the Ægean, and Asia Minor, which not only did violence to the principle of the rights of nationalities, but would be certain to bring her into conflict with the Southern Slavs and the Greeks, whose goodwill was essential to the success of Allied policy in the Balkans. Roumania was to have territories which she did not even profess were Roumanian. Tsarist Russia was not only to have Constantinople (which, of itself, in the opinion of a good many judges would in a few years

¹ Will the reader please note here that the present writer emphasizes at several stages in this argument the fact that the real lesson to be drawn from those treaties is not a moral blame of the states involved. Rather is the conclusion emphasized that however much those states might have desired to avoid the character of engagement into which they drifted, it was impossible for them to do so given the international system which obtained.

inevitably have caused another Balkan War, throwing Balkan States against the policy of the Allies and under Austro-German influence) but was to have a free hand in the adjustment of Germany's eastern border, and to be allowed to annex, not only German Poland, but East Prussia as well. In return for this, Russia would allow France a free hand on the west, implying not only the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, but the indefinite occupation by France of all the German territories west of the Rhine. Germany was thus to be shorn both west and east. Austria, as Mr. Lloyd George proclaimed publicly, was to be "torn limb from limb." (What was not so loudly proclaimed was that some of the pieces were to be incorporated into foreign bodies.) Albania, whose national integrity the Allies had solemnly recognized in 1913, was to be dismembered. Serbs—as well as Magyars—were to go to Roumania. On the other side of the world Japan was acquiring a position in China that certainly promised grave trouble for the future. To the territorial demands

must be added the economic ones outlined at the Paris Conference: commercial discrimination against the enemy, his exclusion from access to raw material which had heretofore (as in the Lorraine ore fields) been the life-blood of his industry.

These claims of the Grand Alliance were of course familiar to the enemy peoples long before they were made familiar to us by the Petrograd publications. The enemy governments, availing themselves of that nationalist myopia which patriotism in all countries counts a virtue, had no difficulty in persuading their people that these aims of the Allies more than justified the statement that the Central Empires were fighting for their existence—a claim they supported in the economic sense by pointing to the Paris Economic Conference and the very free rein given in Allied countries early in the war to chauvinist newspapers that daily planned the partition of Germany. But the greater evil contained in these treaties, as we shall see, was that they became a very large element in the alienation of the Russian

Revolution from the Western Democracies¹ (aiding in the drift of power to the extremist party) and so in the greatest breach so far suffered by the Alliance; and a large element also in the alienation from the governments and the cause of the war of radical and socialist opinion within Allied countries, a further cause of Allied weakness and disintegration.

One misapprehension already referred to should be emphasized. Not only is no pur-

¹ Mr. Don Levine, the author of *The Russian Revolution*, for instance, writes:

" . . . The Russian people cling passionately to the hope of a German revolution. This hope cannot be destroyed by ignoring it. It can be destroyed by putting it to the test. And the Russians have been begging France and Britain for months to put it to the test, but in vain. The Russians wanted to show the German people that the Allies were fighting only for the democratization of Germany . . . thus exposing the falsehood of the Kaiser's claim that the Allies were intent upon destroying Germany.

"The secret of Kerensky's fall is the failure of his government to make the Allies subscribe to the Russian peace formula. Particularly it was the failure of the Foreign Minister Terestchenko. There is no doubt in any Russian mind that had Terestchenko pursued a vigorous foreign policy and succeeded in bringing to the attention of the Allied Governments the vital need of their joining Russia and the United States in a restatement of war aims, the Maximalists would never have succeeded in overthrowing Kerensky."—*Boston Globe*.

pose served by making these revelations of the secret treaties the ground for railing and girding at diplomats or for indulging in recrimination, but we shall misread the real nature of the trouble by so doing. The condition of things here exposed is not due to the criminal "Imperialism" of any Ally or to the special wickedness of diplomats. The important thing to note in all these intrigues is that diplomats and peoples alike were helpless in the grip of a system. They may have had a common responsibility for the

Other authorities have borne similar testimony.

The New Europe, whose motto is "Pour la Victorie integrale," Dec. 6th, says:

"It is at least arguable—we believe it to be demonstrable—that the Bolshevik campaign against Kerensky was largely assisted by the suspicion that Russia's Allies still harboured designs for which the new Russian democracy repudiated all responsibility. A shrewd political strategist would have grasped the fact that new Russia required new assurances, which could only be given at a collective Conference of the Allies. No such sagacious counsellor arose in London to make the plea; and the opportunity which remained open throughout the summer, passed from our grasp in the autumn when Kerensky fell.

Mr. H. N. Brailsford who has followed events closely in Russia, says: "The arrival in Petrograd of the news that the promised Inter-Allied Conference would not deal with war aims was the signal for the launching of the Bolshevik revolution."

perpetuation of that system in the past. But given its existence no results other than those we have seen were possible. Even though the motives of avarice or lust of power had been entirely absent—which in the case of the Western Democracies we can well believe to be the fact—there is one justifiable and overwhelming motive which would have prompted the same policy: and that motive is national self-preservation.

Take the case of Italy as an illustration.

In a world in which each state must look to its relative strength alone for security, Italy certainly was justified in asking for naval command of the Eastern Mediterranean, and so the deep harbours of the Dalmatian coast and coaling stations in the Greek Islands and on the coast of Asia Minor. Given the anarchy which we have known in the past and the absence of any real Society of Nations, there was no other course which a patriotic Italian statesman could take. In justification of Italy's action Signor Vincenzo de Santo writes as follows:

Italy knew very well that even a weak Austria and a weak Germany would have constituted a great danger for her after a few years of recuperation.

In drawing up her treaty, therefore, Italy had to consider two main points: that is, the balance of power in the Mediterranean and the ability of protecting herself from aggressive action on the part of the Teutonic empires, which, as she thought, would certainly take place a few years after the conclusion of the war. The first point meant her prestige as a European power, and the second concerned her national safety.

Looking at the question from this angle, which, so far as I can see, is the only right angle, it is difficult to conceive how Italy could be accused of imperialistic aims. No one, I am certain, could reasonably expect her to be magnanimous to the extent of willingly putting herself in a state of inferiority in relation to the other Mediterranean powers and of exposing herself to danger which undoubtedly would have been fatal to her. That would have been not magnanimity but downright folly. . . .

As for Dalmatia and its islands it must be remembered that Italy will not be safe if they remain in the possession of a hostile power. The Italian coast on the Adriatic is shallow and devoid of natural harbours. On the other hand, the Dal-

matian coast is rich with hiding-places for enemy war vessels. A proof of Italy's inferiority on the Adriatic is found in the fact that in the present war, although the Austria high seas fleet is bottled up in Pola, small units of the enemy's navy have found it very easy to raid the Italian coasts on several occasions. When the treaty was made the Allies had full knowledge of this condition, and for that reason the Italian claim on Dalmatia was granted.¹

All of which is perfectly true. Under the system of defence by competitive power, a nation is perpetually placed in the alterna-

¹ *New York Times*, March 4, 1918:

Signor Bevione, who, acting for the Foreign Minister Sonnino, read Italy's secret treaty to the Chamber of Deputies on the 16th of February, made the following statement:

"Italian diplomacy comes out the least hurt from the revelations of the Bolsheviki. Our Government is the one that has shown itself the least imperialistic, the least annexationist, and the most repelled by the unscrupulous methods of old diplomacy."

The New Europe of December 13, 1917, says:

"The full significance of Trotski's action in publishing the diplomatic documents within their reach has not yet been realized in England. They have dealt a deadly blow at the methods of the old diplomacy, and we believe that the effects of that blow are likely to be far-reaching and permanent. Thus, though we regard the Bolshevik leaders as political desperadoes and utterly reprobate their whole policy and outlook, we are grateful to them for letting light into the dark places of Allied

tive either of denying the national rights of others or endangering its own. And under that system the better patriot and diplomat a statesman is, the more damage he does. The less entitled, in terms of nationality and international right, a country may be to a given piece of territory, the greater is the diplomatic triumph of its annexation if such annexation adds to the conqueror's national security. They are the things for which diplomats are ennobled: and they are also the things which make future wars inevitable.

diplomacy. It may be that some of the worst 'secrets' which they have unveiled had already leaked out in many quarters, but they have supplied a wealth of detail such as will, when public opinion has once had proper time to assimilate it, show up in its true light the indecision, and too often the cynicism, which the accepted leaders of every European nation has found it convenient to conceal behind lofty moral platitudes and empty assurances of loyalty.

"These revelations should clear the air. They render inevitable, not indeed that repudiation of solemn treaty pledges at which certain pacifist organs are already beginning to hint, but a careful reconsideration and restatement of the Allied war aims as a whole. Trotski has made clear to all the world what was already known to many, that there was a difference between the public and private profession of the various Powers; and though that difference is not as great as he and others would like us to believe, it is none the less real and must be promptly eliminated."

It is sometimes said: "Why rake these things up? Why reflect upon our conduct? We don't make things better by reminding ourselves of them."

Let the reason for so doing be made quite clear. It is not for the purpose of passing a moral judgment, but because the system which makes them inevitable is a source of weakness to us and of strength to the enemy.

Mr. Arthur Bullard writing before the American entrance into the war, said:

No one knows with any certainty, what is going on in the diplomatic councils of the Allies. And it is one of the most obvious arguments against such secrecy that it encourages all sorts of rumours, invites all the most sinister forms of intrigue. The Germans are, of course, taking advantage of this. . . . An inexplicable mystery has surrounded the entry of Italy into the war. First she declared war on Austria-Hungary. Months later she declared war on Turkey. Whether or not she is at war with Germany is uncertain. That intrigue is rife over this equivocal situation is certain. The lack of frankness lends itself to the most sinister suspicions. Such *mal-ententes* are promising soil

for German diplomats to plant the seed of discord.

Unfortunately diplomatic history is only too full of rank treacheries and brutalities, and some are so recent that it takes a very large optimism to hope for a complete reformation in so short a time.

All that can be said with certainty is that no disloyalty between allies would be so raw as not to find ample precedent in history, that the interests of the Allies—aside from waging this war to victory—are far from identical; that there are manifest tendencies towards discord which increase with time, and may become acute as soon as the fighting ceases; and that it is the obvious thing for the German diplomats to study these tendencies towards dissension and encourage them.¹

But we don't dispose of the danger by being silent about it. We make it worse.

Precisely the character of argument which justifies Italian action in Dalmatia, justifies Japanese action in Siberia (and Germany's in Russia); and the ultimate effects upon the unity of the Alliance and the resistance of the enemy is the same.

¹ *The Diplomacy of the Great War* (Macmillan), p. 232.

Italy's course was justifiable; but it began the disintegration of the Alliance. It inevitably alienated the Southern Slavs (to justify her policy Italian public opinion had to deny the genuineness of the Southern Slav movement), in the face of the fact that the goodwill of the Southern Slavs was essential to the Allied plan of creating independent states, strong internally by their racial and national homogeneity and resting upon the common aspirations of the Slav world, as a reliable barrier to the expansion eastward of the Teutonic power. The Italian policy increased the difficulty of any attempt to detach Austria from dependence upon Germany, and checked the tendency to thoroughgoing rebellion of Slav elements, thus helping Austria to maintain her "ramshackle empire," and to use Slav troops to fight on the Italian front, and even to put them under Slav commanders. Moreover it stood, as we know, in the way of the creation of a "single military front." The Italian aims not representing a common interest of the Alliance—rather the reverse—the Italian cam-

paing was not, until disaster had overtaken it, an integral part of the common effort.¹ Italy's programme alienated her own radicals and socialists and caused her to oppose the free expression of radical or socialist opinion in Allied countries. It was Italian opposition that accounted largely for the action of British and French governments in opposing the Stockholm Conference, after they had first favoured it. The Italian position thus added

¹ Nor has the cost of our lack of internationalization been confined to the Italian front. Two remarkable passages stand out in Mr. Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on April 9, 1918. In the first of these there is 'he plain statement that the German advance was not to be accounted for by superiority in men. "The combatant strength of the whole of the German army on the Western front was only approximately, though not quite, equal to the total strength of the Allies in infantry. . . . They were slightly inferior in artillery. They were considerably inferior in cavalry. . . . They were undoubtedly inferior in aircraft." There was one factor alone in which the enemy was undoubtedly superior: unity of command. "In so far as the enemy has triumphed he has triumphed mainly because of superior unity and the concentration of his strategic plans." Mr. George added: "It was reported to me on good authority that the Kaiser informed ex-King Constantine 'I shall beat them for they have no united command.'" Mr. George went on to declare that the obstacles presented to Allied unity "by national prejudices and national interests" were "almost insurmountable." Yet that unity was "the fundamental condition of victory."

enormously to the difficulties of the Allies in handling the already difficult Russian situation and placed the whole Alliance in a false position in its relation to the Revolution.¹

But even if that conference had been held,

¹ In *The New Europe* of Nov. 22, which at an earlier stage of the war seemed to be an opponent of the League of Nations policy, but which has since become an advocate of it, Edoardo Giretti, writes on *Italy and the Allies: and the Single Front*, as follows:

"This is not the moment for recrimination. The responsibility for error and disaster falls not upon this Ally or that, but belongs to them all, because of the fact that all of them, more or less, have sinned in the same way, having failed in the spirit of the old diplomacy bound to the principles of secrecy and of 'The Balance of Powers' adequately to perceive the true character of this war, which is a sheer undertaking of collective international defence enforced upon peace-loving democracies of the world by the brutal lust of conquest and domination of a feudal autocracy.

"But all our war aims, the greatest as well as the least, are now endangered by our failure to recognize the principle of the single front, both in politics and in strategy. . . . What profit is it to France or to Great Britain to add some new slice of territory to their colonial empires in Africa or Asia? What gain is it to Italy to extend her sway over the whole of Dalmatia or to concur in the division of Asia Minor if in so doing she violates the principles of liberty and nationality which are her purest glory and the very reason of her existence as a great and civilized nation in the world? . . . Continued stubbornness in pursuing that course of politics would simply mean the complete failure of the general programme of the Entente. It sends a message of good cheer to the enemy; for the Central Powers could wish nothing better."

the statecraft which forms the background of the secret treaties would have stood in the way of the accomplishment of its object—the detachment of enemy radicals from the support of their government. We see here the way in which the principles of that statecraft not only tend to disintegrate the Alliance, but to unify the enemy. The underlying assumption that national security must be based upon preponderant individual power compels us to make upon the enemy a demand which in terms of our own doctrine is an unjustifiable one, namely that he shall accept a position of manifest inferiority in power, that is to say of national insecurity. The assumption that nothing but individual power can protect a nation compels the German, even though detesting his military institutions, to resist defeat in order to preserve his only means of future self-defence. The failure of the Allies early in the war to reveal any workable or obvious substitute for national power as a means of defence converted the aggressive war of the German

Government, into the defensive war of the German people, and so played the game of the enemy autocracy. The policy which disintegrated us united the enemy.

For this relation between internationalism and democracy on the one side, and autocracy and territorial consolidation in disregard of nationality on the other, is organic, not accidental. The great experiment of political freedom, the "self-determination of peoples," the independence of separate national groups, implies necessarily the growth of separatist tendencies which, if unchecked by the voluntary and self-imposed discipline of an international order, will make co-operation or a common centralized direction, even for self-protection, impossible. Contrariwise, autocracy grows by the strength of a central power, and is able to impose common action and centralized direction upon the different national units over which it has succeeded in asserting dominion (sometimes historically just because the smaller units were incapable of self-directing co-operation and were split

by irreconcilable differences). The enemy, by reason of the very circumstances of his historical development and the philosophy which his experiment (as against ours) involves, has less need than ourselves of a policy which will unify by voluntary action many states widely separated in character and geographical distance, and ensure their common effort toward a common end. As already noted, the special position, geographical, economical, historical, and political of one state in the enemy Alliance ensures a centralized direction by virtue of power and authority, and enables the group to dispense with that voluntary, democratic internationalism which alone will enable the western group to hold its own.

And there is little in European history to show that consolidation will come of itself *par la force des choses*, without conscious effort.

Although that history, century after century, taught that predominant military power always led to aggression by its possessor, Europe has never been able to deal as a unit

with this common problem.¹ The democracies had no concerted policy with reference to it in 1914. The Alliance was not formed with reference to the common need, but each member came into it for his own particular purposes, Russia for one purpose, Japan for a second, Italy for a third, Roumania for a fourth.

Democratic Europe was quite unprepared on the political side for its common task. Indifference before the war to international co-operation rendered the policy adopted during the war inevitable. While we were doubtlessly sincere in our professions that we were fighting the cause of democracy and national right against autocracy, we failed to see that our refusal to take any sufficient steps to end the old system of Europe made those professions often absurd. In a war for democracy and national right we were perfectly content to make agreements with a Tsarist govern-

¹ The nearest that it came to it perhaps was in the crusades. Subsequent attempts to deal with the Turkish horror did not reveal any similar degree of unity among the nations of Europe.

ment (which we did hesitate afterwards to admit to be the implacable foe of democracy), giving it a free hand to deal as it pleased with the Polish question, although its record on that question showed it to be as shamefully anti-national in its tendencies as any government in the world. In the arrangements with it before the war neither France nor Britain treated with any practical sympathy the aspirations of the Russian people, as expressed in the revolutionary movement. Over and over again Russian Liberals and Radicals had asked the French and British governments to make financial aid to the Tsarist régime conditional upon the recognition of popular right. These demands were disregarded. The governments of the British and French democracies were quite ready to ally themselves with the Russian government, whatever its character, as earlier they had been allied with the Turkish. They still in fact retained the old diplomatic attitude that the people did not matter. We failed altogether to establish the democratic unity of the Alliance, and our policy was such that

neither Poland, nor Finland, nor the mass of the democracy in Russia made really much distinction between what it might expect from the victory of a Tsarist Russia in alliance with the Western Democracies, and the victory of Germany. Finland, indeed, at the beginning of the war, on the whole, hoped more from Germany's victory than from ours. The result was that our own neglect to make the moral issues completely clear and to base our policy upon those issues, prepared the ground for the disunity of aim in Russia upon which later the German autocracy traded with such disastrous effect. Had our statecraft realized that the issues of conflict were moral more than territorial, and in the years preceding the war had refused (as one instance only of a measure of policy) financial aid to Petrograd until concessions had been made to Finland, Poland, and parliamentary constitutionalism, the subsequent story of the relations with Russia would have been very different. But we adhered to the old view, that alliances are simply alliances of governments.

We did not hesitate to shoulder very grave responsibilities concerning the Russian Government's territorial aims; we refused altogether to concern ourselves with the aspirations of the Russian, Finnish, or Polish peoples. Our great preoccupation with the territorial aims and our disregard of the moral and democratic aims reflects not, it may be, upon the sincerity of our public professions in 1914 that this was a war for democracy and national right, but upon our understanding of what those things really involved for the purposes of Allied unity and of the way in which the co-operation of democracies must differ from the old diplomatic contact of states.

It is fashionable just now to speak as though the present preponderance of Germany were ascribable simply to our inertia before the war in the matter of military preparation. If only England and America, it is urged, had adopted universal military service, Germany would have been deterred, or the war would now have ended in her defeat.

But no assumption could disregard facts more completely. The possession of greater power by the present Allies would only have deterred Germany had she known beforehand with practical certainty that that power would be used against her in the event of her taking a certain line. But the condition of Europe in the ten or fifteen years preceding the war was such that Germany was justified in assuming that it was unlikely to be brought against her. Less than two decades before the war, Mr. Chamberlain was talking of an alliance with Germany, and the more popular British press of "rolling France in blood and mud." Had Britain possessed a great conscript army in the early years of the twentieth century, or a little before; and her government and policy taken a somewhat more belligerent and militarist tone in consequence of the added power of military influences, it is extremely unlikely that the long series of quarrels with France could have ended without collision; that the Dogger Bank incident would have ended without a break; that the rapprochement with

both France and Russia would have taken place. So with America. It is all but universally admitted that the possession of a great military establishment at the time of the long, wearying, and somewhat humiliating relations with Mexico in the three or four years preceding the war, would have made it impossible to resist the demand for occupation and pacification. If a Boer population of less than half a million could absorb something like half a million British soldiers—in a war lasting three years—how many American soldiers would the pacification of thirteen million Mexicans, and the hostility of Spanish America, absorb? Nor do we know how such a conflict would have affected the position of Japan.

These may seem today remote contingencies. But they were not remote contingencies in the period preceding the war. There was not a student of politics in Europe who would not have said that what has actually happened in Russia was immeasurably less likely than American entrance into Mexico, the

adhesion of Italy to the Triple Alliance, an Anglo-French war over Fashoda, or an Anglo-Russian one over the Dogger Bank affair.

The assertion now so common that greater armaments on the part of the western democracies during the past generation would have prevented this war, indicates a kind of political thinking which simply robs the future of all hope--hope, not alone of a freer world but of real success in dealing with the danger that has forced war upon us. The assertion implies that we can return to the old international anarchy provided only that it is a still more heavily armed anarchy. Such a policy would deliver the future not alone to militarism, but to Prussian militarism. For the western democracies to be armed but quarrelling among themselves is the condition, which, above all others, the German military caste would desire. It ensures that the political system of Europe shall be rooted in militarism; it renders German armaments inevitable; prevents the realization of socialist or internationalist systems; furnishes excuse

for wars of aggression under the guise of defence, and yet ensures that there shall be no real preponderance of European power against Germany.

The first condition of the successful restraint of German aggression before the war would have been for the western nations to have realized that Germany was the common enemy. But such a realization could only have come as the result of dropping the rivalries among the non-German nations; which would have involved an internationalist conception of Europe. There was no such conception generally current outside doctrinaire socialist circles. The nationalist impulse expressed itself in a popular attitude which made us all enemies one of another. Quarrelling with a foreign nation was always popular in every country. In the generation which preceded the war we were accustomed to have the French railing at the English, the English at the French; American politicians winning votes by tail-twisting, varied by the parade of the Japanese peril;⁴ we had great

English writers painting the ever-impending Russian peril, "the bear that walked like a man." In such an international atmosphere, how could Germany be aught but one enemy of many, and how could common action against her be devised?

Had our nationalist prejudices been sufficiently modified, and had an honest attempt been made to create a real international society and to endow it with democratic organs, one of two things must have happened: the German autocracy would have been unable to resist the demand of its own people to make part of that society, or, Germany would have revealed herself plainly as the one unit standing out against the purposes of western civilization. That would have led the way to really united and effective action against her.

European unity could never have come from a mere alliance of sovereign states; a bargain between governments. To have succeeded it must have rested upon a union of the peoples as well. It is because we made no institutional provision for the co-operation of

peoples, as distinct from governments, that we were in no position to handle the Russian revolution when it came. And that wrecked all our calculations. In considering the place of Russia in our alliance, we thought simply in terms of the military forces of the government. We put down on paper the fact that the potential army of Russia was ten million men, or some such number, and talked about the steam roller; but did not apparently put down the fact that the growing forces of revolution which we were systematically slighting by such things as our refusal to make financial aid to the Tsar's government conditional upon certain reforms, by our delivery of Russian political refugees to the Russian police, our own police action against them in certain cases, our conscription of them in the early part of the war to fight for a government which they desired to destroy, and so forth, were all contributing to the destruction of that army as a fighting force.

It will be urged that no one could possibly have foreseen the events of the revolution,

and that any idea of the western states taking sides in the internal conflicts of Russia would have been fatal to the establishment of any alliance with her.

Let both points be granted. And again I must remind the reader that the effort now being made is not to pronounce judgments for the purpose of assigning blame, but for the purpose of profiting by past mistakes. No one perhaps could have foreseen the Russian revolution. But it warns us not to ignore similar forces at work elsewhere. We could not establish any sort of contact with the Russian democracy without getting into trouble with the Russian Government. That is why proposals for somewhat radical changes in the representation of European nations in international affairs are here made. It should be our object to change a method of contact between states which in fact has smashed our Alliance.

The same lesson is driven home, in some respects even more suggestively by the history of the Austro-Italian Alliance; of the relations

of Italy with the Allies and with the Jugoslavs. Neither the Alliance with Austria—that “*accouplement contre nature*” as some Frenchman indecently but vividly described it—nor the secret Treaties of 1915, nor the attitude of Jugoslavia, things which between them have played so enormously into the enemy’s hands, would have been possible if the contacts had been as between peoples instead of governments and had been marked by publicity instead of secrecy. For nearly four years we have witnessed the miracle of a government like Austria able to send hundreds of thousands of its subjects into battle to die for a cause that they loathe. There is hope now—at the beginning of 1918—that an end may be put to that monstrous situation and that the West may be able to enter into effective alliance with the subject peoples of Austria for their liberation: that, in other words, the disintegration of Austria may become a fact. Two outstanding circumstances have marked this development, and contributed without doubt towards it. One

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is the publicity given by the Bolsheviks to the secret treaty of April 26, 1915; and the other is the Subject Races Conference held in Rome in April, 1918. The first event prepared the way for the second. Publicity compelled revision of the Italian attitude towards Jugoslavia and finally made possible an understanding, not with the government of Austria, but with great sections of its people. And that contact of peoples as distinct from governments, a form of representation which enables us to get nearer to national and democratic aspirations, may possibly show the way to a political strategy which will transfer the advantage from the enemy to us—assuming that we have the wisdom to profit by the lessons of the past and follow up our advantage.

But indications elsewhere are not so hopeful. There is a danger that European Labour and socialist parties—which, whether we like it or not, are destined to be the most powerful political groups of tomorrow—may come to regard American Labour as the Allies of

European reaction. It was an analagous misapprehension which contributed to complicate disastrously the relations of the West with Russia. But instead of attempting to profit by our mistakes in Russia we seem to be in danger of making them all over again in the management of the contacts of European Radicalism with American democracy. The delegation expressly chosen by the Conference (of February 25, 1918) representing the immense preponderance of the Labour and socialist parties in Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy is discouraged or prevented from visiting America. But there is sent to America, as representatives of British Labour, a delegation which the British Labour Party repudiates. There goes from America a delegation from which is carefully excluded just those elements in American Radical opinion that favour the European Labour attitude. The attempt is thus made to keep from both the European and American publics, a knowledge of the real nature of the European movement—just as was done in the case of the

Russian Revolution. American Labour as represented by the American Federation of Labour, is led to support one particular party in British Labour politics as against another—but to support the party which most certainly is not destined to come to power.

The British Labour Party is relatively a vastly more powerful body today than were the revolutionary parties of Russia in 1916. It is in close co-operation with hardly less powerful Labour and socialist bodies in France and Italy. These inter-Allied forces stand in common for a certain programme. They desire to come into contact with American Labour and socialist forces. And the governments immediately adopt the general methods they adopted in dealing with the revolutionary parties in Russia. Not only is everything done to prevent real contact between the radical elements in the various countries (which are not pro-German or anti-war elements as the programme of the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference in London

proves) but we indulge in reciprocal misrepresentation and deception.

The only effect of depriving minority opinion, whether in Britain, France, Italy, or Russia of any real representation in international "official" bodies is to drive that opinion to extra-governmental representation, as in Socialist and Labour Conferences. And the only effect of forbidding those Conferences is to intensify the sense of grievance among the minorities—destined tomorrow perhaps to be majorities—and to create a disunion which some unforeseen circumstance may render dangerous. The unifying method would be to provide for constitutional representation of those minorities in the international field. The absence in our present machinery for handling international affairs, of anything in the nature of a European legislature or deliberative assembly, where the opposition parties in the States of our Alliance could express themselves, renders it inevitable that complex democracies should be represented by governments chosen for purely

administrative purposes and out of touch with what may be the prevailing aims of their peoples. Real unity of the western democracies cannot come from such conditions.

II

Now it is commonly argued—perhaps it is the commonest of all arguments against any constructive internationalist policy—that the moral obstacles are insurmountable; that internationalism, to any such degree as the federation of independent sovereign states, runs counter to such deep impulses, such strong political emotions, that it is bound to prove in practice quite unworkable, if indeed it should not be regarded as morally despicable, as many very able writers do declare it to be.

It is a noteworthy fact, however, that many who use the argument that the emotions of nationalism are so natural and deeply rooted as to be incapable of change, reveal their very evident fear that, on the contrary, the motives of nationalism may change too rapidly

and give way to others. Chauvinist writers on both sides of the Atlantic are just now urging a campaign of ruthless repression against certain forms of the socialist revolution because they tell us such threaten to undermine and weaken our patriotism. And, without any sort of doubt their fears are at this moment well founded. The emphasis of motives is being shifted from the narrowly nationalist, geographically political, to the more universally social and economic.

No one who knows anything at all of what is moving among the workers in England and France and Italy (to the least degree of all perhaps in America) can doubt this stirring of a new feeling throughout the world. It may not take catastrophic forms, as it did in Russia; but the same ferment is at work.

What is the bearing of these forces upon the problem of our struggle with Germany—upon that unification of the Western world, which is our immediate problem; and upon the detachment of the enemy peoples from the support of their governments?

It is here suggested that (1) this ferment is actually an element of dangerous disintegration within our alliance; (2) it might be made one of integration; (3) to serve this end an organic change in the method of international representation is indispensable; (4) this method—to be presently indicated—would facilitate very greatly the detachment of the enemy peoples from their autocratic government.

We should realize the extent to which the major motives in international politics are shifting from the political to the economic or social ground; and the extent to which such a change renders obsolete our present methods of handling international affairs—the method which necessarily assumes each of the geographical areas we call “nations” to be a political social or moral unit.

The world is not yet in a position to interpret the Russian revolution—to know even what took place. But among a mass of uncertainties a few things are certain. One is

that the vast mass of the people of Russia, as well as the active authors of the revolution, are indifferent to the political aims of old Russia—the possession of Constantinople, the penetration of Persia, and so forth. The revolution was social and economic as much as political. And the evidence for that is to be found not merely in the declarations of the Socialists and the Bolsheviks, but in the conduct of the Bourgeoisie. The salient, the illuminative fact about the armed struggle now in progress between the Ukrainians—or the Rada party of Ukrania—and the Bolsheviks is that the “Whites” of Ukrania, like those of Finland, have called in the Germans to help them fight the “Reds.” Little Russians are now being led by German officers against the Bolshevik Russians of the north. The son of Leo Tolstoy begins an article in an American paper with these words: “I shall be glad for Russia when the Germans take Petrograd. It will upset the Bolsheviks.”

All the evidence now coming from Russia

goes to confirm the fact that that represents the attitude not alone of the Rada party in the Ukraine and the Germanized land-owners of Courland, Esthonia, and Lithuania, but of practically the whole bourgeois order of European Russia.¹

Note what it signifies in the case of Finland and of Russia. The Finns are a nationality that have struggled for the best part of a century for their political independence. But

¹ "In the south the German advance continues. Here the Germans are present on the invitation of the Ukrainian Rada. It has been undertaken within the borders of the Ukraine and with the Rada's sanction for the purpose of overthrowing the Soviet power.

"General Muravieff who lately commanded the Soviet troops in the south gives a vivid account of the German occupation. The remains of the old Eighth Army offered no resistance to the German occupation of Shmerinka. The only troops that fought well were the sailors and the First Army, which is composed, not of peasant soldiers, but of class conscious workmen from the industrial districts.

"This is quite natural, and the formation of a large fighting army by the Soviets is impossible until the Germans by their definite support of the propertied against the poorer classes force similar class consciousness upon the peasants. This, however, they seem to be doing. The methods of the German punitive expeditions are awakening much of the consciousness among their own soldiers who in many cases are refusing to obey orders." —Despatch from Petrograd by Mr. Arthur Ransome, to *New York Times*, March 29, 1918.

an element within that state—the Bolsheviks—desire an economic change which might menace the institution of private property. Immediately the bourgeois classes that have been most insistent upon political independence surrender that object and make common cause with a foreign—and enemy—power against a class of their fellow countrymen. In the case of Russia it is the party (the old régime, the Bourgeoisie) which in 1914 was most in favour of the war against Germany that welcomes Germany as a deliverer when their estates or property are threatened. The motives have plainly shifted from the political to the economic plane; and the alignment of forces correspondingly.¹

Let us see how such re-alignment affects

¹ Parenthetically it would be well perhaps to forestall a possible misunderstanding. In a former section it was assumed that the major motive actuating the nations in their relations one with another was the national motive: desire for national, political security. That is a sound assumption. We are here examining, not the complete accomplishment but the process of change from that motive. The classes or parties in the Western Democracies that have attained governmental power are still actuated by the older type of political, nationalist motive.

the political strategy of the war, and the attainment of its object.

Finland represented typically the cause of the rights of nationality, of small states, which it was peculiarly the object of this war to vindicate. Let us assume the Western Allies entirely victorious, and not alone Finland, but Roumania, Serbia, and the lesser Balkan states fully established in their independence. A Russian Socialist Federal Republic is also successfully established. In Great Russia it is economically Bolshevik—confiscatory or communist—say, in its land policy. The endowment of the peasantry with the property of the land-owners is accomplished. In the states in which Junkerthum is better organized—in Ukrainia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Courland—the present system remains. But we know perfectly well that the communist movement rapidly spreads among a landless peasantry. It would spread—has indeed already spread—to the very oligarchical, almost feudal state of Roumania. The position of the land-owners and bourgeois class then

is this: if those states are dominated by Germany, their estates and property will be secure; if by Russia, lost. We know from what has actually happened, even during a bitterly contested war, what will happen. There will arise a Russian party which is socialist, and a German party which is junker and bourgeois.

If the Western Allies are to support the forces hostile to Germany they must be prepared to support, not "Ukrainia" or "Roumania"—those terms in the circumstances have become meaningless—but one party or the other, which means one economic system or the other.

As a matter of recent history the Western Allies have consistently supported the bourgeois parties, which inevitably were bound, in the circumstances of the case, to be in the long run pro-German. Before the war, France, despite most earnest protestations on the part of the Russian revolutionists, lent immense sums to the Tsarist Government—sums which were used for the actual purpose of

suppressing Russian revolutions. During the war, the bourgeois parties, whether Tsarist or republican, were recognized by the Allies; the socialist parties opposed. The movement of Kaledines during the Kerensky régime was approved; the Bolsheviks bitterly, ferociously, derided. It is commonly reported that the bourgeois Ukrainian Rada was supported by an Anglo-French loan at the very time that it was arranging to call in German aid against the Red Guards of the Socialist North.¹

Now there are two facts to be noted in the relations of the Grand Alliance to the Russian Revolution. First, that though the political ideals of the Western Democracies are much more in sympathy with those of the Russian revolution than are those of Germany, it is German diplomacy which has made most efficient use of the moral factors in the Russian situation; and secondly, our

¹ I have heard this from both American and French financiers, and the statement has been made by English papers, but official confirmation is wanting.

failure to make equivalent use of those factors has been due in large part to the situation created by our recourse to the old diplomacy and the consequent entanglements of the secret treaties.

M. Chéradame, the French publicist, declares that the disruption of Russia "was brought about, not by force of arms but by means of a moral propaganda, carried on by speech or in print." But why was Germany alone able to carry on this propaganda? We had not only the more democratic cause but for the three years of our Alliance we had a facility and openness of access denied after all to the Germans. Here were two factors in our favour, yet the German effort succeeded and ours failed.

We know now the salient which was left open to German attack in this moral struggle for the capture of the Russian political soul. For reasons just indicated the mass of Russians, inspired with a new social and economic vision, and having themselves renounced territorial aggrandizement and "imperialist"

aims, were not ready to jeopardize the revolution and its aims by a long-continued war on behalf of what the Germans alleged to be (and which we did not sufficiently counter) a policy of European imperialism, the very success of which would spell the defeat of all that was vital and real to them in the revolutionary programme. The starting point of the German propaganda in Russia, to which M. Chéradame refers, was the suggestion: "The Allied aims are imperialistic; their success will make your revolutionary aims impossible of realization." Hints as to the nature of the secret treaties were freely scattered. Already under Miliukoff one heard the demand "publish the secret treaties." The effective counter to the German propaganda would have been to show the falseness of the assertion upon which it was based.

Kerensky made it plain that in order to hold Russia even passively to the Alliance, there would have to be a restatement of aims which would clearly show the parties of the

Left that the Alliance was not fighting for an imperialist Europe that would make a socialist Russia impossible.

Why was that clear re-statement of aims, despite many promises, never made by the Allies?

The nature of the secret treaties—and it cannot be too often and too insistently pointed out that those treaties were fully justified by the needs of the national security of the nations involved so long as nothing better than the old Balance of Power scheme of Europe could be devised—sufficiently supplied the answer.

To summarize the conclusions thus far established:

Events have in some measure compelled us to recognize what evidently was not clear before, that though the power of the Alliance obviously depends, not merely upon the military forces of each constituent state, but also upon the capacity to combine those forces for a common purpose, that collective

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unity cannot be taken for granted. We may unintentionally develop a policy bound to destroy it.

We have seen already that unity is impossible by the old methods of statecraft and diplomacy; and that the only alternative is for nations to cease their competition for individual power one with another, and trust for their security instead to co-operation for reciprocal protection. But such a method, being only a project, an aspiration, a "dream," no one regards it as reliable or feasible; so each falls back upon competition for territory and power, which provokes instability within the groups, and thus makes the general agreement still more remote. Our scepticism sets up the very conditions which we cite as its justification.

The ultimate fact in our problem, therefore, is a moral one. The chief obstacles to the abolition of the old disintegrating policy and the success of the new, are not mainly physical, like difficulty of communication over wide distance (which mechanical development has

in large measure met), but moral and intellectual difficulties, the mental habits, opinions, and impulses of men, which have not kept pace with the changes wrought by our progress in mechanical contrivance. Our management of matter has altogether outstripped our management of human relationships, of our own minds and natures.

Yet that the moral forces are capable of change we have the testimony not only of those who desire the change but of those who do not.

We are dealing with two currents of feeling and opinion: the old impulses and feelings of nationalism, at present controlling governments; and the newer social and economic forces, menacing governments; both make for the disintegration of our Alliance, and, partly at least, for the integration of the enemy.

What are the practical steps of policy to meet these conditions?

Let us take the political side of the problem first.

III

The proposals here made to meet the political situation of the Alliance are:

(1) The transformation of our Alliance into a permanent League of Nations in which two main principles shall operate: (a) That the security of each state should rest upon the combined strength of the whole League. (b) That the League shall offer to the enemy peoples this clear alternative: Admission into the League on equal terms and *protection by it*, on conforming to its conditions (which may include democratic representation in foreign affairs); or, on failure to conform to its conditions, exclusion from the benefits of the League, and, instead, the penalty of such coercive measures, economic and other which it can employ.

(2) The mechanism of such a League should provide not merely for the representation of its constituent states as geographical units and national or political entities but (by proportional representation) of the minority parties therein.

It is further suggested that the method of putting that proposal into effect might be the calling of a Public Inter-Allied Conference to draft the definite plans by which the policy outlined by Mr. Wilson could be put into practice. The Conference should show that the things emphasized in diplomatic rhetoric are indeed the things for which the war is being fought, by dealing first and foremost with these objects:

(1) Political security for every nation resting upon a League of Nations plan broadly but definitely outlined with the conditions indicated which would permit the enemy peoples to enter.

(2) Equality of economic opportunity secured by equal access to raw materials, to the economic development of backward states, to suitable seaports for land locked states, by internationalization of certain railways, rivers, and straits.

It will be noted that territorial questions are at this stage excluded. The reason for

that is to be found in almost every argument in these pages. Until the problem of national security and economic opportunity has been met, the territorial conflicts are insoluble. "Since your League of Nations is not a reality, I must have this strategic alien province, it is necessary to my defence; that province, because it contains ore. Annexation violates the principle of nationality, but you cannot ask for our suicide on behalf of the political ideals of other people." Until national sovereignty and independence, are qualified by certain international rules, to do justice to one party will be to do injustice to another: the security of one makes the insecurity of the other.

Everything so far urged points to this one great need: the making of the plan of a Society of Nations a present reality. How can our democracies co-operate in that except by some such method as an Inter-Allied Congress?

Now the need of making the League of Nations a reality is not merely admitted but

particularly emphasized by both Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson. Both, by the overwhelming emphasis of their recent pronouncements have admitted the urgent need of convincing the enemy peoples that we are not bent upon their destruction nor upon challenging their security or vital interests and that, as we shall see, must lead us to some such plan as this.

This should be noted: that the very emphasis today placed on this implies that after nearly four years of war the enemy still misconceives our objective. Otherwise why do we protest so much?

This shows that the means so far adopted to convince the enemy of the nature of our intentions have failed.

That should not surprise us. The policy has been applied by half measures—largely because it ran counter to war psychology.

The method now universally admitted as sound is the method which certain Liberal groups in Europe have long been advocating. During three years or more in Europe and

nine months or more in America public opinion—and very largely government opinion also—has derided this method as an attempt to substitute “talk,” and pacifist talk at that, for hard knocks; as based on the notion that you can fight a war with speeches. The newspapers and persons who now acclaim this policy as the highest statesmanship are precisely those who for years have been ferociously condemning the advocacy of it as sedition and pro-Germanism. Very many were so doing only a few weeks ago,¹ in their criticisms of Lord Lansdowne’s letter. Mr. Arthur Henderson, ex-member of the British War Cabinet, says of Mr. Lloyd George’s move that it is splendid—but six months late. Had this very thing been done six months ago, says Mr. Henderson—when he strongly and passionately urged it—there would have been, he thinks, no Russian defection from the Allied cause.

This “I told you so” kind of reflection would be very fatuous, if it did not carry a real

¹ Written in January, 1918.

warning and a possibly useful suggestion with reference to the question of method. Allied diplomacy has shown again and again a marked tendency to be "a day after the fair," to lag behind instead of being in advance of events; to do the right thing, not as a measure towards preventing the creation of a bad situation in the future, but as an eleventh hour attempt to mend one that has already arisen.

And the fact that it has now been adopted as the result rather of the pressure of events than of free decision due to foresight, prompts the misgiving that it may be applied haltingly, may lag behind the real needs of the situation in the thoroughness of its application. Yet if this principle is sound at all it is worth applying thoroughly. Mr. Lloyd George himself, declares that a statement of aim should show "not only the principles for which we are fighting, but also their definite and concrete application," and that mere lip service in this or that formula is useless.

Very good. We recognize the need of making the German people know that they will not suffer in any vital interest by Allied victory. But we have also been proclaiming with emphasis that the preponderance of German military power must disappear, Belgium and Servia be restored, Alsace retroceded, arbitration, limitation of armaments, and a Society of Nations arranged.

Now those general terms might easily be so applied as to mean for Germany either of two conditions: a condition of much greater security, freedom and scope of economic opportunity than she has ever known in the past; or a condition which would mean the crystallization of Allied economical and political domination in the great undeveloped areas of the world from which, in fact, Germany might in practice be excluded as from access to Lorraine ore fields by future French policy; or from even legitimate economic expansion in the near East; a condition in which Austria might be harassed by—and helpless in the presence of—a Serbian Sinn-

Feinism, an Italian Imperialism, or exclusion from any really equal access to the Mediterranean; a condition in which all-round limitation of armament might mean the permanent enclosure of Germany by an outside world commanding the sea; a Germany out-voted in every international conference, unable to talk on terms of real equality or to secure respect for her rights when it came once more to the discussion of problems like Morocco or the Bagdad railway.

But, it will be objected, the President has declared emphatically against economic discrimination to Germany's detriment. What more can the German people ask?

It cannot be too much emphasized in considering the new political strategy that it is not a question of what our intentions really are but of what they can be made to appear by enemy governments interested in putting the worst interpretation upon them, controlling the press, and controlling the "translation" of statements made by Allied spokesmen. It is no good bewailing the fact that we are

misrepresented by the enemy governments. That we must expect and make provision for. We must get around the difficulty in some way.

The centre from which most misrepresentations of our intentions, by the enemy governments, radiate is the emphasis we have put upon the "destruction of German militarism" as our major aim. The emphasis was a proper one, but if it was not to be represented as a determination to render Germany in the future impotent to defend her rights, helpless to resist the unjust claims of more powerful neighbours, we should have indicated how we propose to assure her protection.

I am perfectly aware that this is likely to be met by an explosion of impatient irritation. "Here," it will be said, "is Germany in a position of immense power, having reduced most of her neighbours, great and small alike, to helplessness. She boasts arrogantly of her victories"—and they are, in fact, most menacing—"and it is then mildly suggested that the way to deal with this arrogant,

powerful, and monstrous bully, whose strength menaces mankind, is to tell him that we—who at present are not altogether in a position to talk about what we intend to do with him—do not intend to hurt him when we have him in our power!”

And moreover, there is a distinct feeling that in such matters as the German policy on her Eastern Frontier we are confronted with an accomplished fact; that in any case it is out of the question now for the Entente, and consequently for the Germans, to assume that Germany, after the war, could be placed in a position of national danger by our policy.

Now whatever truth there may be in this it is not the characteristically military view, either German or Entente. If we assume that misgivings as to their future safety on the part of Germans must necessarily be hypocritical, it would be well to keep in mind what our own very scientific military critics believe on that point. I take one of the most distinguished, as typical. Mr. Hilaire Belloc

puts the whole point to which it is here desired to call attention, thus:

It has been well said that the most straightforward and obvious conclusions on the largest lines of military policy are those of which it is most difficult to convince a general audience, and we find in this matter a singular miscalculation running through the attitude of many Western publicists. They speak as though, whatever might happen in the West, the Alliance, which is fighting for European civilization, the Western Allies and the United States, could not now affect the destinies of Eastern Europe. They even speak as though these destinies were something remote from us, which we could afford to neglect, and as though the great German victory over Russia, which so far has proved decisive and final (for it has destroyed the fighting force opposed to it, though that destruction did not take place in the field), was now a part of history and could not now be undone.

Such an attitude is, upon the simplest principles of military science, a grotesque error. The enemy's armies will be defeated if we are victorious; his military machine, if we are victorious, will be dissolved, while ours will remain intact. If both remain intact we are not victorious; we are de-

feated. If we are victorious (and the confident prophecy of victory may be left to those who enjoy such exercises) the destruction of the enemy's military power gives us as full an opportunity for deciding the fate of Eastern Europe as it does for deciding the fate of Western Europe. *Victory gained by the Allies will decide the fate of all Europe; and, for that matter, of the whole world. It will open the Baltic and the Black Sea. It will leave us masters with the power to dictate in what fashion the new boundaries shall be arranged; how the entries to the Eastern markets shall be kept open, garrisoned and guaranteed.*

One reads sentences such as this: "Though the German armies were driven out of Northern France and Belgium, and even beaten back to the Rhine, the German domination over Eastern Europe would still be secure."

Such a judgment—and it is typical of the whole of this school—is illuminative of the minds that framed it. They would seem never to have read military history or to understand what is meant by victory and defeat. There is no question of "driving the German armies out of Northern France or "out of Belgium" or "back to the Rhine"—or to the Elbe or to the Vistula for that matter. *Wherever they are defeated, whether upon the line they now hold or upon other lines, their defeat and our victory*

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will leave us with complete power. If that task be beyond our strength then civilization has suffered defeat and there is the end of it. If by some negotiation (involving of course the evacuation of the occupied districts in the West) the enemy remains undefeated, civilized Europe has lost the war and Prussia has won it.¹

Will it be noted that the present writer does not accept these conclusions? His point is that if such a view is the honest view of an Entente military critic, it is more likely still, to be that of the German. It is in fact the attitude of the militarist type of mind, accustomed to think in terms of final and definite decision by material forces.

It is therefore the simple truth that our silence as to the position which we propose for Germany when she shall have been placed in a position of definite military inferiority enables the enemy governments to represent to its peoples as "defensive" the most mischievous and Imperialist of its policies. Nor, in order to obtain popular support for such

¹ *Land and Water*, Feb. 21, 1918. Italics mine.

measure on grounds of defence, need the enemy government represent its position as weak or precarious without those conquests. Mr. Winston Churchill, the British First Lord, once laid down the maxim: "The way to be sure of peace is to be so much stronger than your enemy that he won't dare to attack you." It is precisely on that ground—the promise of a really permanent "peace through power," assurance against any renewal of the war by the attack of hate-maddened enemies—that the German Government may make a successful appeal for support, unless we indicate, more clearly than we have done, the nature and conditions of the security offered in our alternative method.

We are apt, on reading a speech like that of Mr. George of Jan. 5th,¹ to say: "After this the Germans can no longer pretend that we are bent upon their destruction or disruption." But such a remark reveals the failure to grasp the difficulty which has been at the bottom of most international conflicts.

¹ 1918.

Mr. Lloyd George states in this speech, that German rulers have persuaded their people that they are fighting a war of self-defence. But those rulers are at least too astute to pretend that the Allies started war out of the blue for the simple object of stealing German territory. The German case is not that Germany started war actually to defend German territory against invasion, but to defend German rights—rights to future equality of economic opportunity throughout the world. In a sense the Allies take a similar position. England did not fight to resist invasion; she also fought to defend certain rights. The most thoroughgoing defender of the Allied cause can admit, without any surrender whatever of any part of his case, that in a sense the Kaiser may be sincere when he declares that he did not want war. He wanted to impose German policy upon Europe, beginning with Serbia, and he would have preferred to have obtained that without war. If Europe had been content to accept the German autocracy's view of its rights,

there would have been no war. It was a conflict between what the rulers of Austro-Germany regarded as their rights and security and what other European States regarded as theirs.

We declare that we intend to respect Germany's rights. We are absolutely sincere; and the German might admit that sincerity, and still ask: "Whose view of Germany's rights—her enemy's view?" And that is why these general declarations get us very little farther. Until the conditions of the new international order are more specifically indicated, we have not made real that assurance of Austro-German national integrity which Mr. George admits it is our interest to make—whether the enemy makes equivalent statement of terms or not—and which, in fact we shall find is the indispensable condition of the solution of practically all the other questions of settlement. We ask, say, for a completely independent Serbia. "But if that means a Serbia that is the centre of revolutionary and expansionist Pan-Slavism, or

Southern Slavism, the integrity of our whole group is threatened. If it means hostile tariffs and vexatious transport regulations, our economic strangulation." If we admit, as most of us do, that National self-preservation must be the law of national life, we must expect Germany to make everything—the Trentino, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, perhaps even Belgium, subsidiary to the one problem of "security"—security, not only of territory, but of rights and opportunities.

What are they to be in these cases? How do we propose to assure them?

Mr. George speaks of arbitration. But arbitration on the basis of the old international law and practice would be hopeless all round. It could not restore, say, unredeemed Italy, or, restoring it, make provision for those conditions of access to the sea necessary for neighbouring peoples. That would necessitate the elaboration of a new and far-reaching public law governing the intercourse of nations. In its absence arbitrators would have to decide in terms of old rules, which

have proved an utter failure. The mention of arbitration with no indication of the vast juridical changes which must precede its successful application to international affairs, is generally a pretty sure indication of incomplete understanding of the deeper difficulties; for it is precisely the character of those changes which constitute the real crux of the problem.¹

What guarantees are we prepared to offer that, say, Lorraine ore, in a French Alsace-Lorraine will be available for German industry; that access to Africa, Asia, and the sea will be provided? Are we ready to enforce our settlements as against our own Allies—support Austria as against any *post bellum* Italian movement for correcting our settlement? If we are not prepared to do that, we invite Austro-German re-arming to defend the settlements which we, ourselves, make. What does our League of Nations really imply in regard to those things?

¹ It would come nearer to the heart of the problem if we were to talk less of a World Court and more of a World Legislature.

But this is what we never indicate in our exchange of terms, showing we have not realized the fact that some agreement about the condition of a new Society of Nations must precede all other details of settlement. We are caught in the vicious circle already referred to. For our territorial demands to be feasible from the point of view of the enemy, he must know whether the Society of Nations really can be a substitute for the isolated power of nations. If it cannot the plea of national safety, or the impulse of national self-protection, will prompt him to add to his strength by annexation. Not only do we not give him any means of judging that, but all our behaviour shows that we ourselves have no very lively faith in the new policy. We proclaim our "belief" in it of course, in the sense of a hope or desire that it may be realized. Everyone does that.

The German autocracy, through a German Chancellor, has declared itself in favour of a League of Nations—and not only in favour of it but ready to lead it; Austria is in favour of

it; everybody is in favour of it because nobody takes it seriously.

M. Clemenceau is one of the few statesmen in Europe who has been sincere enough to blurt out what most think; that the whole thing is vague and nebulous and has not entered the region of practical politics. The most significant fact in connection with M. Clemenceau's declaration—and the one which reveals why the President's statements of policy have had so little effect—is the fact that no one was particularly disconcerted by it. If even the Allies, including this country—to say nothing of the enemy—had been taking Mr. Wilson's policy seriously, a statement like that of M. Clemenceau's, made by an Allied Prime Minister on taking office, would have created an immense sensation, an explosion. No notice was taken of it. The admission implied in that fact paralyses the political strategy which we have at last adopted. The basis of our present policy is this: We are asking the German people to trust, for the safety of their future rights and

opportunities, to something other than their military power. And admit that the alternative is something which we ourselves do not believe possible!

If the new order cannot be taken seriously, then neither, from the point of view of the enemy peoples, can our terms; and if that new order is to be taken seriously, to be a real political and diplomatic factor, we must be able to give a picture of it, show some architectural design, at least, of the new House of Europe—something that the enemy peoples can examine, approve, or criticize. For that purpose ministerial speeches will not suffice. Not so easily or so casually can the plans of the new Society be laid.

Imagine that after the victory of the Marne it had been possible for the Allies to lift the general aspirations since outlined by Mr. Wilson into the region of practical politics by (1) embodying them in a solemn Public Pact, and (2) by outlining a definite plan or method by which they were to be applied to actual cases; by which political security and

equality of economic opportunity were to be achieved for nations—including the enemy nations; and that this had been so carried into effect as to dramatize the policy and strike the imagination of Allied and enemy peoples alike.

Such a policy would certainly have rallied to itself much idealist, socialist, reformist support long hostile or indifferent to the war. It would have meant that Socialist opposition in Italy, to that country's participation would have been weakened or turned to support, making it easier for the government to justify its course without having to show a brilliant territorial bargain. American participation might have been secured much earlier; Russian Bolshevism and German propaganda checked and Russian's defection prevented. The whole war policy of the Allies would have rested much more upon the parties of the Left and much less upon those of the Right. And that very fact—the relative increase of Radical, and decline of Conservative motives in the war—would make “prac-

tical," Radical policies, which are today "unpractical."

It may be objected that such a Conference would divert energy from the prosecution of the war. Yet we did not deem the Inter-Allied Economic Conference, held at Paris, (the net effect of which was to help the enemy governments in persuading their people that they were fighting for Germany's economic freedom) a diversion of energy. In any case the contrary policy of *failing* to give real effect to the (now admittedly wise) policy of stating clearly our aims creates a diversion of energy (revolutionary unrest, socialist suspicion) surely greater than that which such a Conference would involve.

It is necessary again to warn the reader against a confusion and misinterpretation to which the proposal here urged is subject. This policy is not an alternative to the active prosecution of the war, or to military victory; it is the means by which it can be rendered effective and made to give the political results for which we entered the war. The German

Socialists would not suddenly drop their arms on the holding of such a Conference; but it would advance the point at which the "general will" in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and even Turkey would no longer sanction the further prosecution of the war, and in so far as the general will is a factor at all, advance the acceptance of our conditions. That that will is a factor we admit by policies—blockade and reprisals—aimed at pressure upon the civilian population. In the struggle now going on between annexationist and anti-annexationist, the existence of a definite project for a Society of Nations would be an immense aid to the anti-annexationist and more Liberal party. If this latter party triumphs we know that we are much nearer the end of our task than we can hope to be if the Pan-Germans once more dictate German policy. The triumph of the parties opposed to Pan-Germanism would mean saving the lives of tens, it may be hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. Those parties would be a good deal nearer now to political success if

three years ago we had drafted our plans for the new European order and the fact of its realizability had had time to penetrate the mass of German Liberalism and Radicalism.¹

But even if these hopes are illusory, our attempt involves no risk of military disaster. It may have no success. But we have had to say as much of great military operations—not alone in the Dardanelles—and uncertain success has not prevented our paying a very certain cost for the trial. Why therefore should a proposal which involves no such cost be met not only with inertia, but—until just recently—with violent and hot-tempered opposition, often with wilful misrepresentation?

The method does not even involve contact with the enemy; it is not a proposal to negotiate with him in any diplomatic sense. It is aimed first at arriving at agreement among ourselves. It is not a proposal to end the war, to make a “patched up” peace, to admit

¹ In a vote in the Reichstag Main Committee on one occasion a transfer of two votes would have carried a minority Socialist Amendment.

defeat. Yet it is confused with all these things. A large party of the public, particularly the newspaper public—seems unable to distinguish between a statement of aims for the purpose of rendering the prosecution of the war more effective, and an offer to treat with the enemy for the purpose of bringing the war to an end. Such criticism has no relation to the merits or demerits of the proposals; it is temperamental and subjective.

IV

But the foregoing proposal would only affect one group of the forces with which we have to deal: the political motives, the forces originating in the desire for national and political security. There remain the other group of motives—those of revolutionary socialism; which affect both our own unity and the strength of the forces which we have to meet on the side of the enemy.

The statement made in a previous section that the policy of competitive power, like that

pursued by Italy and Tsarist Russia, was justified by the needs of national defence in a politically anarchical world, assumes of course the outlook of the "governmental mind," that of the diplomat and ruler moved by the momentum of the motives that have been predominant for centuries in Europe. The stirring of the mass underneath has not yet affected that mind.

It will be one of the surprises of the historian of the future that the greatest war of history arose in large part from a struggle of rival nationalities—the assertion of Slav nationality against German and Magyar ascendancy—at a time when nationalism as the dominating political motive was beginning to wane. The very Russian Nationalists whose claims of protection over Slav states precipitated the aggression of Germany, are today looking to Germany as their allies for the purpose of fighting an economic movement emanating from the peasantry and proletariat of the same Slav nationality that they went to war with Germany to protect! The new orienta-

tion may, of course be checked momentarily, but all the signs go to show that vast masses the world over are putting their economic and social condition first and their politico-national condition second. Part of the testimony to that fact, as already indicated, is the emphasis put upon it, not by those who desire it, but by those who fear it. Some of the most emphatic statements of the fact just referred to are furnished by those who demand severe and ruthless stamping out of the revolutionary socialist movement now growing up. And, in truth, the fact that the national motive should be giving place to another during a war most calculated to excite bitter national passions, is indeed testimony to the strength of the newer forces. It is a common remark that socialism proved itself helpless in the grip of national feeling at the beginning of the war. Whether it was national feeling or the sheer momentum of a political machine so constructed as to render a real understanding between different peoples impossible, we need not stop now to enquire.

But this much is certain; that despite the collapse of socialism in 1914, as a war-preventing measure, today it is a commonplace, that the needs of war itself have done more, not only for state socialism of the administrative kind, but for the undermining of the whole ethic of private property, for the establishment of the rights of the community to conscribe wealth as it conscribes lives, than peace time propaganda could have done in half a century.

But the immediate point that concerns us is this: We not only proclaim that this new motive is a disintegrating force within our states, but by our policy proclaim that we regard it as other than a disintegrating one with the enemy. The Allied governments opposed the Stockholm Conference and the public took the view that encouragement to the socialist element and the talk of peace could only result in internal divisions and the weakening of morale. But the German Government was ready to authorize its Socialists to attend at Stockholm. How comes it

that Germany did not fear that peace talk would weaken *her* morale and strengthen *her* Socialism? It was a case of the side with the better cause afraid to discuss it with the side that had the worse. Here as elsewhere we showed that we are afraid the enemy will use the moral factor against us; we fear to use the moral factor against him.

There is this much of justification for the policy adopted by the Allied governments with reference to Stockholm. Enemy public opinion is undoubtedly more "disciplined," that is to say, more docile, than our own. The enemy can "manage" his socialists; we cannot so well manage ours.

That point seemed to mark the limit of the ratiocinative effort of Allied statecraft, for the conclusion drawn from it was that the Stockholm Conference should be forbidden, and a policy of repression towards Socialist and Maximalist activity be adopted. Whereas of course the true conclusion which follows from the fact that the enemy public opinion is so much more docile than ours, is that re-

pression which might succeed with him will not necessarily succeed with us.

And it has not succeeded. The socialist movement has grown by leaps and bounds since the suppression of the Stockholm Conference. In France and in England the Radical minority has become the majority. Messrs. MacDonald and Longuet have not moved towards the Right; Messrs. Henderson and Renaudel have moved towards the Left.¹

It is here suggested that because of the very lack of docility in our democracies, the whole policy of repression as a means of ensuring unity behind the lines has failed, and is bound to fail. It is further suggested that the situation as created by the Russian Socialist Revolution, the demand from the Russians for a statement of terms, the demand from European Socialists for an international conference, should have been met by the frankest readjustment of emphasis. The existence of

¹ Written early in 1918. The German advance has checked the tendency, but it will re-assert itself when the military situation again improves.

a new order of motives in Europe should have been boldly recognized by governments, and its expression by orderly means provided for. The suppression of the Stockholm Conference—if necessary—should have been accompanied by the convening of an Inter-Allied Conference in which minority opinion, notably socialist opinion, should have had ample representation. War aims should have been reconsidered in the light of the Russian Revolution and its purposes, and a much greater stress put upon the social and internationalist policy.

In our attitude towards international socialism we have followed the familiar curve of conduct towards heretical theories or principles. First we deride them as silly or impracticable; then we declare them to be dangerous, shameful, or immoral. Then we attempt suppression. That suppression renders impulses and emotions which a little wisdom might have made socially useful and fructifying, violent and anti-social. Finally, after disastrous conflicts, and much avoidable damage, we pretend that we always more or

less held these views, proceed to give some recognition to them, and to organize them for our purposes. It is the story of all heresies from early Christianity to modern feminism. How can we accelerate the process and come as soon as possible to the stage of organization?

It is for the reasons just stated that in proposing an Inter-Allied Conference, as one of the means of carrying out the political strategy upon which we are all now pretty well agreed as the soundest, it was suggested that in one important particular it should differ from international conferences of the past. It should represent not only the executive but the legislative branches of the governments as well; and not only the majority parties in the respective legislatures, but the minority, the opposition parties as well. The condition might be formulated in some such terms as these:

The Inter-Allied Congress which should meet for the purpose of formulating the plan of the Society of Nations should consist of two bodies: a smaller one, composed, as in international congresses of the past, of the delegates or nominees of the execu-

tive branches of the governments represented, and a larger body drawn from the legislatures of such governments, and not only from the majority parties, but, proportionately from the minority, opposition, parties as well.

The smaller body might act as the initiating and drafting committee, their proposals being subject to the discussion, amendment, and even rejection of the legislative representatives, before being finally ratified by the constituent states of the Congress. The discussions of this larger body should of course be public.

The Allied nations should make it known that they stand in common for this method of representation as the basic principle of the final peace Congress whenever that takes place.

The reasons for urging that method are mainly two:

- (1) It is indispensable to our own unification.
- (2) It is indispensable to the democratization of Germany in foreign affairs—the only practical method of carrying into effect our policy of not dealing with the German autocracy.

It is not merely for the purposes of the Inter-Allied Conference itself that that form

is suggested, but because it is urgent for our purposes in the war that the principle of legislative and minority representation at intergovernmental conferences should become firmly established before we come to the final peace conference.

Although international consolidation is our prime need and the very condition of presenting during the next generation a united front to the enemy, our present political machinery of international negotiation renders it impossible to use the greatest unifying force in that respect that we possess.

It is the literal truth to say, that if President Wilson were to meet the governmental representatives of the European democracies tomorrow, the mechanism of that representation would automatically exclude all those who have the liveliest faith in his policy, and would bring forward all those who by lifelong association and habit of mind are skeptical about it or definitely hostile.

The other day, M. Clemenceau speaking for "France" expressed his disbelief in the

whole plan of a Society of Nations. Did that mean that no considerable body of Frenchmen believe in it? All young France believes in it, but "young France" happens to be a minority; or a majority that has not yet captured political power, and so internationally gets no expression whatever. If such a policy—new, unfamiliar, forward looking—is to get any chance at all, it is essential to rally to its support all the scattered elements favourable to it. By the system of existing international representation all such elements, though very considerable in the mass, are automatically excluded because one party, one opinion, one "personality" must stand for each nation. That form of representation is of course the direct outcome of the conception which would regard Europe, not as a unity bound by all sorts of moral and material ties that intersect the state frontiers, but as a group of entirely separate and distinct entities.

What is the present method of governmental representation?

Each government appoints delegates to a Conference; and each government counts as one and not more than one. It seems the simple, and at first glance, the only method. Let us see what it involves.

It involves first the assumption that the executive branch of a government represents the nation for which it acts; second, that the geographical area it represents is a moral and intellectual unit; third, that each of the units is entitled to equal voting power. All assumptions are absurd. Government executives represent not their nations but the majority parties for the time being only, and it is a fundamental rule of democratic practice (within the state) that for this reason they shall not have those law making powers which they have in international conferences. No great modern state is a moral and intellectual unit. A Bolshevik government is probably as unrepresentative of Russia as was the Tsar's Cabinet. Neither Trotzky nor Sazonoff are "Russia" any more than Hertling is Germany; or a Cabinet of Mr. Balfour

and Lords Milner and Curzon is the Commonwealth of England, Ireland, Australia, and India. And any system which professes to give to Portugal or Guatemala the same voting weight as the British Empire or America will not, among other things, protect the small state, for it is based upon a sham; and the fiction of "equality" of power with the great can only end in its having no power at all, and being at the mercy of the great. This archaic machinery produces certain general results in international relationship.

Since only one point of view can be represented by each state, the point of view of opposition or minority parties is excluded in the interest of the governmental view; which, in the case of orderly and constitutional states means the view of the past rather than of the future, of old habits of thought, of established institutions, of elderly men. It was thus that the Congress of Vienna "settled" Europe on the basis of the dynastic principle just when that principle was moribund and being replaced by the principle of nationality.

The only chance of considerable minority elements getting expression is by becoming violent and revolutionary and seizing power. A group—say of Bolsheviks—who by successful violence or intrigue can defy orderly democracy in their own state and impose their power, can then in the name of constitutional regularity stand for their whole nation in an international congress. Contrariwise, an autocracy which by oppression or trickery can circumvent its democratic elements and by hook or crook retain its position as a *de facto* government, will equally be accepted by a congress of democratic states as standing for its people. We thus put a premium upon violence. And it is to be noted that while violence can give to autocratic institutions a certain permanence it has never in practice been able to give that permanence to democratic institutions.

It is well to recall how completely the governmental representation of states at certain peace settlements of the past ignored what had become in fact the preponderant

feeling among the people for whom those governments were supposed to speak. A certain minor settlement, made on behalf of the most democratic people in the world, illustrates how undemocratic the accepted form of peace representation can be. At the Peace of Vereeniging which closed the Boer War (the instance is taken, not because of its intrinsic importance, but because of the fashion in which it brings out the point it is here desired to enforce), Lord Kitchener is supposed, in dealing with the Boer generals, to have used the following argument: "I am aware that the offer which I bring is not altogether satisfactory to you. But in a few years the present Liberal opposition will be in power. That opposition is pro-Boer, and they will annul this settlement and give you one far more satisfactory to yourselves." If General Kitchener ever used such an argument, he proved a true prophet. Within a year or two the government of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain, which made the Boer settlement, was thrown out as the result

of the greatest electoral "landslide" ever known in English history, and one of the first acts of Henry Campbell-Bannerman's government was to annul the Balfour-Chamberlain-Milner settlement and make one of radically different character (one which incidentally led to the Union of South Africa and to the fact that the Boers are today fighting on the side of the Allies).

Two points are to be noted here. For whom did the British Government of 1903 speak? The British people? The election a year or two later proved overwhelmingly that that government, and the principles which it was enforcing at the settlement, did not represent the British people; that they really stood for quite contrary principles.

Will a government composed of Messrs. Balfour and Bonar Law, Lords Milner, Curzon, and Robert Cecil, Sir Edward Carson, Sir F. E. Smith *and* Mr. Lloyd George really represent the British people as a whole more truly than did the Balfour-Chamberlain government of 1903? Very nearly the whole of

the existing British Cabinet owe their position, not to the working of democratic institutions, but to the suspension of those institutions—the very proper suspension be it said—for the purposes of war. Yet that government will—if the old methods are adhered to—represent the British democracy in the most important piece of legislation which perhaps it has ever faced in its history; in a settlement which, as Mr. Lloyd George has said, may fix its destiny for centuries, in a war which is being waged for the purpose of making the world safe for democratic institutions.

So much for the first point: the extent to which the executive branch of a government, and more particularly of a war government, can fitly stand for a whole people when it comes to acts of international legislation. The second point illustrated by the incident in question is this: That while it was relatively simple for the British people to correct the settlement made by their unrepresentative government of 1903 because only one government, their own, was in fact concerned, it

would be extraordinarily difficult and complicated for a group of ten, twenty, or thirty nations to go back on a settlement made by their respective governments in common.

A peace conference may represent the *governments* of ten, twenty, or thirty states and still only represent one section of their peoples—that section which the circumstances of war have brought into governmental power. What is true of the government of England, today, is true in only lesser degree of the government of France (in which large legislative groups refuse to co-operate) and, as we too well know, of Russia.

The hint conveyed by the circumstances of the Peace of Vereeniging was contained also in the great world settlements, like that of the Congress of Vienna. Representing governments, in contact with the governmental side of politics, the distinguished—and elderly—diplomats who assembled at Vienna were honestly convinced that the one thing which could restore order and stability to Europe was the enforcement of the dynastic principle,

and that the irresponsible doctrinaires who talked of popular rights and employed the "jargon of the Revolution" stood for nothing weighty or solid or which should be considered in European settlements. If the diplomats had been a little less distinguished—and elderly—and a little more in touch with popular movement, they would have known that the dynastic principle, so far as the future was concerned, was moribund; that the despised minorities were creating already a ferment which was destined to make the main impulse of European politics not dynastic but national. They ignored in large part the principle of nationality, with the result that Europe has had a whole cycle of wars in order to correct their oversight. This war is the direct result of that oversight.

The new Congress of Vienna—if our Congress of tomorrow is really to be of that form—also composed of distinguished and elderly diplomats, that is to say men somewhat detached from the movement of popular feeling not at present crystallized into majority

expression, men whose conceptions belong to the old order, must inevitably make an analogous mistake. They will realize that the dynastic principle has been replaced by the principle of nationality, but they will give as little weight to new forces as did their predecessors at Vienna. They are quite unlikely to realize that just as the old dynastic loyalties were imperceptibly giving place to national or group loyalties, so today those loyalties are giving place to loyalty to certain aims and aspirations that intersect nationalities, aspirations which will in large part ignore the political division. And that disregard of those strong and growing collective emotions, at present unexpressed in institutions, is likely to produce disasters even vaster than those produced by the disregard of nascent nationality in 1816.

In other words the old diplomatic method is an inevitable part of the system which (*a*) compels each nation, as the first measure of national self-preservation, to enter into a competition for power, and consequently

territory ; (b) regards each nation as a completely independent unit entirely separated from the rest, a single personality to be represented by the executive branch of its government; and so (c), while taking into account the separatist fact, that all national "personalities" are entitled to equal rights, and thus, in international congresses should be regarded as equals, (d) leaves out of account the unifying fact that nations are composed of individual men and women, a vast proportion of whose activities have no relation to their national quality—activities which should be taken into account in a world of realities.¹

¹ E. g., The Republic of Panama may be a "nationality" to count as of equal weight with the United States or the British Empire; but the economic rights of fifty Panamanian muleteers resenting the construction of railroad or canal are not of equal weight with the vital economic needs of a hundred million Americans. And in the construction of the Canal *some* Panamanians approved while others disapproved. Such a question could not be settled in terms of "nationality."

Imagine the law-making power of the United States in the hands of a body composed of delegates appointed by the governors of each State and responsible to them alone, and that there existed neither Congress nor President. What would have been the chance of creating a unified democracy by such means?

Europe is made up of separate nations. Those nations are entities, each with a distinct "personality." It is a separatist fact. Not only does each assert its inalienable right to existence, but its equality of right with others. Each must count for one and not more than one. Nicaragua or Haiti counts in the voting for just as much as the British Empire; Portugal is equal to the United States.

Now this is a great truth—this fact that nations are persons and that their personalities must be regarded as of equal importance. But it is not the whole of the truth, and if we ignore the other part of it we get an unworkable disruptive world in which the smaller nationalities are doomed to disappear.

This "equality of national personalities" is analogous to the place of the rights of the individual man in any organized society. Society exists for the sake of the individual; but the individual cannot exist without society. Respect of the individual is the separatist factor in the state; the need for co-operation the unifying one.

In the same way, while nationality is a fact and respect of it a great political need, there are other facts and needs. European society is not only twenty or thirty nations; it is four or five hundred million men and women, most of whose needs, physical and moral, have nothing to do with nationality and must be filled irrespective of national groupings. Something like a third of Great Britain is normally kept from absolute starvation by virtue of co-operation with foreigners. Food and raw materials, trade and science, religion and social freedom, the aspirations for a juster economic order—these, and thousands of other needs and aspirations—are not mainly national things, and the attempt so to treat them can only end in disaster. The disaster of the war itself is due in no small part to that attempt. If, for instance, the only possible form of international organization, upon which our society of nations must be based, is one in which Portugal in all relationships will always count for as much as the United States and the votes of Nicaragua and Haiti weigh just twice as

much as those of the British Empire, we can never even lay the foundations of our Society of Nations, and in practice the essence of the old order will remain; each will look to increasing his power as the first obligation to his nation, with all that that involves of secrecy and intriguing and "balances."

No league to enforce peace can give us either peace or unity, unless, in addition to being a league of states, it is also a union of their peoples. That, incidentally, connotes a political truth which the founders of the American union were forced, on pain of failure, to realize.

If in our future inter-allied or international congress no provision is made for minority representation there will be further demands for a Stockholm Conference of Socialists, further refusal of passports, further alienation of Radical forces, further disintegration within the frontiers of the Allied nations. If it is provided for, the Radical and Socialist forces will either be won to the major aims of the war, or their opposition to it will be

proven to be based on other than democratic grounds.

We must provide for the representation of those minorities in due form or they will express their influence in some non-parliamentary, anarchic, disrupting fashion. By ignoring what is perhaps the most expansive and potent social and political emotion in Western society today, we shall in ten or fifteen years see that society rift by grave internal divisions and weakened by these internal strains.

Perhaps the gravest defect in current thinking on the problem of international organization is to regard the first essential step as the creation of a judicial body or Council of Conciliation, and of the means of carrying out its decisions. But this implies that the laws according to which a court would give its decisions, or the conflicting rights that a Council of Conciliation would attempt to reconcile, are now already clear and fully determined. Whereas the great and fundamental difficulty is that the nations have not

yet agreed as to what *are* their respective rights. Their "laws" are a mass of custom and precedent very often having no sounder basis than the fact that powerful belligerents in the past have been able to compel their reading of the "law." The old conceptions in such things as neutrality, national sovereignty, rights of way, economic right of eminent domain, have been proven to be utterly unworkable. And the first task is to decide how they shall be altered, what shall be the attributes of national independence; what are the rights that we accord to each nation, so that justice to one will not involve injustice to another.

It is therefore not so much a court to administer the law or a body to enforce it, as a legislature to make it, that is needed. Lord Robert Cecil (and it is a delight to find the recognition of this particular truth coming from his particular sphere) has said most truly that the very first thing to be done is to decide definitely what laws we shall try to enforce through our League of Nations.

For of course a League to Enforce Peace is in reality a League to enforce certain rules of international conduct.

If we face this truth squarely—that our first big task is the making of the most important laws that have ever perhaps affected mankind—we must go on to face this question: Should those immense law-making powers be given into the hands of a body drawn from those branches of the governments which under every democratic constitution are expressly denied law-making power? The problem is more than legal. Should the laws of the future be made by bodies in which vast and growing sections of European opinion have no representation?

The rule which forbids an Executive to assume legislative functions is not a mere arbitrary fashion or fortuitous tradition: it is a principle rooted in the foundations of efficient democratic government. The legislative function is denied the executive precisely because it does *not* represent the whole of a nation, but only the majority. The

minority acquiesces in its acts, because action there must be, and because the minority has expressed itself in the legislature; has had an opportunity of presenting its arguments. And it is because it has had that opportunity that it acquiesces in the final executive act. But if the executive, from the carrying out of laws that had been discussed and debated, proceeded to pass laws in the making of which the minority view had had no expression, it would then have violated the condition by virtue of which, in democratic principle, a hostile minority can fairly be asked to abide by the law.

It will be objected that when the Conference has reached its decisions, the legislatures of the constituent states, and minority parties therein, will have an opportunity of criticism. It would be futile criticism. To give effect to it, the ten, or twenty, or forty governments would have to reassemble the Conference—and even so it would still be composed of the nominees of the executives. The thing would be hopeless. The decisions of the Conference,

however much in theory subject to the ratification of the constituent states, would be final.

But whatever the difficulties of putting some such methods as this into execution, there is one overwhelming consideration which should steel us to meet those difficulties with inexhaustible patience. And that consideration is this: With whom shall we be talking when we come to deal with Germany at the settlement?

Over and over again the President has rightly emphasized this fact: that it will make all the difference with whom we make peace. Terms possible enough if made with a responsible and democratic government might be impossible if made with an irresponsible autocracy. With whom should we be treating if this principle of representation is put into effect—with the German autocracy or with the representatives of German parliamentary institutions, democratic Germany? We should be treating mainly with the latter. By this not very elaborate device we should have democratized Germany in foreign affairs—taken

effective power away from the executive and put it into the Reichstag. By this one fact we should have given parliamentary institutions to Germany.

For it is certain that if it were now made known that the Allies stood for this principle—that it would be one of their main “conditions of peace,”—all the forces now fighting in Germany for parliamentary institutions would see in this peace term of the enemy a condition which would give them parliamentary control in the most important act of their state. We should have entered into alliance with the German people against the autocratic element of their government. And no form of democratization which did not include this democratic control of foreign affairs would give us other than absolutely worthless guaranties.

We should realize why that is the case.

V

The first Peace Conference of the Great War—that between the Russians and the

Central Empire—provoked two significant statements from the Allied leaders, one from Mr. Lloyd George and one from President Wilson. Both bore an extraordinary similarity in their outstanding declarations, although Mr. George has assured us there was no pre-arrangement concerning the terms.

In Mr. Lloyd George's statement occur these passages:

The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators, trying to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. . . .

We did not enter this war to alter or destroy the Imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination has, indeed, died in this war and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But,

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after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

President Wilson said:

Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between representatives of Russia and the Central Powers. . . . The representatives of the Central Powers presented an outline of settlement which . . . seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific programme of practical terms was added. . . . It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principle of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military readers. . . .

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties—that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states, which

have felt obliged to become their associates in this war?

The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired.

To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening in fact to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.

In the address from which the foregoing is taken the American terms were put into fourteen clauses. The first one is this:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

We see here the emphasis that has been laid upon the need of doing away with the old methods. What is to replace them? The problem is not so simple that methods will just discover themselves. If we have not new ones ready we may be sure the old will be used.

We have fallen into the habit of saying, of believing perhaps, that this war is to see the end of intriguing diplomacy and secret treaties. But our mere good resolution to that effect will not achieve the result. Intriguing diplomacy, the irresponsibility of foreign offices, secret treaties, autocracy in foreign affairs, are not due to an extra dose of original sin on the part of a special race of men called

“diplomats,” but to their entanglement in a very deeply rooted system which will inevitably continue, whatever our good resolutions, if a condition of international anarchy justifies their conduct on grounds of national self-preservation—or if imperialists, German or other, can trade upon that instinct of self-preservation to any degree.

Mr. Bullard, in his work, *The Diplomacy of the Great War*, says very truly:

In forecasting the work the diplomats will do, it would be unjust to expect too much of them. Left to themselves they will follow their traditions—and their traditions are bad. It would be hard to put your finger on any spot on the map of the world where some diplomat has not been “decorated” by his king, or promoted by his government, for a piece of work he would not like his children to know about. Whether your finger chanced to fall on one of the great capitals of Europe or on some distant corner of the “uncivilized” world, China or South Africa, Teheran or Fez, Bangkok or Bogota—there in the archives of the consulates or the legations you could find the same story record of broken pledges, bribery, all too often of

prostitutes on the pay-roll of the foreign office and not infrequently of murder—all for the greater glory and power of the home land.

It is rather cheap to criticize these resplendent gentlemen in gold lace, their breasts covered with jewelled decorations, for having been involved in such scandalous affairs—cheap and useless. The important point is that the results they obtained were approved of by their governments—and they were not questioned as to the means they employed.¹

And they are not questioned because they are presumed to make for national safety and self-preservation.

Imagine that Germany had introduced a constitution as liberal in character as that of England or France, but that Europe retained the old method of conducting its international relations and the old struggle for power. There would be one department of affairs in which the power of the German Government, the aristocratic and military order, would be as autocratic as ever. That department

¹ P. 266.

would be her foreign relations—the only one, which, after all, we are concerned in democratizing!

For the foreign affairs of the most democratic nations in Europe—England, France, and Italy—have been marked by secret treaties, negotiations between governments concerning which for long periods the legislatures and the public were ignorant. A Germany, thoroughly democratized in its internal administration, but with the conduct of its foreign affairs in the precise relation to parliamentary control which exists in France and England, would still be able to commit its people to unknown foreign adventures; and so to manœuvre that the country can be placed apparently in the position of having suddenly to enter a defensive war.

If the various stages of international negotiation are left to diplomats reporting secretly to their governments, those diplomats will always have it in their power to present their nation with the alternative of war or failure to fulfill an obligation given

secretly or semi-secretly; or of war as against dangerous political isolation. Popular control of a government's foreign policy is a fiction where the government is free to create step by step a certain diplomatic situation, the steps being entirely in their hands and taken secretly.

So long as the virtual conduct of international affairs is in the hands of the executive branches of government, and preponderantly in the hands of the foreign offices, decisive power in such affairs will always be autocratic, whatever the form of those governments at home.

This situation of the Foreign Offices under the old system and the necessary secrecy that goes with it, has been very successfully used by the German autocracy as a factor of Allied disruption and would certainly in the future be used by any autocratic party in Germany after the war as a means of breaking up the democratic unity of Europe and any Society of Nations based thereon.

The process is very clearly indicated in the

case of the relations with Russia. German propaganda used the existence of secret treaties among the Allies as the means of sowing suspicion among the Radical elements of Russia. "You are fighting for the Imperialist aims of others," said in effect the German agent in Russia. "Ask for the publication of the secret treaties." And we know that the demand so created did very greatly embarrass the earlier revolutionary governments in Russia.

The revolutionary psychology which dominated the Russian situation was very unfavourable to the repose of trust in governments. The men who had made the revolution for the purpose of destroying autocracy realized that for a government to be able to commit a whole nation to war, or the continuance of war, for objects which remained secret, was autocracy in its severest form. It deprived the people of any real opportunity of passing judgment upon the nature of the cause for which they killed and died; of any real control over their destiny. Secrecy of foreign policy

meant delivering the Republic to an unknown fate. This was too much to ask of those who had just made a revolution to end autocratic power. The power of a tiny group of men to commit the nation to policies which it did not even explain was the system of Germany. But the repeated refusal to publish the treaties gave rise to a widespread belief that the same system obtained in some degree in the governments of the Allies and that Allied victory did not necessarily mean any guaranty of real democracy, any real attainment of the revolutionary end.

The same kind of forces are certain to come into play in future revolutionary movements in Europe, and it is easy to see how an unscrupulous party in the Germany of the future could play the same sort of tricks. It is allowed to leak out that the German foreign office is making secret treaties with this or that Power. Rival foreign offices, in defence, make similar treaties. Those arrangements become more or less known; suspicions are sown, and on the strength of them Germany

arms "defensively." It is the beginning of the end of the Society of Nations.

In this present advocacy of internationalism, and of the representation of minority opinion, two misapprehensions should be avoided.

Internationalism after the war there will be, and must be. We have already the internationalization of government departments for the purposes of the war, to a highly developed degree. That will not stop with peace. For some years the world is likely to be on rations of food and raw materials, and the distribution of those things will be for long, in fact, controlled by international organization. The same control may extend to finance, shipping, communications, vast areas of economic activity. An international organ will grow up, and will assume large powers.

Then for a long time the world will be war weary to an intense degree. Certain of the nations will not readily fight again in our generation. France must have time to renew her youth; Russia to set her new house in order.

So we have two facts: an intense disin-

clination to war and the growing power of international organs. What sort of international government is to come out of that? The government of an international bureaucracy? Possibly. A Holy Alliance of executives and established institutions? Very probably.

And that might well become one of the worst tyrannies that mankind has known, slowly growing in power, unnoticed, and so uncontrolled. And that result would accrue because the world, instead of recognizing the need for an organ and seeing that it is of the right kind, denies the need and accepts as a consequence of that denial the wrong kind.

So much for one danger. The second is perhaps closely related to it. It is certain that representation of minorities, of a sort, there will be in any case at the Peace Conference. That also is inevitable. "France" cannot be represented by a government which something like a third of the French Chamber refuses to support. "England" cannot be represented *merely* by Lords Milner and Curzon, Messrs. Bonar Law and Arthur Balfour—

or by men responsible to them. Organized labour which stands directly or indirectly for more than half the population will get representation of a kind. But such representation is likely to be haphazard and unorganized, with no proportional basis. With this result: that the German Government will arrange for the representation of *its* minorities in the same way, and by that fact deprive it of the very force which, from our point of view, gives it its main value. If Social Democracy or parliamentary institutions are "represented" by one or two "tame" Socialists and parliamentarians, leaving effective weight and power still in the hands of the German executive—and that would certainly happen if an unorganized and haphazard application of the principle of parliamentary or minority representation were given—the device would immediately cease to be one by which Germany could be democratized in her foreign relations.

Nothing suggested here is put forward as a final and complete plan. The intention is

merely to indicate a few general outlines that might furnish the frame for useful constructive thinking on the definite problem that confronts us. It might well happen, for instance, that the practical difficulties of agreeing upon a basis for the proportional representation of the belligerent states would be so great that it would be preferable to abandon the attempt at first, and to give each of the great Powers an equal number of delegates, on the understanding that, say, two thirds stood for the representation of the legislature. That would still throw power in the case of Germany into the Reichstag, and if it were open to the delegates to vote—or even to speak—as individuals we should get some co-operation of the German with the Western Democracies.

Such a conference would, of course, be a “talking shop.” It would be slow, apparently inefficient; unfit for rapid action. But rapid action, when we come to the settlement, is precisely what we want to avoid. That the exact status of some territory should remain

in doubt for six months or a year would be a small price to pay for its final settlement on satisfactory lines. If we can allow a war to last four years we can let the conference run into a few months. No battle in that field will be lost by delay.

There is one grave defect in the whole proposal: it has not, on its merits, any particular applicability to the special needs of America. The parties in Congress are not divided in foreign affairs on any definite lines of principle, and minority representation has no particular meaning. But to brush the proposal aside on that ground is to miss its whole object. Its object is not the greater democratization of America, but of Germany. It is part of the process by which alone the world can be made safe for democracy, and the influence of autocracy undermined. It is irrelevant to point out that America does not need this form of democratization.

After all, the plan here urged is nothing more than the beginnings of an International Legislature or Deliberative Assembly. The

Inter-Allied Labor Conference of February, 1918, in London, put the establishment of such a legislature among the very first essentials of a permanent peace in Europe; a part of the constitution of a League of Nations. If such a League is to be an organic part of the settlement—and it is becoming every day more evident that it ought to be—that conclusion carries with it the approval of some such proposal as this.

It may fail, prove altogether unworkable, and we may have to come to something else. Will the experiment have cost a million lives? I ask that question because it is one of the astonishing facts in national life that we never seem prepared to introduce into the work of peace the spirit and fine adventure of war. If we did this war would be less and peace more attractive. At a dozen junctures in a war like this we are quite ready to risk a hundred thousand lives on an experiment which may fail. We did it at the Dardanelles. In war, as in life as a whole nothing is certain. But we are prepared "to take a chance." It is

the sign of virility. Yet in the case of any political or social proposal, a risk that it may fail is usually regarded as an unanswerable argument against attempting it. If an experiment of this kind should fail it would not be the end of the world; democracy would not go under, or even "reel from the blow." We might have to try another way to this particular end. But in all human probability something useful — and unexpected — would come out of the experiment.

One of the great moral needs in the period that follows the war will be the "spirit of experiment," of social adventure. Mankind will then be faced in the international field by the old, old problem of maintaining the balance between order and freedom. Freedom will be gravely menaced. Nations to which the world has looked for moral and intellectual innovation and ferment will indeed be "bled white." Young France will have disappeared. If we merely drift into our inevitable international organization giving its development no very conscious direction,

it may well become a worse tyranny than that of militarism itself.

This is therefore not so much an argument for internationalism—since internationalism of a kind there is bound to be—as for an internationalism of a certain type: the internationalism that will give a place to the minority—that is to say to youth, to change, to innovation, and furnish some counterweight to established government and institutions.

Only intelligence, conscious foresight of consequences, not mere drift, mere obedience to impulse and the mood of the day, can give us both integration and freedom. To get both may be beyond us. But whether both are possible or not, we must assume that they are—at least as a working hypothesis, since we are fighting for them—and refrain from using instruments never designed for the purpose we have in view; instruments which not only do not promise success, but actually stand in the way of it, if they do not make it impossible.

The aid of the diplomatic expert and the statesman of administrative experience is essential to the new experiments, but if entrusted to them alone, with no correcting influence from below, the attempt will either fail, or success will be a new disaster to human freedom.

To expect bold experiments to receive the kind of support necessary to make them a success in a conference made up of men whose habits of mind and prepossessions run so strongly with the methods of the past is to ask for psychological and moral miracles. Capacity to initiate "unprecedented things," as the President calls them, cannot reside in men drawn from professions—diplomacy and government—dominated by precedent. They may perhaps be instruments in working out the "unprecedented things"; the initiation and advocacy must come from men who believe in them with the faith that moves mountains.

William James, in his essay on *The Will to Believe*, has an illustration to enforce a truth

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several times insisted upon in this summary—the truth that very often in political, as in certain other affairs, the one factor necessary to make a method or institution practical is just the general decision that it is practical. So long as men believe that their effort will not succeed, that belief of itself renders the belief true; just as the contrary belief would render the contrary true.

I am climbing in the Alps [says James] and have had the ill luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make me sure that I shall not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute what, without those subjective emotions, would have been impossible. But suppose that on the contrary the emotions . . . of mistrust predominate. . . . Why then I shall hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and trembling, and launching myself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into the abyss. In this case, and it is one of an immense class, the part of wisdom is to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of the indis-

pensable preliminary conditions of the realization of its object. There are cases where faith creates its own justification. Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish.

And that is the moral for the Western world at this moment. It may decide that these "new and unprecedented things" cannot be done. In that case the decision will be justified by the event. But the contrary decision that better methods can be made to produce better results than in the past—that decision too would be justified by the event.

PART II

THE CONDITIONS OF SURVIVAL FOR THE DEMOCRATIC STATES

CHAPTER I

THE CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY DECISION¹

Public opinion and success in our aims. The difference between what is necessary and what is enough. How bad political strategy can add to the soldier's burden, and good political strategy lighten it. What is "Political Strategy"? Destroying an army and destroying a people. The impossibility of the latter. The military renaissance of defeated nations. Disintegration of the Alliance during or after the war equivalent to defeat, whatever the temporary military decision. If the Allies cannot make their internationalism successful they cannot wage war or make peace successfully. The conditions of successful internationalism. Balance of Power *v.* Community of Power. Why obligations to maintain a Balance of Power must conflict with obligations to maintain treaties, or law, on which the security of scattered democratic states must depend.

In politics, as in life, the most serious errors of conduct arise not so much because the essential facts are hidden from us as because we are apt to draw wrong conclusions from the

¹ The chapters of this part were originally framed as lectures, and that form has been retained.

facts which are quite obvious. Wisdom is not necessarily born of vast learning, as the German professorial caste have so tragically demonstrated to us. People may have immense erudition—and immense stupidity; know innumerable facts and come to utterly wrong conclusions concerning them, making disastrous mistakes that folk less learned, less dominated by wonderful theories, political, philosophical, historical, would not be apt to make.

Perhaps it is obvious to you that public opinion may cause—has indeed already caused—certain disastrous political mistakes adding to the military difficulties of this war and menacing its final success.¹ But those mistakes of public opinion which, as I think I shall show you, have already added so griev-

¹ One can never be quite sure what will be regarded as a truism or a commonplace, and what a paradoxical absurdity. We want to have Pacifists imprisoned or shot because we fear their doctrines will have an effect on public opinion which might be disastrous. Then public opinion is all important in its effects. When it is suggested that peace terms should be studied in order that public opinion may be informed concerning them, we are apt to be told that public opinion will not have the slightest effect on policy.

ously to the soldier's burden and threaten to render his vast sacrifices futile, do not arise in the main from the inevitable failure of busy and preoccupied folk to make themselves familiar with the obscure intricacies of military and political problems, with disputed points, on the one hand of strategy, and on the other of the difficult political problems of Europe—Balkan frontiers, ethnological, racial, religious, and historical facts of great complexity. Those things are important, and it is certain that we could not obtain a satisfactory settlement without expert knowledge of them, and equally certain that the mass of common folk who make public opinion and dictate policies will never have that knowledge. But the common sense and ordinary shrewdness which in a hundred relations of life enable us to detect the point at which it is necessary to control the expert, would enable us to devise a similar division of labour in the matter of the war and its purposes, if there did not enter in certain very natural, very human, and excusable impulses, instincts,

and emotions, which cause us to overlook, not obscure facts, but obvious facts, and to confuse not intricate things but things that are very distinct and very simple.

The confusion which I have particularly in mind as bearing upon the relation of civilian policy to our ultimate success is this: the confusion between what is necessary and what is enough; between the indispensable and the sufficient. Victory is absolutely indispensable to our ultimate purpose and efficient armies absolutely indispensable to victory. But because that is so it is assumed that victory of itself is enough however it may be misused at the peace; and that armies themselves will give us victory whatever the policy which directs them. And this one confusion might well of itself render victory impossible however magnificently efficient our armies; or, giving us victory deprive it of any value in the accomplishment of the purpose for which the war was undertaken. It is not victory but the right use of victory (which we cannot make

if we come to the peace unprepared) that will destroy the menace of German power and make the world safe for democracy. And, in a war waged by an Alliance composed of many states it is not merely armies, however powerful, that will give us victory, but armies fighting to a common end. If incompatibility of aim splits the Alliance, the very power created to give us victory may be used to make it impossible. It is not alone the gun which matters, but the direction in which it shoots; and that depends on policy. Our own guns in Russia may be turned against us.

And these are not propositions predicating some remote and fantastic contingency. Their truth is revealed in actual and disastrous conditions, in events that have actually occurred. And yet whenever we would urge the importance of policy we are told that we are trusting to "talk" and "theories" instead of to the hard facts of military preparedness, and are lukewarm in our desire for the defeat of the enemy. Those of us who for the last three years have been pointing out the military

cost of certain defects of our policy, the need for a somewhat different political strategy, the advantage for the purpose of the war itself of such things as a clearer statement of aims, have again and again been met by the utterly irrelevant retort: "Nothing but the destruction of German military power will destroy the danger of German aggression"—as though that answered the argument for the need of certain other things as well. It is much as though we should send a million soldiers to France without food or clothing, and criticism of the fact should be met by the perfectly true statement: "Nothing but soldiers can win the war."

Only now, after three and a half years of war, at the cost of disastrous experiences like the Russian defection and the Italian debacle, after playing diplomatically the enemy's game instead of our own, are we learning a truth which would have been obvious if we could have thought clearly for a few moments concerning a few simple facts accessible to all of us, without the push of a thought-paralysing

impulse like that which prompts us to rush into the balls at tennis, or to rush out of a theatre on fire.

But judge it in the light of one suggestive relevant fact. There has been, as we all know, within the last month or two a very great change of view as to the advisability of a clear statement of terms—even from the standpoint of mere military advantage. On what facts is that changed view based? Upon facts that are only now available? Not at all. Upon facts that have been obvious from the beginning of the war.

Let me tabulate some of the things I shall suggest to you in these addresses. They are these:

The bad political strategy of our civilians, mainly the result of the state of public opinion, has (a) strengthened the morale and unity of the enemy; (b) weakened that of the Allies; (c) involved already definite military cost, thus adding to the soldier's burden, and (d) threatens the success of our ultimate object.

What, concretely, is "political strategy," and how can it bear on military success?

Well, take one great political fact: the Russian Revolution. No less a person than President Wilson has suggested that if the Allies had disavowed clearly and categorically the alleged "imperialist" aims of which German agents among the Russian revolutionists were accusing us; had we given more decisive support of every kind to Kerensky, the Bolsheviks might not have come to power, and Russia might not have made a separate peace, or gone to pieces to the degree she has done. No one can know, of course, how true that is; but if it is true in any degree it indicates how policy as between allies and belligerents may have immense military results.

Take the present relations with Japan. There are those who say that if we sanction the landing of Japanese forces in Russia that will cause Russia as a whole to turn to Germany, and look to her for protection against Japanese influence; that it would create in other

words a Russo-German Alliance, and facilitate the German organization of Russian resources during and after the war; that it would almost inevitably tilt the balance of force against our Alliance at the peace, and make Teutonic power definitely predominant, and so undo the whole object of the war.

There are others who say that the refusal to sanction Japan's entrance into Siberia would result in her going out of the Alliance, and perhaps joining Germany. They would between them have both Russia and China in their power and constitute an immense menace.

Which view is correct? It is not our present purpose to determine, but only to use the problem as illustrating a fact which, personally, I regard as self-evident and a truism, but which the immense majority of folk in this country and in Europe have for three years been violently denying: that military force is not sufficient to win the war; that an understanding of certain broad political factors is also indispensable, and that intensity of

emotion about German atrocities will not give us that understanding.

Suppose that we misjudge the Japanese situation and do the wrong thing—and the right thing is so little self-evident that today one party in this country strenuously supports Japanese intervention and another strenuously opposes it. If we take the wrong course and create a Russo-German combination (which one party alleges is certain if Japan occupies Siberia) we shall have a failure in civilian politics with military results that must be measured in whole armies, in the lives of tens, hundreds of thousands of our men, in years of war, in the future balance of power in the world as between democracy and autocracy. The mistake that will cost this price in the blood of your countrymen and mine is not a mistake of the soldier, it is due to no failure of military power, to no lack of ammunition or military training, it is due to moral factors—to a failure to appreciate the psychology of Russians and of Japanese, to a misunderstanding of human nature, to a failure

to think with the other man's mind. It is an utter refutation of the childish and shallow view that in a war carried on by an alliance composed of a dozen diverse and disparate nations, all we need think about is men and munitions, that policies are merely "talk." We have only to make a few mistakes of that kind utterly to defeat our purpose, to produce, after the war, some combination which will constitute as grave a menace to civilization as that which confronted the world in August, 1914, and to save us from which our men will have died—unavailingly.

We have most of us a general impression that once Germany is thoroughly beaten she will be done for as a military power, her menace will be removed and our victory will be equivalent to the solution of the whole problem. She will be "wiped out" and bother the world no more.

That is not only a popular view. It is the view of a certain school of military critics. Destroy the German army, we are told, and you can impose your will completely, remake

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the map of Europe, dispose of the whole danger of Prussian military aggression.

I submit to you that all history is against this view. The military resistance to Prussia's military aggression is an indispensable part of the solution. But if we confine our energies to that, we shall fail. In order to make our military power effective, there must be such other factors as the political solidarity of the non-German world after the war; and the destruction of the German will to conquer by creating a system which will ensure better protection to the vital interests of the German people than military conquest can hold out to them.

Let us dispose of the more obvious illusions first.

The destruction of a people of one hundred or one hundred and fifty million souls is, of course, a mere phrase. The destruction of an army is a military problem, a military possibility. The destruction of a people is not a military problem at all. You can't destroy a people, because you cannot, as Mr.

Shaw has pointed out, "slit the throats of the womenkind." Yet if you do not, they will, after the habit of their kind, go on breeding. And though you destroy utterly the German and Austrian armies of today, in ten or fifteen years you face a new army. The school-boy, now at his lessons, is the soldier of tomorrow. The iron and coal and all the other raw materials of military force are there. And the gift for organization which has come down to Germans from the days of Frederick will not be gone. Even though we break Germany up into separate states the knowledge of how to come together again and act as one would still exist. Knowledge is the decisive factor. The universal education, the habit of discipline, would still remain. Defeat her as completely as you will and there is no reason why Germany should not have a military renaissance as great as that which France showed after her defeats in 1872.

The merely temporary effect upon a virile people of the destruction of their armies and political machinery, the artificial and unreal

character of the apparent, "wiping off the map" that follows, have been dramatically demonstrated in the case of Germany within the lifetime of the fathers of men still living. In the first few years of the nineteenth century Prussia was annihilated as a military force. The army was destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt, and the whole country was overrun by the French. By the Peace of Tilsit, Prussia was deprived of all territory west of the Elbe, and all her Polish provinces, of the southern part of West Prussia, of Dantzic, thus losing nearly half her population and area; the French army remained in occupation until heavy contributions demanded by France were paid and by the subsequent treaty the Prussian army was limited to not more than forty-two thousand men, and she was forbidden to create a militia. She was broken, apparently, so completely that even some five years later she was compelled to furnish, at Napoleon's command, a contingent for the invasion of Russia. The German states were weakened and divided by all the statecraft

that Napoleon could employ. He played upon their mutual jealousies, brought some of them into alliance with himself, created a buffer state of Westphalia, Frenchified many of the German courts, endowed them with the Code Napoleon. Germany seemed so shattered that she was not even a "geographical expression." It seemed, indeed, as though the very soul of the people had been crushed, and that the moral resistance to the invader had been stamped out, for, as one writer has said, it was the peculiar feature of the Germany which Napoleon overran, that her greatest men were either indifferent, like Goethe, or else gave a certain welcome to the ideas which the French invaders represented. Yet with this unpromising material the workmen of the German national renaissance laboured to such good purpose that within a little more than five years of the humiliation of the Peace of Tilsit, the last French army in Germany had been destroyed, and it was thanks to the very condition imposed by Napoleon, with the object of limiting her

forces, that Prussia was able finally to take the major part in the destruction of the Napoleonic, and in the restoration of the German Empire.¹ It was from the crushing of Prussia after Jena that dates the revival of German national consciousness and the desire for German unity.

Take the case of France in 1870. The German armies, drawn from states which within the memory of men then living had been mere apanages of Napoleon, which as a matter of fact had furnished some of the soldiers of his armies, had crushed the armies of Louis Napoleon. Not merely was France prostrated, her territory in the occupation of German soldiers, the French Empire overthrown and replaced by an unstable republic, but frightful civil conflicts like the Commune

¹ By the convention which followed the Peace of Tilsit, the Prussian army was limited to 42,000 men. Scharnhorst kept to the terms of this convention, and at no time was the army more than 42,000 men; but he saw to it that each year or two they were a different 42,000, so that when Prussia's opportunity came, after the failure of Napoleon's Russian campaign, she was able to call up a quarter of a million trained men, and became by her energy and power the most formidable of the continental members of the alliance which broke Napoleon.

had divided France against herself. So distraught, indeed, was she that Bismarck had almost to create a French Government with which to treat at all. What was at the time an immense indemnity had been imposed upon her, and it was generally believed that not for generations could she become a considerable military or political factor in Europe again. Her increase of population was feeble, tending to stagnation; her political institutions were unstable; she was torn by internal dissensions; and yet, as we know, within five years of the conclusion of peace France had already sufficiently recuperated, to become a cause of anxiety to Bismarck who believed that the work of "destruction" would have to be begun all over again. And if one goes back to earlier centuries, to the France of Louis XIV., and her recovery after her defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession; to the incredible exhaustion of Prussia in wars like the Thirty Years' War, when her population was cut in half, it is the same story: a virile people cannot be "wiped from the

map." Their ideals, good or bad, cannot be destroyed by armies.

There are, moreover, one or two additional factors to be kept in mind. The marvellous renaissance of France after 1871 has become a commonplace; and yet this France, which is once more challenging her old enemy, is a France of stationary population, not having, because not needing, the technical industrial capacity which marks certain other peoples, like ourselves and the Germans. The German population is not stationary; it is increasing at the rate of very nearly a million a year; and if the result of this war is to attenuate something of the luxury and materialism which has marked modern Germany, that rate of population increase will not diminish, but rather be accelerated, for it is the people of simple life that are the people of large families. It is altogether likely that the highly artificial Austrian Empire (itself the work of the sword, not the product of natural growth), embracing so many different races and nationalities, will be politically

rearranged. The result of that will be to give to German Austria an identity of aim and aspiration with the other German states, so that, however the frontiers may be rectified and whatever shuffling may take place, this solid fact will remain, that there will be in Central Europe seventy-five or eighty millions speaking German, and nursing, if their nationality is temporarily overpowered, the dream of reviving it when the opportunity shall occur.

And there is one more fact. You may go into American cities, of which fifteen years ago not one stone stood upon another, but which have all the machinery of civilization—the factories, the railroads, the tram-lines, telephones, telegraphs, newspapers, electric light, schools, warmed houses—that one can find in New York or in Paris. It is merely accumulated knowledge which enables all these things to be created in a desert within a decade; which means that given this accumulated knowledge and technical capacity, the recuperation of a people from the destruction of war will be much more rapid in our

day than it has been in the past. And that technical capacity, that special knowledge, the Germans possess to a very high degree; they have, indeed, been called the Americans of Europe. If we can imagine their machinery of civilization destroyed, their factories pulled down, and the railroads torn up (things which will not happen to any very great degree), even so, within a very few years it would be all restored once more, and we should have to reckon with this fact of seventy-five million Germans manufacturing, trading, teaching, organizing, scheming as before.

There remains the theory that if you once thoroughly defeat a nation, it will "larn" it not to do it again, whatever its subsequent power. Well, obviously, the very history we have just reviewed shows that we must bring very important qualifications to that theory. For not only is the survival of national ambition demonstrated by the history of states that have known great military victories after great military defeats, but by the persistence of national aims in the face

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of repeated defeat and helplessness. The ambition of the Irish to rule themselves has survived five hundred years more or less of defeat. The resistance of Balkan states to Turkish rule, the renaissance of Poland, the intractability of the Alsatians, show how ineffective is military defeat as a means of disposing of a certain spirit.

No one, you will say, proposes to destroy German nationality; only Prussian aggression. But Prussian expansion has shown the same historical persistence, the same revival after defeat, which we have seen in the case of more respectable national ambitions. Certain facts which may throw some light on that will be dealt with later.

There is this much of truth in the "larn 'em" theory. If Prussia is shown that there are certain acts and ambitions of hers that will excite such unified and world-wide resistance that they simply cannot be carried into permanent effect, ultimately she will abandon the attempt to do it.

But two facts stand out in her history:

repeated military defeat; and the instability of the Alliances hostile to her. By virtue of the second fact she has always been able to offset the first. Lack of political cohesion among her enemies has enabled her to overcome their superior potential military power. Is not that the story of this war? We get, therefore, this conclusion:

If the power of the anti-Prussian combination is to be effective as a check to Prussian ambition, that power must be maintained not only for the purpose of securing a momentary military decision, but after the war. The anti-Prussian combination must be a permanent feature of European life—if Prussia is to learn by the method of force at all.

There is nothing in the history of European alliances which gives much hope of such permanence.

Assume that we obtain complete military victory over the Teutonic Powers, but that at the time of coming to the Peace Table the future foreign policy of Russia, Japan, America, Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, is

all uncertain—as it is likely to be—so that the future action of any or all is not clearly predetermined but guided by interests dictated by the circumstances of particular international situations as they arise. If that is the condition of chaos in international politics (as it has been for generations); if there are no general fundamental principles to which states and peoples are pledged, and in which they have come really to believe, as they now believe in their separate “national destinies”; if their common interest is obscured by secret bargaining and deliberately nursed national rivalries—why, Prussia will realize, as she has realized in the past that a military decision in Europe is not a permanent decision, since the forces that have carried it into effect are bound sooner or later to split, to “cancel out” their power by internecine conflict, and so once more give her an opportunity of profiting by the division of her enemies.

Modern Europe has never shown sufficient cohesion to meet even a common danger, or deal with a monstrous moral evil. I have

mentioned the case of Turkey. Here was a pagan, barbaric, anti-Christian, anti-European Power who oppressed year after year, century after century, great Christian populations, oppressing them with a form of tyranny compared to which the fate of the Alsatians under Germany or the Poles under Austria was liberalism and freedom itself. Europe could have dealt with this problem. It had at any time during the nineteenth century a preponderance of power, if it could have acted as a unit. It never could act as a unit. Always was Turkey, the Great Assassin, able to detach one of the Christian nations and make it her ally. For half a century Great Britain was that nation. The last war fought by Britain on the continent was to prevent the break-up of Turkey, to check the power of Russia in the Balkans, to prevent the liberation of Christian populations from Turkish rule.

It is very nearly true to say of all the combatants today fighting, that they have not an enemy today who was not quite recently,

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historically speaking, an ally, nor an ally that was not in the recent past an enemy.

A popular American statesman said not long since, pointing to Belgium to illustrate his dictum: "This war proves that the nation which looks to international agreements instead of to its own power for protection is lost; and deserves its fate."

Mr. Roosevelt also appears to draw that moral. Speaking at Portland, Maine, on March 28th (1918), he comes out definitely against any future participation of America in disarmament, and anything more than the most halting participation in international organization. He says:

Friends, be on your guard against the apostles of weakness and folly when peace comes. They will tell you that this is the last great war. They will tell you that they can make paper treaties and agreements and guarantees by which brutal and unscrupulous men will have their souls so softened that weak and timid men won't have anything to fear and that brave and honest men won't have to prepare to defend themselves.

Well we have seen that all such treaties are worth less than scraps of paper when it becomes to the interests of powerful and ruthless militarist nations to disregard them. . . . After the war is over these foolish pacifist creatures will again raise their piping voices against preparedness and in favour of patent devices for maintaining peace without effort. Let us enter into every reasonable agreement which bids fair to minimize the chances of war and to circumscribe its area. . . . But let us remember it is a hundred times more important for us to prepare our strength for our own defence than to enter any of these peace treaties and that if we thus prepare our strength for our own defence we shall minimize the chances of war as no paper treaties can possibly minimize them; and we shall thus make our views effective for peace and justice in the world at large as in no other way can they be made effective.¹

It will be noted that Mr. Roosevelt falls into just the confusion here dealt with and perpetuates it. Intensify the armament competition of the past, let everybody be stronger than everybody else, put into the background any arrangements for preventing our quarrel-

¹ *New York Tribune*, March 29th.



ling with one another, and peace will be maintained. For Mr. Roosevelt international agreements are merely a weak alternative to military power, not the means by which power can be made effective to common protection. He implies that internationalists expect international organization to render the maintenance of peace effective, not because it is a means of concentrating power upon a common danger, but because they expect "brutal and unscrupulous men" to have their souls "softened." When the six-shooter of the frontier town is replaced by the more efficient police force of the city, is it because the organizers of the police force expected brutal and unscrupulous criminals to have their souls "softened" by the charter of municipal government? One refrains from comment. But the matter is important since the report from which this speech is taken says that a call for "three cheers for the next President of the United States" was responded to by the audience rising and standing.

Have we here an indication of the line which

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America will take in 1920 in international organization and agreement for limitation of armament?

It is one of the extraordinary things of life that there is a type of public character who can gain a great reputation as a practical man, and a man of action instead of a man of words, by doing mainly two things—talking a very great deal and propounding policies that are outrageously impractical and in flat contradiction to common sense.

Take this very common conclusion from the fate of Belgium. Belgium was a little state whose independence was guaranteed by a treaty resting on the word of four Powers. The treaty was violated. Therefore we will have no more treaties. So be it. After the war then you are going to say to Belgium: "We have found that treaties are no good and you must henceforth depend not on collective but individual power. Shift for yourself." Are you really going to say that?—to a Belgium of seven millions of population, confronting the power of an Austro-Germany of some hun-

dred and fifty millions? Of course not. It would simply be an admission that you can't protect a small state against a greater one and that the only future for the small state is to be absorbed on the best terms it can get. It would be to abandon the whole purpose and justification of the war, a craven admission of most complete defeat.

You are going to say to Belgium: "The treaty which protected you was a dangerously unreliable one, signed by four great Powers, all at periods suspecting one another's intentions and having obligations that might very well come into conflict with the obligation to fight whichever state, irrespective of anything else, should threaten your integrity. We are therefore going to have an instrument of a wider kind, backed by a much larger number of guarantors, who shall not have any obligation that will come into conflict with the obligation to protect you," and so on. And you are going to do that or admit defeat, not only so far as Belgium is concerned but so far as all of the western democracies are concerned.

You say: "No nation can depend upon anything but its power; treaties cannot be relied upon; each nation must shift for itself." Very well. Take France. Imagine France having to depend in this war upon its own power. What would have been her chance of success? Could any one of the western nations have successfully waged this war alone? We have internationalized war. Internationalism—for us at least—has become the condition of military success.

What is the most immediate political question affecting this problem of the impermanence of military alliances? The substitution of Mr. Wilson's policy for the old? Yes, but that itself involves a consideration of a hoary principle of statecraft: the Balance of Power. Very learned students of international affairs assure us that even a Society of Nations must be based upon a Balance of Power, as order within the state is based upon the "balance of power" held by the government party as against the opposition. There is a whole nest of confusions here which we must clear up.

What is the difference between the Balance of Power and what Mr. Wilson has called the Community of Power? Between the condition of affairs which exists in a legislature when the preponderance of one party makes government possible and that which exists as between different states?

The fundamental idea of a Balance of Power was stated by Polybius. "Never," he said, "should any one be allowed to acquire power so great as to make it impossible for you to dispute with him concerning your just rights." So no state or group of states should be allowed to obtain such power that others could not dispute with it or them on terms of equality.

But how, in practical politics, are we to determine when a group has become preponderantly powerful? We know to our cost that military power is extremely difficult of just estimate. It cannot be weighed and balanced exactly. So in political practice the Balance of Power means a Rivalry of Power, because each, to be on the safe side, wants to be just a bit stronger than the other.

You get a condition indeed in which security for both depends upon each being stronger than the other. In the end there is bound to be a trial of strength. It creates of itself the very condition it set out to prevent.

The fundamental defect in the whole conception is this: it regards power as the ultimate fact in politics; whereas the ultimate fact is the purpose for which the power will be used. Obviously you don't want a balance of power between justice and injustice, law and crime; between anarchy and order. You want a preponderance of power on the side of justice, of law, of order. And here we have the fatal defect of the whole principle.

If, in international politics, you are pledged to the maintenance of the Balance, just for the purpose of maintaining the Balance, you cannot also be pledged to the maintenance of a preponderance of power on the side of law or justice. The two obligations are in conflict.

That can best be made clear perhaps by an illustration.

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Assume for the sake of illustration, what many English authorities declare to be the case,¹ that England would have been bound in the interest of the Balance of Power to go to the assistance of France when she was attacked, whether Germany violated the integrity of Belgium or not. Then that absolute obligation deprived English power, however great it may have been, of any effectiveness as a deterrent of German aggression against Belgium, or material value as a guaranty of Belgian independence, once Germany had decided upon war with France, or decided that it was inevitable. England, through her signature of the Belgian treaty, would say to Germany: "If you go through Belgium you will have to meet our power." To which

¹ "Our honour and interest must have compelled us to join France and Russia even if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights of her small neighbours and had sought to hack her way through the Eastern fortresses. The German Chancellor has insisted more than once upon this truth. He had fancied apparently that he was making an argumentative point against us by establishing it. That, like as much more, only shows his complete misunderstanding of our attitude and our character. . . . We reverted to our historical policy of the Balance of Power."—*Times*, leading article, March 8, 1915.

the German Government would reply: "But we have to meet your power even though we do *not* go through Belgium, since for the purposes of the Balance of Power you are pledged to France. In terms of expediency therefore it does not matter whether we violate the Belgian treaty or not. For you are going to punish us with your enmity whether we keep it or whether we respect it; whether we violate the law or whether we scrupulously observe it."

The Balance of Power obligation rendered ineffective the defence of the law through power. There was a real conflict of obligation, as there must always be under a system which places the maintenance of power, or its fictitious "balance," before the maintenance of the purposes for which power should be used.

Take another illustration.

Imagine (incidentally a quite possible contingency) that some member of the Allied group—Italy or Roumania say—does not get at the settlement all that it had hoped to, and

that, following the precedent of former Balkan settlements, it goes forward with preparations for securing by arms what it has been unable to secure by negotiation. Austria, say, says in effect to the Allies, "If Italy attacks will you help to restrain her, to render effective your own settlement." What is going to be our reply, our policy? If we are to retain Italy on our side of the Balance of Power, we must make it clear to Italy, and so to the world, that she will not be interfered with by the Alliance. That notification will do two things. It will enable Austria to say to the Alliance: "If I am to be secure in the settlements which you yourself have sanctioned, I must re-create my power as the only defence of rights you yourself have recognized." It will also serve as notice to any other disgruntled state of the Alliance that it is free to secure its maximum programme if it can find the power and the opportunity. Which means that the whole edifice of Europe will once more crumble; thanks to the obligations of the Balance of Power.

If, on the other hand, we notify Austria that we will not permit a member of our Alliance to violate a settlement we have laid down, we become, in the conditions just indicated, the allies of Austria. And that ends the Balance of Power. If Italy should push the thing to war and Austria defend herself we should fight on Austria's side in order to make the undertaking good. The obligation to enforce a law has turned the Balance of Power into a preponderance of power on behalf of a predetermined purpose. That is to say it has made it what Mr. Wilson has called it, a Community of Power.

If our Belgian treaties—or any other treaties—of the future are to stand the strains of fear and anarchic struggles for self-preservation or selfishness and rival ambitions, then the Balance of Power must give place to the Society of the Nations.

Balance of Power and Community of Power are mutually exclusive methods. The struggle to maintain the balance excludes the possibility of common action in the defence of law,

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and compels each of the two parties to rely on his preponderant strength; and that, as we have seen, can only lead to anarchy or despotism.

CHAPTER II

A PATRIOTISM OF THE LARGER FATHERLAND— OR SUBJUGATION

Will Germany duplicate in the Balkans and in Russia the process by which Britain achieved the conquest of India, *i. e.*, conquer by forces furnished by the conquered? The conflict of the two patriotisms. How the intensity of the narrower patriotism renders inevitable the triumph of an enemy with a wider one. The patriotism of defeat or the patriotism of victory?

THIS much then is established: If our safety rests upon a basis of force at all, an indispensable part of that force is a degree of political unity greater than the European group now composing our Alliance has shown in the past. Without that unity as a permanent fact in western society, a momentary military decision in our favour, even the complete destruction of the existing German military machine, cannot be a permanent decision.

But just what that means as affecting our

future outlook in foreign politics, and certain profound emotions that have marked it heretofore, cannot be realized unless we examine the present situation of Germany with reference to the states that used to compose Russia; and to the states of the Balkans.

Here on the one hand is Prussianized Germany, a state whose outstanding characteristic is a very high degree of national discipline and unity. We know too well the degree of regimentation which has given that state, not only unity of action but unity of feeling and thought: the whole nation moves with a synchrony of motion in ideas and national policy as complete as the synchrony of the physical motion in a platoon of soldiers exhibiting the goose-step. Incidentally, there is this important fact to note: that during long periods of history it was the exactly contrary fact which characterized the history of the diverse and warring states, which the world knew as Germany. Under the Holy Roman Empire they numbered some three hundred. For centuries German state fought German

state, and the whole tendency was disruptive. No people of common tongue and more or less common origins had broken up into such fragments. The moral and intellectual drilling which has reversed that process was in many respects the conscious reversal of a "natural" drift or tendency; as little spontaneous in many of its aspects as the discipline of a conscript army.

What concerns us today, however, is its very high degree of success. The Germans are a docile and disciplined people if ever there was one; cohesive, unified, and national in their policy.

Now place the fact of that national discipline and cohesion side by side with another fact: the welter of mutually hating nationalities, races, religions, economies, tongues, cultures, aspirations composing the Slavonic world which is Germany's geographical neighbour—that is to say the Balkan States and Russia. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the countless deep and bitter divisions that split these peoples. As one attempts to un-

ravel the tangle it would seem that human ingenuity had been exhausted in the attempt to find causes of division, hate, and disintegration. It is not merely that we find the racial tree split into innumerable branches, races becoming tribes and tribes becoming clans; but that where identity of race or clan might unify, the clan itself is split by divisions of religion; and where a religion elsewhere is unifying minor divisions are discovered here which set up decomposition. If you get race and nationality coinciding, you are certain to get deadly enmities on the question of religion—one kind of Catholic bitterly antagonistic to another kind of Catholic of the same race and nationality. And the divisions are not only vertical but horizontal. You may find one geographical area claimed as the unquestionable national patrimony of six different nationalities—for the Near East shows claims based on “historic tradition” and “national irredentism” of a kind which if they obtained in the West would make the Dutch, for instance, the passionate claimants

of New York because it was once New Amsterdam; or the French of New Orleans. We talked at the beginning of the war of the struggle of Slav *v.* Teuton. But the event has shown what we might have expected: that there is no Slav block.

Let us keep in mind the fact of this juxtaposition of a solid German block of disciplined, efficient, unified people, endowed with a well trained gift for organization, possessing to a very high degree all the machinery of industrial development and of civil order, all that, on the one side; and on the other, a loose, unorganized, hopelessly divided, and mutually hating mass of complicated nationalities, lacking the means of economic development and the capacity for maintaining civil order or social security. Then by way of getting some hint of the moral of that picture, recall Seeley's illuminating lecture on the real explanation of the British conquest of India.

He asked this question: How was it that a vast country, with two or three hundred

million souls, not savage or uncivilized but with a civilization, though descending along a different stream of tradition, as real and ancient as our own, came to be utterly conquered and subdued by a people, numbering less than twelve millions, living on the other side of the world? It reversed the teaching of history which had shown again and again that it was impossible really to conquer an intelligent people alien in tradition from its invaders. The whole power of Spain could not in eighty years conquer the Dutch provinces with their petty population. The Swiss could not be conquered. At the very time when the conquest of India's hundreds of millions was under way, the English showed themselves wholly unable to reduce to obedience three millions of their own race in America. What was the explanation? The Inherent Superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Stock?

Well, for long we were content to draw such a flattering conclusion and leave it at that, until Seeley pointed out the uncomfortable fact that the great bulk of the forces used in

the conquest of India were not British at all. They were Indian. India was conquered for Great Britain by the natives of India.

The nations of India [says Seeley] have been conquered by an army of which on the average about a fifth part was English. India can hardly be said to have been conquered at all by foreigners; she was rather conquered by herself. If we were justified, which we are not, in personifying India as we personify France or England, we could not describe her as overwhelmed by a foreign enemy; we should rather have to say that she elected to put an end to anarchy by submitting to a single government, even though that government were in the hands of foreigners.¹

In other words, India is an English possession because the peoples of India were incapable of cohesion; the nations of India incapable of internationalism. And what I am suggesting is this: that the part which England played in India will be played inevitably by Germany, for the same order of reasons, in the Balkans and in the states

¹ *The Expansion of England*, p. 202.

that were once Russia, unless the process can be checked, or take on another character altogether, by virtue of a factor which I will indicate presently.

In order to realize how far the cases are parallel (and I do not of course pretend that there is an absolutely mechanical parallel) note first what is actually taking place as between Germany and the states of Russia at this moment. Ukrainians have called in the aid of Germans for the purpose, not so much of creating a Ukrainian state—for the Russian Bolshevik government would not have opposed that—but for the purpose of suppressing Russian (*i. e.*, Bolshevik) parties within Ukrainia. Ukrainian troops are being led by German officers and are co-operating with German troops in conflict with the Red Guards of the Bolsheviks from northern Russia.¹ In Finland, Courland, Esthonia, and Lithuania, the property-owning classes have appealed to German aid for the maintenance of the independence of their states as against

¹ See footnote, p. 52.

Great Russia. The pregnant fact in the whole situation today is that Germany is using Russian forces for the purpose of subduing Russia, and there is every indication that that process is likely to continue in one form or another.

And a suggestive fact is that it is not a new process in the war. The Central Empires have been employing it from the beginning. Austria has not only been able to use, during the best part of four years, troops—conscript—of Slav nationality for the purpose of fighting “the Liberators of the Slav world” as we proclaimed the Tsar’s army to be; but was able to place troops under Jugo-Slav officers—a Jugo-Slav general led the Austrian troops against the Italian forces. And this was made possible, be it noted, as much by our policy—our sanction of Italy’s designs—as by any initial lack of Slav solidarity.

The parallel we are dealing with fails at one point: Britain, which subdued India, was ten thousand miles away with a long line of communication to maintain. Germany—

in which for this purpose one includes the Germans of Austria—has her frontier running cheek by jowl with *her* India. Or rather, the solid German block is driven like a wedge right into the unorganized Slavonic mass.

Just recall the divisions that separate Ukrainian, Lett, Esthonian, Lithuanian, Pole, Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, Serb, Roumanian, Albanian, Bulgar, Greek, Macedonian, and recall Seeley's description of India:

There was no India in the political, and scarcely in any other, sense. The word was a geographical expression, and therefore India was easily conquered just as Italy and Germany fell an easy prey to Napoleon, because there was no Italy and no Germany, and not even any strong Italian or German national feeling. Because there was no Germany Napoleon was able to set one German state against another, so that in fighting with Austria or Prussia he had Bavaria and Württemberg for allies. As Napoleon saw that this means of conquest lay ready to his hand in Central Europe, so the Frenchman Dupleix early perceived that this road to empire in India lay open to any European state that might have factories there. He saw a condition of

chronic war between one Indian state and another, and he perceived that by interfering in their quarrels the foreigner might arrive to hold the balance between them. He acted upon this view, and accordingly the whole history of European Empire in India begins with the interference of the French in the war of succession in Hyderabad that broke out on the death of the great Nizam ul Mulk (1748).¹

There is one passage in Seeley which indicates the most important conclusion of all perhaps to be drawn from the parallel his story suggests. But the words he uses have connotations which almost inevitably prompt a conclusion which is the exact reverse of that to which in truth the facts point. Seeley says:

✓ The fundamental fact then is that India had no jealousy of the foreigner because India had no sense whatever of national unity.

• What would the ordinary protagonist of nationalist patriotism point as the moral of

¹ *Expansion of England*, pp. 202-203.

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this passage? He would say: "Now you see the utility of the instinctive patriotism which connotes a dislike of the foreigner; the absolute need, for national preservation, of this sentiment of which internationalism is the negation. India had no patriotism, no dislike of the foreigner, she was universalist—with the result we know."

But as we shall see, that was not Seeley's thought. He might have expressed it as nearly by the contrary statement; if for instance he had said:

The fundamental fact then is that India had no sense of national unity because the Indian's jealousy of foreigners was so intense that to him everybody except the people of his own village—and they only if they belonged to the same race and caste and creed—was a foreigner.

For Seeley says this:

We regard it as the duty of a man to fight for his country against the foreigner. But what is a man's country? When we analyse the notion, we find it presupposes the man who has been bred up

in a community which may be regarded as a great family. . . . But if the community has not been at all of the nature of a family, but has been composed of two or three races hating each other, . . . that at most the village has been regarded as a home, then it is not the fault of the natives of it if they have no patriotism but village patriotism.¹

Here is a further fact to be kept in mind in drawing the true lesson from the parallel we are indicating. Germany was itself—and not long ago—an European India, riven into an infinity of small states each with its exclusive patriotism. Both contrasting conditions that we are dealing with—the present cohesion of the originally separated Germanies (which our grandfathers always called them) and the anarchy and welter of the Balkans—are both ascribable to an intensity of patriotism, to group loyalty, to what Mr. Trotter has taught us to call, hard instinct. But the development of Germany's cohesion has been . due to the enlargement of the patriotism of Bavaria or Hanover into the patriotism of

¹ *Expansion of England*, p. 206.

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Germany, and if the Slavonic world—(or for that matter non-German Europe)—is successfully to resist the German power it must go through a like process. If it becomes, in any sense, the apauage of a German power it will be because its patriotisms have been too limited in scope; too little and not too much universalist; too much of the village, and too little of mankind; because it has found too many foreigners not too few. And the moral is that if these little dividing patriotisms could be swept away and centred upon the patriotism of all the non-German peoples suffering German tyranny—if in Poland, in Austria, in Ukraina, Courland, Lithuania, Esthonia, Finland, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the non-German elements could make common cause, the position of Germany as a power of tyranny would become impossible.

But Germany may conquer because the lesser patriotisms will make the larger patriotisms impossible.

We can profitably push the analogy a little further and say this: Our successful defeat of

tyranny depends upon such a development of the sense of patriotism among the democratic nations that it will attach itself rather to the conception of the unity of all free co-operative societies, than to the mere geographical and racial divisions; a development that will enable it to organize itself as a cohesive power for the defence of that ideal, by the use of all the forces, moral and material, which it wields.

And if we do not show ourselves capable of that one can imagine a Seeley of the future writing in about this strain:

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Non-German Europe fell, not because it was inferior in power or resources or civilization to the Germanic conqueror, but because its patriotic loyalties centred upon too small a unit. European civilization, Western Society, were entities only for the student. Every attempt to express that unity in defensive institutions—a common parliament, or senate or court—excited immediately the hostilities of the smaller patriotisms. “Internationalist” became a term of reproach and contempt on the part of the national writers almost as intense as “pacifist.” All the institutions of unification—Hague Courts, League of Nations, and

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the like—came to have in the popular mind connotations of lukewarmness in patriotism. So little had the habit of co-operation between the non-German European states been developed, that even during the Five Years' War the Military Council established at Versailles to create some unity of military direction was regarded with great disfavour. In fact the Allies at no time were able to achieve complete co-ordination of military action, largely because of this hostility to any but national bodies. Whether it be true or not, as some evidence seems to show, that the German power encouraged this separatism by subsidizing the more clamantly "patriotic" press in the Allied states, it is certain that the propaganda of intensely nationalist type carried on by that press had results in public temper and outlook which in the end made German triumph inevitable.

Of what avail is this moralizing? It will be argued that we are dealing with a condition, not a theory; that these rivalries of differing race and creed are age-long; that such hostilities are inherent in our natures and that we can do nothing to attenuate them. They are "elemental forces." And so on.

Now one of the most suggestive things in the contrast of German solidarity on one hand, and Balkan and Slavonic disruption on the other, is the fact just touched on that the very disunity which now marks the Balkan peoples, marked less than a century ago the Germanies. Before Napoleon awoke it with his conquest, there was practically no "German" patriotism. There was a Bavarian patriotism, a Suabian patriotism, a Prussian patriotism, so that Napoleon was able to set one against another. But now the patriotism for Württemberg or Hanover has been merged in the patriotism for Germany.

How have these "elemental" hostilities been overcome? How have the old enemies been brought to make common cause?

We get here what is in one sense the most hopeful fact of the whole phenomenon. That change has not been the result mainly of non-human factors, or of the blind play of outside forces. It has been due to the conscious effort of men's minds, the actual personal work of certain definite German writers who by

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their labours destroyed one tradition and established another. It is a familiar story how Fichte, Stein, Hardenberg and Scharnhorst and their co-labourers converted the Prussian and Suabian patriotism into the German patriotism. They played as definite a rôle in that transmutation of feeling as another German, Marx, played in the ideas that are now having such explosive force in Russia.

Would a more unified world outside of Germany affect in any way Germany's power of domination over her conquered territories? Could a league composed of Britain, France, Italy, America,—North and South,—Japan, China, South Africa, and the other overseas British states, wielding its moral and material forces, successfully resist the German subjugation of neighbouring peoples?

Now—and this is a truth which one feels disposed to stop and shout at every stage of this argument—it is not necessary to answer that in the affirmative in order to make a sound case for the larger patriotism. All we need to show is that, whether resistance to

German power on the part of these states with the aid of the Western Democracies can be successful or not, it certainly cannot possibly be successful if the old narrower patriotism obtains. With the enlargement of our patriotisms it may succeed; without that, it cannot.

And that is the extent of this particular moral.

CHAPTER III

THE FORCE OF A SOCIETY OF NATIONS: COULD IT BE EFFECTIVE?

Why the Policeman of Civilization has not the power that he might have; and the criminal, power of which he might be deprived. The prevailing misconception concerning the means by which a League of Nations would maintain peace. Its power would be effective not so much through repression as by so changing the conditions of international intercourse that conflict would not arise, or, arising, would be controllable by depriving the rebel of forces upon which he can now count.

“If the Nations at present leagued against Germany are not in a position to impose their will, what hope can there be in a League of Nations? What more could a Society of Nations add to the power of civilization? What other forces are needed to prove the presence of the moral unity of mankind?”. asks Mr. G. K. Chesterton. “Is Iceland to turn the scale? Is Spitzbergen to dic-

tate peace to the world? Is the Island of Rumpti Foo roused at last?"

It is not an unusual question. But it implies a misconception of the way in which society, in the spheres where it ~~has~~ done it successfully, organizes its power against the forces of evil that would threaten it and renders its moral unity practically effective.

Any government or authority, national or international, which is merely an instrument of repression, is certain to be a very bad instrument of repression, as recent governments in Russia—from Tsarist to Bolshevik—have been very abundantly illustrating. If the forces of our governments are effective within the frontier, they are so because they are means of protection (protection even to the potential criminal so long as he obeys the law or so soon as he ceases to defy it), and so rally support to themselves. They achieve this strength as protectors, not primarily because they have policemen—that is putting the cart before the horse—but because they stand for a law which the majority favours and desires

to see enforced, since it enables them to live and go about their business. If the law is uncertain and there is a fear that a strong police force might use its power for oppression, that power is unlikely to become dependable. When there is no law and everybody with stealable property must be ready for self-defence—for enforcing his own right—there can be no concentration of society's power, no "moral unity." It may well happen that in such a state of anarchy—in Arabia, in Morocco—there blazes up a tribal feud in which all the right is on one side and all the wrong on the other. But what of the law for which the tribes that are in the right in this case will stand in the future? It is that question which will determine very largely the support which will rally to them and the consequent power which they can wield.

Now the truth is that European society is ineffective in dealing with its criminal just because the moral unity which Mr. Chesterton would have us believe is so complete is dangerously incomplete. It is true that most

of the non-Germanic world is leagued against Germany. But nearly all have entered the League for different purposes: Italy for one, Japan for another, Greece for a third, Roumania for a fourth. We know—in our honest moments—that of all the belligerents perhaps only two, America and Belgium, entered the contest simply on behalf of a general human law. Will Mr. Chesterton tell us the future law of the nations—the conditions of life that is—which the Entente will establish as the result of its victory? Mr. Chesterton tells us that it certainly ought not to be a League of Nations which he regards as an invention of the Devil—or at least of the Jews and the Pacifists, and the international usurers.

But, it will be said, the *pre-bellum* lack of moral unity is irrelevant. The fact is that the forces of civilization are now rallied against the enemy regardless of the purpose of each belligerent.

Well, even that is not true. Russia was so uncertain as to the future conditions which would be established that the purposes of her

revolution seemed to her people more worth while than the purposes of the war; Russia must be deducted from the forces of civilization. Japan's forces have been passive. Her ultimate purposes are so uncertain that many Russians may fear the enemy's purposes less, and side with him. Again, the Revolutionary socialists in Italy, France, and England are so uncertain as to the conditions of life for which the war is being fought, that they may use some of their force for purposes other than those of the war; that diversion has already possibly played some part as in the Italian defeat and then there are the dangerous complications in Ireland.

Can we say here that we have a "moral unity"?

But even though we could disregard these considerations, Mr. Chesterton's argument is fallacious. For if the Society of Nations had existed many factors of weakness for us and of strength for the enemy would not have been brought into play at all.

But is that a practical consideration now?

Yes. For if he is beaten his decision as to renewing the fight or not will depend on whether the forces rallying against him will make the next contest more, or less, favourable to him. If he is not completely beaten the extent to which his partial victory may become a tyranny and a stepping-stone to further aggression will depend also upon the forces that meantime can be arrayed against him.

There are some situations in life which can only be cured by prevention; for the worst phases of which there is no remedy, as in fires and pestilence. If the prevention has failed we must merely start again and improve it with a view to the next danger: not ask the prevention to cure. A homely illustration may clear up the confusion. My party in the town council had been insisting that the habit of householders of keeping kerosene cans in their kitchens, and the fire department's insistence upon so distributing its stations that rapid concentration on a given spot was impossible, would

one day result in a gigantic fire. A fire breaks out and assumes big proportions. The householders immediately remove their cans, and the fire department, after much delay, concentrates all its force upon the fire. Both measures are ineffectual; the fire has too firm a hold. The critics of our party say: "Your precious plan was carried out; the kerosene cans were removed and the fire department was concentrated. Yet the town burned down. That shows your method was quite ineffectual."

The nature of much of the propaganda on behalf of a League of Nations has provoked this misconception. We commonly conceive of it as a means of compelling obedience to the laws of the nations as they now exist. But its greatest effectiveness as an instrument of peace will be in so changing those laws that we shall disagree less upon them, so that when they are challenged a much larger party will be found on the side of society and a much smaller one against it. That will be the first step—and a most necessary one—to the effective employment of force, of the

policeman. Certainly any League to Enforce Peace which assumed that its whole task was to enforce the international order as we now know it—even with considerable modifications of the map—would be an utter failure.

Men fight because they disagree concerning the conditions—some of them unfair—on which they shall have access to the earth. Or they disagree because they regard agreement with the foreigner as wicked, and his destruction or humiliation as a duty; an attempt to understand his point of view, treason. (It is the case of the racial, religious, and national patriotisms of the Balkans and elsewhere already touched upon.) Those ideas may be modified, as they have been modified by the intellectual authors of the Russian and other European revolutions. The creation of the outward form of a Society of Nations would itself be an immense force in their modification. That would be a by-product. Its first specific task, like the first task of society within a nation, is to secure the general recognition of those rights, denial

of which will cause men to fight; to find the arrangement which will secure the largest measure of agreement; and then to unify the forces pledged to the support of that body of law. And for these forces to have restraining or preventive power the prospective criminal must know that they will be used for the law's support. If Germany was uncertain that England's power would be used for the defence of Belgium, or thought that that power would be used even if Belgium was not attacked, then the actual and potential force of England, however great, was deprived of effectiveness as a preventive of aggression against Belgium.

It comes to what we have already noted: in the absence of a workable internationalism we cannot even discover the common enemy, because we are all more or less presumed to be enemies one of another. Had Europe unified itself sufficiently before the war to deal with its common problems of the Balkans, neither Turkey nor Bulgaria would have been found on the side of the enemy—a fact to

be kept in mind when we ask, "What more could a League of Nations do that the Alliance is not now doing?"

If before the war there had existed, not the coercive machinery of a League of Nations, but the legislative machinery; a parliament of Europe in which the problems of Morocco and Bagdad and Serbia had been very publicly and plentifully discussed so that enemy radical opinion had been able more clearly to discern the position of its government; if Austrian minorities had been able to express themselves before a European assembly if parliamentary control in all countries had been strengthened by the presence of representatives of the legislatures in such a body; if members of the Russian Duma had had their place therein; even if a general treaty had made it plain to the German and Austrian peoples that they would find arrayed against them in the circumstances of August, 1914, not only France and Russia, but England, Italy, Japan, and the United States—even so of course the Austro-German govern-

ments *might* have defied the world (though no one now seems to believe they would), but it is certain that the position of those governments in respect of their people's support would have been weaker than it is, and in Bulgaria or in Austria to say nothing of Germany itself the movements of revolt would have been bolder and more decisive than they are.

There are large sections of the enemy force which we know to be hostile to his purposes—the Slavs of Austria for instance. Was their failure to oppose their government more effectively due in any degree to the uncertainty of purposes, first of Russia and then of Italy and Roumania?

And finally there are the enemy peoples themselves? Under what law will they live when their government is defeated? They do not know, and that perhaps is the strongest of all the moral factors giving added power to what we believe to be an enemy of civilization.

The point is then that the force of the League of Nations will be largely preventive

by removing the causes of conflict; by depriving beforehand a prospective rebel of the force which would otherwise rally to him. The discovery of the real common will, the reaching of agreement on the general law, must precede the effective organization of the common forces to deal with the criminal, individual or national. To the degree to which a society fails in reaching agreement it is bound to find itself confronted by forces with which it cannot cope. The fact that the "government" in Domingo, Haiti—or for that matter Russia—so often finds itself overmatched in power by a rebellion, does not prove that organization for common protection should be abandoned in favour of anarchy.

The opposing moral which we commonly draw on the one hand from the Russian situation, and on the other from the position of the Alliance in reference to Germany, reveals the fashion in which, perhaps unconsciously, we become guilty of flat contradictions for the purpose of repelling any plan or method to which habit has not yet accustomed us.

Government in Russia breaks down, fails utterly; the country disintegrates; the forces of anarchy and crime become predominant. We do not say: "This proves that government is a failure; that constitutions will not hold together; that laws will not be obeyed. The anarchists, the Bolsheviks, the criminals are more powerful than the forces of order. These Pacifists who told us that laws and constitutions and governments were the way to deal with crime and disorder are all wrong. Here is the criminal stronger than the law. Let us kill the criminal where we can, and let everybody now go armed. But for heaven's sake, let us hear no more of this idealistic rubbish about orderly governments and laws and constitutions."

Nobody talks thus when national governments fail, as they do so often. Yet they have been given a good trial—say through all written history—and their failures have been bloody and disastrous. Nevertheless we go on with them, amending and improving where we can. Yet propose to correct or lessen the

anarchy of international field by the same means, and prospective failure, or partial failure, is accepted as proving any attempt in that direction to be foolish dreaming.

We are fighting for things—democracy and freedom—that have been mainly failures in the past. We do not accept these failures as the last word; and in such refusal lie the hopes of the world.

But there is a more material consideration. What may prove to be the most effective instrument of coercion to be employed against the Central states depends absolutely upon a closer unity of the nations outside. And that instrument is economic discrimination.

This, again, should not be conceived as a bludgeon suddenly to be used for the purpose of terrorizing a nation that had decided upon war. A boycott, threatened at the eleventh hour as a means of dissuading a state from a war upon which it had already decided, would certainly fail.

But that process is very different from the maintenance of a Society, membership in

which, and the advantages of which, are contingent upon the assumption of certain obligations. For instance: in return for the obligation to place his forces at the disposal of the Society for certain predetermined purposes, to accord a certain minimum of political rights to all communities within his state and to accord to other members of the Society the same conditions that he receives, each member would enjoy conditions of access to markets and raw materials and economic exploitation much superior to those accorded to states outside the Society. Tariffs, shipping rates, insurance, harbour dues, patent royalties, loans, could all be made subject to this differentiation. Would any great state—confronting commercial discrimination in North America, South America, Africa, India, China, not make very considerable concessions in order to obtain the advantages of membership in such a League?

This particular pressure or suasion would not be effective immediately, but if maintained would set in operation powerful motives in

favour of co-operation with the Western World as against a military challenge to it. In time the German people—in which must be included the German commercial classes—would ask questions as to the real value of economic imperialism as against economic internationalism. The consideration would be one factor in undermining the aggressive character of German policy.

There is a further fact to be weighed in this connection.

In shifting the discussion from immediate territorial readjustments to future international arrangements and Germany's place therein, the Allies would have this immense advantage: they would be dealing with matters in which the balance of forces is in their favour instead of against them. When we make claims for large territorial rectifications, the Germans are in a position to remind us of the war-map; but when we come to the question of Germany's future privileges in the world at large, we are entitled to say:

The war map may show in your favour; but you are absolutely unable to impose your will on any of your major enemies. We, the Western Allies, have created a Society of Nations, dominating not only western Europe, but the whole of the New World, the whole of Africa, and virtually the whole of Asia. If you hold your conquests and create a militarized Mitteleuropa at the cost of exclusion from the privileges of such a Society of Nations, you will lose immeasurably more than you will gain.

The argument presented by such an alternative would appeal not only to all those who have in the past fought autocracy in the Central Empires—the Social Democrats, the subject nationalities, the liberals—but to the great commercial and industrial interests that have heretofore supported imperialism. Commercial and industrial Germany would not lightly face permanent exclusion from, or unfavourable treatment in, South America, Asia, Africa.

It comes to this: that in our international relationships we have neglected a large

part of the persuasive and coercive moral forces by which society normally deals with the recalcitrant member, the criminal. The real social control in any community is not merely the threat of punishment—crime is often worst where the punishments are most ferocious—but the positive advantages offered to everyone in being part of Society, accepting its obligations, and supporting it. Not only do we say: “Break the law and we will punish you”; but we also say: “Obey the law and we shall see that it protects you, and that you enjoy its advantages.” And it is that part of the “sanction” which is probably the most operative.

But the analogous sanction, to be applied by the Allies to Germany, although powerful at present, is destined probably to lose much of its force with the passage of time. The more the stress of war compels Germany to become self-sufficing, the less will the threat of our blockade and the hope of access to our raw materials weigh with her. Russian and Turkish cotton, wood pulp cellulose,

synthetic rubber, are so many weapons drawn from our armory.

President Wilson here also has recognized the possibilities of such an economic weapon, and a hint concerning it has found a place in one of his messages. But its effectiveness is conditional upon the future of the Alliance. The use of such an instrument by a loosely co-ordinated group, with all sorts of disintegrating forces at work within it, would be far more likely to aid our own disruption than to be taken very seriously by the enemy. This economic instrument could perfectly well be used as part of the coercive machinery of civilization—on condition that we have sufficient degree of unity, and agreement on the ends for which it is employed.

CHAPTER IV

FACTORS OF ENEMY UNITY

How we contribute to the maintenance of enemy morale. Our failure to make clear what we mean by "the destruction of German Militarism" enables the German Government to make its worst aggressions appear defensive to the German people. Why the German Radicals cannot oppose their government, however much they may dislike it. Undoing the moral effect of the blockade. Playing the game of the enemy. Some witnesses.

' You will admit that the unity of the enemy—the unexpectedly prolonged cohesion of Austria, for instance; the continued adhesion of Turkey and so forth—has been a rather important military fact, and one worth while for us to understand, particularly if the public opinion, for which we civilians are responsible, has any bearing on it.

, I suggest to you that it has; that our public opinion, as it is expressed by our newspaper editors, and writers, and popular characters

has a very important bearing indeed on enemy unity; that in fact we are putting a certain instrument into the hands of the enemy governments which they are using to add to the already heavy load of our soldiers.

Let me indicate the nature of the situation by a series of homely illustrations.

Some policemen are at grips with a gang of dangerous brutes whom they want to disarm and take to the police station. But whenever the policemen show signs of getting the upper hand—whenever, that is, the criminals show a disposition to yield—certain kind, but non-combatant, friends of the policemen on the outskirts of the struggle, immediately address the criminals in this wise:

“Once the policemen get the handcuffs on you, you will be clubbed to death like mad dogs. They aren’t going to take you to the police station to be tried at all, for vermin aren’t tried; they are destroyed; and when the police get you down they’ll just crack your skulls like so many black-beetles. Don’t

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think you will get any mercy because you won't."

And that sort of objuratation to the criminals is supposed to help the policemen; to maintain the police morale! And the bystanders who do not join in it are supposed to be hostile to the police, and to desire their defeat.

Now, however you may question the conclusions which I shall draw from that trivial illustration, you cannot question its essential truth as an indication of the facts. Without any sort of doubt whatever, the attitude of those non-combatant spectators has been the attitude of our newspaper and magazine editors, our statesmen, bishops, movie actors, and other great ones of the earth, toward the struggle with certain criminals now going on in Europe.

But you will raise certain objections as one proceeds to develop the moral of this little story. First you will declare that you —by you I mean the spectators since you are part of them—did not mean the ferocious things you have been prophesying for the

criminals when they shall have been caught; secondly that our authorities have plainly declared it is not our intention to destroy these criminals, only properly to punish them; and thirdly that the criminal knew our threat of destruction to be an impotent menace, bluff. That is to say, if I should read to you, as I might, the articles from those popular newspapers, and the speeches of those popular clergymen about utterly destroying the German vermin, you would with very great impatience declare that the enemy knew perfectly well that he could not be destroyed, and that the Allied governments have more than once disavowed any such intention.

To which I would reply that that fact in no way detracts from the mischief of your indulgence in what might be called the "psychology of the non-combatant spectator of a fight." For this particular gang of criminals, being noted for a learned, dense, and unintelligent docility and credulity, is easily persuaded by their leaders that you mean exactly what you say; and those leaders can

use what you say to undo any good that might be done by what *your* leaders say. Moreover, these particular criminals are apt to test the intentions of the authorities who stand behind the policemen with these questions: "If we give up will the authorities protect us from these crazy bystanders with their talk about killing mad dogs? And just what will be our chance of earning a living when we are out of jail?" And on neither point have the authorities so far given any assurances and you almost threaten to rebel if they do.

Moreover your conduct—the conduct of these spectators that is—adds to the difficulties of the police in another way.

The fortunes of the struggle vary, and owing to accidents among the police complete subjugation of the whole gang is beset with such difficulty that an attempt is made to detach its saner and better elements.

But their leaders have discovered that at one period of the struggle, when things seemed to be going your way, your "mad

dog" policy had prevailed with your authorities, who had, it would appear planned some such treatment as that indicated by your first threats. Certain "secret treaties" were to subject the families of the criminals to penalties which would mean for them penury, or hard conditions of livelihood. And that fact makes it extremely difficult for the police to detach even the better element from the criminal gang. For the worst among them say to the better: "When they thought we were losing, they boasted how they would take our land—both east and west—and make our people suffer. There is not a question but that if they were strong enough they would do just that thing: the secret treaties prove it. Read what they threaten in their papers. So let us see that they never do become strong enough; and that we shall always be strong enough to resist. We'll steal all we can. Morality? What did they try to do?"

And so it became very difficult for the better element to prevail—thanks largely to

your policy, dictated by this "psychology of the non-combatant."

And now let us descend from allegory to the facts it interprets, noting first, however, that this method of detaching the better element of the gang from the worst is a perfectly recognized one in dealing with organized or unorganized crime. However much we may insist upon the need of punitive justice, Europe will not be able in the end, any more than Russia, to disregard that method. We, the western nations, are faced by Austro-German criminality. The forces of order and justice in Russia, whoever they may be, are faced by the crimes of a murdering and pillaging peasantry and proletariat, guilty of atrocities—our papers are now beginning to report them daily—as vile as anything that we used to read of as coming out of Germany. How will those horrors in Russia be brought to an end? By rallying to a better cause some of the mass that now makes the anarchic régime possible. And a similar process must be, not the exclusive means, but a part of the means, by which Western civili-

zation will deal with the organized terror of Prussia.

As I write these lines the morning papers¹ contain this telegram:

The Main Committee of the German Reichstag has voted twelve to ten against a motion of the Independent Social Democrats to evacuate the Aland Islands, and not interfere with the internal affairs of Finland by the despatch of troops and the supplying of arms.

. . . The Independent Socialists opposed the War Credit vote . . . Eduard Bernstein explained the opposition of his group by saying that it was due to the fact that the peace treaty with Russia made it impossible to have friendly relations with that country. Moreover, he said, the German policy towards Poland, Belgium, and Roumania, was contrary to the principle of self-determination.

Note what a transfer of two or three votes would have implied. The fact is important as indicating that a little more, or a little less, in the effects of our diplomatic policy will sometimes make vastly important differences. We

¹ March 23, 1918.

adopt a given line of policy like that taken by Mr. Wilson in February. It is followed by a gross act of brigandage on Germany's part. Immediately we say: "See how utterly useless are these attempts to aid liberal policy in Germany." It is an utterly false standard of judgment. Had it been possible for Mr. Wilson to adopt that policy two years ago and keep it up, its results might have been very visible. We are not dealing in absolutes. Neither side will have absolute victory, nor absolutely impose its will. No settlement will be absolutely satisfactory, or conclusive; there is no such thing here as absolute security. The difference between good and bad policies will oftentimes be decided by judgments that must be quantitative; a question of degrees.

And particularly will that be the case in estimating the value of any policy of ours that bears upon the question of the enemy's unity. Let us consider some of the facts.

In preceding lectures I have attempted to show that the disunity of aim among the Allies is caused by our failure to provide, in

any way that will appeal to practical politicians, for the satisfaction of the overpowering instinct of national self-preservation among the members of the Alliance.

But the condition which, paradoxically enough, acts as a disintegrating force within the Alliance, acts as an integrating force in the enemy Alliance.

We have—very rightly in my view—proclaimed as our major objects in this war, “the destruction of German militarism.” So much so that our real demand on the enemy is not a specific condition connected with a transfer of territory—he might offer to evacuate and indemnify Belgium, France, and Serbia tomorrow and yet we should know that our real objective had not been obtained. Our major term is: “Reduce your military power, and its prestige.”

Let us shoulder an unwelcome, unpleasant task—duty, if, as we seem to be pretty generally agreed, it is a duty to understand the right political strategy so that we need not impose unnecessary burdens upon our sol-

diers. And that duty is to think for a moment with the mind of our enemy. To do so is as essential to good political as to good military strategy; and much more difficult. For in the case of military strategy you don't have to shed your moral indignation and take on the moral indignation of the enemy. It is much more in the nature of a mechanical problem. Where you have to consider moral impulses from his point of view it is immensely more difficult. And desperately irritating to your audience, if you are trying to do it for the benefit of one, and almost certain to expose the demonstrator to charges of pro-Germanism. Yet it is indispensable to the solution of our problem.

As a prefatory note let us try to get one distinction clear. You may believe, as I do, the Germans to be utterly wrong, and their cause an evil one. Yet that belief is in no way inconsistent, given the illimitable capacity for human self-deception, especially where patriotism is involved, with the realization that the Germans may believe themselves to

be completely right and their cause a holy one. A people whose sources of information are so controlled that for the most part they only hear part of the facts, and those coloured, can be led into most incredible conclusions. Yet the very people who regard it as a crime to consider dispassionately the enemy point of view, and who have never controlled themselves sufficiently for ten minutes in order to do it, are just those who will insist, not only that the Germans are wrong, but that they know themselves to be wrong.

It is most necessary to keep this distinction in mind, in trying to see the effect of our policy, of Mr. Wilson's declarations, etc., on the mind of the enemy. We must see those things, not with our eyes—which would not be thinking with the mind of the other man at all—but really with those of the enemy.

Suppose then you were a German Radical or socialist, not having approved of your country's conduct, anxious to bring the war to a close, anxious to do the square thing. How would you proceed? And that is a very

pertinent question because through our pressure upon the German civilian population by our blockade and so on, it is just that disposition of mind that we are taking very great trouble to produce. It is, in a sense, our main objective. Assume that we have had some measure of success, and that that state of mind has become very common with the civilian; that those who have come to share that view form a party, or constitute an influence. How, if you were part of it, would you proceed? You would urge the need of offering reparation and restitution. But, though you believe that your country has been wrong, you do not believe that its future children, who are not responsible for the wrong, should be punished. So you want to assure the country's security, the respect of its fair rights, those economic opportunities by which its future citizens are to earn their livelihood. And you are faced by the fact that the only means by which nations have defended those things in the past, military power, is the very thing

which your enemy, as the major condition of peace, asks shall be destroyed. He does not offer any substitute, any method in which even he believes.

How, in these circumstances, would you reply to your Chancellor? He argues thus:

I am anxious to talk peace with the enemy, but he has asked as his first condition, the destruction of our military power.

How am I to continue the conversation. This primary condition "the destruction of German militarism" means that Germany is to be rendered helpless again as in centuries past, exposed by her neighbours' lust for power. . . . That is what our foes understand by the destruction of Prussian militarism.

And he not only proclaims that we are to have no military power, but he also proclaims at a solemn conference called for the purpose, that after rendering us helpless to resist, we are to be discriminated against economically, that we are not to have access to raw material, that there is to follow the "war after the war."¹

¹ This is the general sense of Bethmann-Hollweg's speech in the Reichstag, April 6, 1916.

At the time of the discussions in England which preceded the

This supposititious German Radical, doing his best to show his people that they should refuse any longer to support their government and its methods and insist upon peace, would reply to that argument, of course, by pointing out that President Wilson, among others, had declared that there was to be no economic discrimination against the German people;

holding of the Paris Economic Conference and the taking of certain measures with reference to African Trade by the Colonial office, there appeared in the German press comments of which the following are samples:

"That England's uneasiness about the economic expansion of Germany and her penetration into spheres which up to then England had looked upon as her sole domain was, at any rate, a strong factor in determining the British Government and Parliament to take part in the war, is now increasingly shown by the movement which runs through England and the whole Empire for an economic boycott of Germany, in which project England, taking advantage of the bitterness aroused by the war, is trying to induce her Allies to participate."—*Frankfurter Zeitung* (Radical), March 14, 1916.

"The struggle of the Allies against Prussian militarist domination is nothing but the struggle against the existence of Germany; yes, against her political and also her economic existence. That can no longer be disputed after the declaration of the English Minister, Bonar Law. The latter announces an economic entente among the Allies after the war, and promises to supplant Germany in many markets especially in Western Russia, which is to fall economically into the hands of England and France. Thus he not only indicates the aims of England in the war, but he shows us why she went to war."—*Internationale Korrespondenz*, cited in *L'Humanite*, March 4, 1916.

that the German people were not to be "destroyed" or "punished." To which the Chancellor replies:

Who is to be judge of "fair treatment?" The enemy? Do you believe he is in any temper to judge very fairly? Have you read the proposals made by their most popular public men, their most influential newspapers? We are vermin to be exterminated. You have read from liberal and socialist papers and persons more moderate statements. But those papers so little represent the govern-

"The leaders of the great workmen's associations are fully aware of the terrible danger . . . Whether belonging to the building trade or mining, chemical or graphical industries, wood workers as well as glass and leather workers, members of the union of metal workers, tailors, textile workers, stone-masons, transport workers, all unanimously agree as to the necessity of holding out and of victory."—*Sociale Praxis* (Socialist), February 10, 1916.

"We have never doubted from the beginning of the war that Great Britain intends to destroy permanently the economic expansion of Germany. Great Britain has never fought any war from other motives or for other aims."—*Deutsche Tageszeitung* (Militarist), January 11, 1916.

The organ of the textile workers wrote: "If the German people has to choose between such an atrophied existence as the English Minister of Trade has assigned to her and the sort of existence she has to lead in war time, she would certainly decide in favour of the latter and continue the struggle till such designs upon her were frustrated."—Cited, see *Vorwärts*, April 7, 1916.

The above are from the excellent summaries of German press opinion appearing in *The Cambridge Magazine*.

ments or influential classes that they are actually suppressed, and these liberals—professors and others—driven from their position because fair treatment of the German has become treason and sedition. Let me read, not from the papers that the governments suppress, but from those they encourage—that come freely to this country.¹

And the Chancellor reads from the *Daily*

¹ Dr. Helfferich, the German Minister, replying to a peace speech of the Socialist Cohn in the Reichstag debate of May 5, 1916, said:

"The peace which you would advocate does not mean bread, but hunger for our people. It does not mean liberty, it means slavery. That is not just my opinion. These are the words of our enemies. Just read their speeches and their newspapers. The Deputy Hasse (of the Social Democratic Minority) shakes his head. I know the newspapers which suit you deserve credit, but the others, which do not suit you do not exist for you. I repeat it, you need only look at the foreign press, and you will find no other peace suggested than one which would bring our German people slavery and serfdom. The other day I read in committee an article by the French Senator Humbert, which closed with something like the following words: 'This race of slaves dreaming of world hegemony must be made into slaves.' That is the sort of peace which our enemies allow us and wish to give us. Such a peace can only be promoted through speeches such as Dr. Cohn's, a peace such as the German nation could not tolerate."

It is worth noting by the way that this is the Humbert to whom Bolo Pasha lent a million francs. Humbert, whose activities the German Government found so useful was a ferociously "patriotic" anti-German. Bolo did not spend Germany's money encouraging Pacifism, so much as a wild anti-Germanism.

Mail, the Daily Express, the New York Times, Tribune, and so forth. And then proceeds:

As a substitute for that military power which the enemy insists is to be destroyed, President Wilson has offered what he calls a Society of Nations. There is to be under it equality of economic opportunity. No one knows what that means. Are we to have access to the ore fields of Lorraine if that province is transferred to France? No one knows. Are we to have access to raw materials in Africa when our colonies are taken from us? Nobody knows. Are these new states that are to be carved out of Austria to be allowed to erect tariffs that will make economic communication with the near East possible? Nobody knows. Yet upon these things the very existence of our peoples depends.

But the supreme consideration is our national security. Are we to be allowed to retain any of our armaments? If so, to what extent? Again, nobody knows. We must trust all this to the enemy. The deputy tells us that we must look in future to that Society of Nations which President Wilson has proposed. Well, I won't give him my opinion on it, but the opinion of the Premier of France. Here it is (reads Premier Clemenceau's speech of

Nov. 21, 1917). In other words the enemy is asking us to trust to a device in which he himself does not believe; which he himself regards as chimerical. And not only that; he announces that even if it were entirely practicable Germany would be excluded from it.

Does the honourable deputy really suggest that we should surrender our military power in exchange for—this?

Now, one must admit that in the face of this our German Radical would not have an easy job.

And yet, in the last resort we are depending upon that Radical. For three things stand out in our whole problem: First, Europe can never really be safe until Germany has become free; second, the democratization of Germany must be her own job. "No one is foolish enough to suppose," said Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons recently, "that it would be possible to impose on Germany a constitution made outside of Germany." And third, until Germany's future position—her position, that is, after she shall have re-

judicated her present policy—in the matters of national security and economic opportunity is made clear, there can be no movement against the German Government. “It is all very well,” said the *Vorwärts* recently, “for the Western Allies to talk about the German people rebelling against their government, but if they did the Allied armies would be in Cologne in a week. What would be our fate?”

“Fears of national destruction will prompt men to do almost anything,” says Colonel Roosevelt. It will certainly lead a Socialist to support an autocratic government and military power so long as he is unaware of what will replace that power.

The German is particularly susceptible, from historical reasons, to this argument. In his book, *My Four Years in Germany*, Mr. Gerard, late American Ambassador to Germany says:

We engaged in war against a people whose country was for so many centuries a theatre of devastating wars that fear is bred into the very marrow of their souls making them ready to submit their

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lives and fortunes to an autocracy which for centuries has ground their faces, but it has promised them as a result of the war . . . security.

This point of view is now, after three and one half years of war, striking powerfully the imaginations of very many who would violently have resisted it a year or two ago. Here, for instance, is Mr. H. G. Wells' writing.

Why does the great mass of the German people still cling to its incurable belligerent government? The answer is not overwhelmingly difficult. The main argument by which the German Government sticks to power is this: that the Allied governments are also imperialist, that they also aim at conquest and aggression, and that for Germany the choice is world power or downfall and utter ruin. This is the argument that holds the German people stiffly united. For most men in most countries it would be a convincing argument strong enough to override considerations of right and wrong. I find that I myself am of this way of thinking, that whether England has done right or wrong in the past—and I have sometimes criticized my country very bitterly—I will not endure the prospect of seeing her at the foot of some victorious nation.

Neither will any German who matters. Very few people would respect a German who would.¹

Take another witness whom I do not think you will accuse of pro-Germanism — Lord Northcliffe. In the October (1917) number of *Current Opinion* Lord Northcliffe writes this:

The German people have been purposely deluded into the belief that they are defending themselves against foes who are set upon crushing them out of existence.

Lord Northcliffe states the position very correctly. The German people have been “purposely deluded” into the belief that they are defending themselves against national annihilation. It is a false belief but none the less intense for that, and can be used as an instrument by the German Government for its own purpose. And we are helping that government in its purpose.

Is it not evident that our silence as to what we mean by this major term of ours “the

¹ *New Republic*, September 1, 1917.

destruction of German militarism," our failure to state what we propose as a substitute, is making all but impossible that division of the German people from the German Government upon which we depend for ultimate success? Is it not enabling the German Government to say: "Whatever the origins of this war it is now in sober fact a war of self-defence, since it is a war for the right to have any defence at all for your country?" We turn what was a war of aggression into a war of elementary defence, give to the German people a cause for fighting which will spur any people, good, bad, or indifferent, savage or civilized—still more perhaps a savage than a civilized one—to fight to the last. By making it possible to represent that as the situation we transfer the moral elevation of the struggle from ourselves to the enemy.¹

¹ An article by Karl Liebknecht, on "Self-Determination and Self-Defence" published in *The Class Struggle* for March, 1918, begins thus:

"But since we have been unable to prevent the war since it has come in spite of us, and our country is facing invasion, shall

I am perfectly aware that such a remark will cause intense indignation; but we should never get anywhere if I had to remind you at every other sentence that it is not the facts, but the enemy's view of the facts, which will determine his conduct and his moral attitude. The important thing, again, is not our intention, but what we allow the German Government to represent as our intention.

"Nobody proposes to crush or destroy Germany." No, we merely proclaim repeatedly and with immense emphasis, that we propose to destroy the only means which Germany, like other nations, has of defending herself.

During two years some of the astutest minds in the Allied nations have recognized

we leave our country defenceless? Shall we deliver it into the hands of the enemy? Does not socialism demand the right of nations to determine their own destinies? Does it not mean that every people is justified, nay more, in duty bound, to protect its liberties, its independence? 'When the house is on fire shall we not try first to put out the blaze before stopping to ascertain the incendiary?' *These arguments have been repeated again and again in defence of the attitude of the Social-Democracy, in Germany."*

the situation, but unfortunately done nothing to remedy it. Here, nearly two years ago, we find Lord Cromer writing to the *London Times*,¹ pointing out the real moral of the declaration of Bethmann-Hollweg's, which I have quoted.

Lord Cromer points out that the utterance is worthy of attention for three reasons:

Because it represents what the German Government wishes the rest of the world to believe; because it probably embodies what the vast majority of Germans themselves believe, and because so long as the Germans continue in this belief the difficulties of concluding peace will be almost insuperable.

He continues:

I am aware that it would at present be altogether premature to discuss the possible terms of peace in anything approaching to detail. I cannot help thinking, however, that it would be advisable that some authoritative notice should be taken of the German Chancellor's statement, if only to show the rest of the world, and possibly to such Germans as

¹ April, 1916.

still have ears to hear, not only what we are but also what we are not fighting for.

I am not aware that either Mr. Asquith or any other responsible authority in this country has said anything which can be contorted into a desire to aim at the complete destruction of Prussia's military power.

So far as I know no one in this country wishes to destroy the military power of Prussia. The military strength of Prussia always has been, is now, and probably will continue to be very great. None in this country would object to its maintenance, provided that they could feel some definite assurance that it would be used for legitimate purposes and would cease to be an abiding menace to the rest of the world. . . .

We wish to destroy not the military power of Prussia but the militarist party domination in that country. There is a very great distinction between the two objects.

Again, and this is the tragedy of the thing—it is not our real intention at all which does the damage, it is what we allow the German Government to represent as our intention. The late British Chancellor, Lord Loreburn,

amongst others, has spoken with frankness. He says:

Language has been used by Ministers, some of it explicit enough, some of it marked by an unhappy ambiguity, which indicates, or is interpreted as indicating, a design to effect a conquest of Germany so complete as to leave her stripped of many provinces and without an army sufficient to protect her against other Powers. History tells us what Germany has suffered in the old times from some of her neighbours. It is a record which, while in no way palliating the atrocious methods of Prussian militarism, does explain the national resolve to possess military strength. It also explains the desperate determination to go on fighting in the belief that the German national existence is at stake. The language of some among our Ministers, echoed by less responsible people outside, has played the game of the German Government. These declarations have filled the German press, and been freely placarded on their walls to stiffen their determination.¹

It has many times been denied that such is in any respect the intention of the Allied

¹ *Economist*, June 10, 1916.

governments. But since these denials have not been accompanied by any indication whatever of an offer which shall assure the safety of Germany, it simply means asking the most suspicious—and most hated—people in Europe to trust their future security to the goodwill of their enemies.

In the reply of the Allied governments to President Wilson (Jan. 11, 1917), occurs the phrase: "The political disappearance of the German peoples has never, as has been pretended, formed part of their (the Allies) designs." Yet little more than a month later the British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, accorded to some French journalists a famous interview (in no way since repudiated) in which he said:

It took months to check this nation of more than fifty million men. It will take several months still to annihilate it. But we will strike without respite and terribly, right up to the total destruction of its army. . . . But, war is not merely a shock of armies. . . . The Allies must not let themselves be intimidated by the suggestions or

menaces of Germany. In offering peace, Germany thinks only how to prepare for the next war. If by misfortune we would yield to her perfidious appeals, in three years the drama would recommence bit by bit, country by country. In dividing us she would again take up her dream of destruction. It would be England first that would be attacked, then France, then other peoples. She would reorganize her blow which had missed.

*For the tranquillity of the world Germany must forever be broken up.*¹

To which of these pronouncements—that of the Allied note, or of the British Field Marshal—is the German Government likely to give the greatest prominence in Germany? Which is it likely to placard on the walls, as Lord Loreborn tells us certain other Allied declarations have been placarded; which is likely to be read to the troops?

What more could be done? Well, that I hope to indicate. The point is that what has already been done in this respect has

¹ Published in the English press of February 14, 1917.

failed, and in warfare—as for that matter elsewhere in life—if one line fails we try another and another, until we hit on one that will succeed.

And please, please, do not turn what I am saying upside down by assuming that all this is in any sense a disparagement of what Mr. Wilson has done towards making a League of Nations practical politics. Personally, I believe that Mr. Wilson has done everything that he could for that project. It now depends on the nations, on you, to show that that project, with its “unprecedented things” is really going to be taken seriously. All we have done at present is to show that it is not likely to be taken seriously.

We get the same situation in the matter of the economic intentions of the Allies. Mr. Wilson declares there is to be no “war after the war.” Yet there was a much advertised Inter-Allied Conference in Paris held for the purpose of devising what its promoters called by that very name: “The War after the War.” The fact of that Conference has been used by

the German Government, again and again, as proof that the Allies are bent upon Germany's economic destruction in the event of defeat, and more than three years after the outbreak of the war we find von Kuhlmann, talking in the Reichstag of Germany's "fight for economic existence" as though the Allied menace to it were a thing evident in itself.

The failure of the Alliance as a whole to take seriously the President's policy looking to the establishment of political and economic security on some foundation other than that of competitive military power, is still perhaps the strongest moral factor in the perpetuation of German militarism and autocracy.

Mr. Wilson's policy is the only thing which we can offer to Germany as a substitute for her military power. By that means alone can we hope for the turning of the German people against their government. Without it, victory will defeat the very objects for which we wage the war. For a defeated Germany that is without security for its future, will, whatever we may do, look to the

re-establishment of its military strength. And for that we shall find Germans ready to pay the price they have paid in the past: the support of autocracy.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRIMINAL NATION

What is the good of talking about a Society of Nations since Germany cannot be trusted? We need a Society of Nations precisely because Germany cannot be trusted; and to bring her into the Society for the same reason. The problem with the criminal is not to be able to trust him—you know in advance that you cannot—but to get him to trust Society. An indispensable condition in dealing with criminals. Why the nations must be made secure before territorial readjustments on a basis of nationality are possible. The limitations of sovereignty and independence which will be necessary before we can create a workable society. No mere re-drawing of the map can give us a stable Europe.

“You cannot trust Germany. If it were proposed tomorrow to invite Germany into a Society of Nations I would oppose it.”

Thus M. Clemenceau. A previous lecture indicated broadly the relation of defence and punishment in dealing effectively with crime. We have seen that in the community of individuals we not only punish the criminal when he breaks the law, but we do

something more, which we are apt to overlook; we protect him when he observes it. Without that, our punishment, however ferocious, would be entirely ineffective. Apply the analogy to the case of Germany. Germany after the war, having made reparation to Belgium and France, paid her indemnity or what you will, says in effect to Europe: "Are you going to restrain Italy or Serbia or Roumania if they upset the settlement to my hurt? If they fail to fulfill conditions?" If we say "No," then, again, it is a plain notification to the German people to recreate their militarism as the only means by which their rights can be defended. If, on the other hand, we say: "We will see that the treaty is observed by our Allies; we will come to your aid if you are the victim of Italian or Serbian or any other aggression just as we have come to the aid of Belgium and France"—if we take that line, we have brought Germany into the Society of Nations, we have made her our ally. And unless we do that, we compel Germany to retain her military

power; to take her own view of her own right; to remain a menace.

Mr. Clemenceau's reason for refusing to make that offer to Germany, the offer of the protection of the law of Nations, backed by the Society of Nations, is that we cannot trust Germany's word. But what has this to do with that offer from us to Germany? That is altogether irrelevant when you are dealing with a criminal. There is no question of trusting Germany. We know that she cannot be trusted, and the problem does not lie there at all. Paradoxical and monstrous as it sounds, the question upon which the success of the experiment of the Society of Nations rests is not whether we can trust Germany, but whether the German people can be brought to trust us. Just as in the case of the individual criminal the real problem is to persuade him that he can trust society to give him a square deal; to persuade him that he can live best by keeping society's laws. So in the case of the German people. If they can be brought to trust Europe, the

Society of Nations, there is a chance that they may turn from the support of their military caste as a means of national safety and look instead to an international organization of the world which will give them protection at once surer and less costly, in life and freedom.¹

And for fear you should think that the general thesis I have been here maintaining implies an emasculate pacifism or pro-Germanism, I want to read you a quite brief statement of the same thesis, and I would like you to guess from what author I have taken it. That statement is as follows:

. . . Fear of national destruction will prompt men to do almost anything, and the proper remedy

¹ At a Mansion House dinner last year one of His Majesty's ministers referred somewhat scornfully to the "eminent persons" who had been urging a League to Enforce Peace. It was, he said, already in existence. It was the Alliance then fighting Germany.

The Alliance cannot be a League to Enforce Peace until it has offered protection to the enemy. That is the essence of a League to Enforce Peace. So long as it proclaims its intention to destroy the power of the enemy *and* to offer nothing in exchange, it compels the enemy to depend upon his power, and is a League to Enforce War.

for outsiders to work for is the removal of the fear. If Germany were absolutely free from the danger of the least aggression on her eastern and western frontiers I believe that German public sentiment would refuse to sanction such acts as those against Belgium.

The only effective way to free it from this fear is to have outside nations like the United States in good faith undertake that obligation to defend Germany's honour and territorial integrity.¹

And the author is Theodore Roosevelt!

One query dominates all the serious discussion of any war settlement. It is this: "What assurance can we get that Germany has learned her lesson? Have the German idea and the German spirit, which have devastated four fifths of Europe and carried frightfulness across the ocean, been chastened? If not, would peace be anything more than a terrible illusion, a mere truce, which, after a breathing space for military preparation, would once more break down? Would dis-

¹ *Why America Should Join the Allies*, pp. 39-40. Arthur Pearson, London.

armament, even, be sincere; or be possible with a nation that does not hold to its bond?"

The experience of mankind in dealing with the individual criminal may have some bearing on that question.

It marked an immense step forward in criminology—and consequently in public order and the possibility of more decent and humane feelings on the part of society towards some of its members—when we ceased to allow moral indignation to be the sole or main determinant of our attitude to crime, and began to ask, "What makes the criminal?" Those who asked that did not necessarily hate crime less than those who regarded the question as subversive and as tending to excuse the criminal. Incidentally, crime was often worst where the punishment was most ferocious, not because punishment necessarily fails as a deterrent, but because those who depended upon it were treating symptoms instead of getting at causes.

In international politics we seem only now to be emerging from this early stage, where

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policy is guided by moral indignation, expressed in plans of simple repression. Two years ago a very able British statesman could write that it was useless to look into the causes of this war, because the war had only one cause: the wickedness of Germans. He seemed to find it unnecessary to deal with the question: "What makes the Germans more wicked than other folk?" He implied that German foreign policy, with its self-regarding nationalism, was not the result of historical or political conditions, but of sheer original sin; and that the problem of internationalism resolved itself, not into changing the conditions of international life, but into the subjugation and punishment of the German people.

One almost wishes that this were true. It would simplify things so much! But it is, alas, too simple. The notion that Providence endowed a certain conglomeration of races, living within certain artificial political borders, with so special a depravity that given conditions do not act upon them as upon other men, does rather too much violence to

one's intuitive sense of probabilities. But if the "original sin" explanation is unsound, it follows that this wickedness, the menace of Prussianism, is historical, not racial, in its cause; that it is the result of conditions that must be altered if a permanent cure is to be obtained. It means further that if mere ferocity of punishment or repression failed to lessen personal crime within the state, it would be still less likely to succeed in the case of the "criminal nation."

Before our punishment can be effective at all there must be, on the part of the sufferer, not only a sense of guilt, but a sense that the punishment is inflicted for the purposes of justice, not for the advantage of the person inflicting the punishment.

In a preceding paper we saw, from witnesses in no way suspect of pro-Germanism, men like Ambassador Gerard and Lord Northcliffe, that the mass of the German people went gladly to war because they believed themselves attacked. That does not apply to the rulers, but it does to the people. It is monstrous,

of course, that they should have thought so, but it only appears monstrous to us because we do not, in judging the case of the enemy, make sufficient allowance for self-deception under the stress of patriotic emotion.

Hermann Fernau, the German anti-militarist and Republican, who condemns as unrestrainedly the wickedness of Germany's course as could any writer on the Entente side, says:

Let us suppose that in the last days of July, 1914, people like Rohrbach, Harden, Reventlow, Chamberlain, Keim, Bernhardt, etc., had come before the German people and had said, what they had previously been saying only too loudly: "We are strangling; we need more land. We need a place in the sun. We are the strongest, we have the highest culture, and we have therefore a sacred right to wage a war of conquest," is there a single man who would so insult the German nation as to assert that it would have assented with enthusiasm to this war programme? No, the immense majority of the German people stood then, as always, on the side of Bebel and his degenerate successors. That is to say they did not become enthusiastic for the

war until it had been made clear to them that Germany had been treacherously attacked and must defend herself.

What the people in fact were told was false, as this author admits. But what enabled their masters thus to provoke a sense of right on behalf of a wrong cause? The secrecy of diplomatic negotiations, the absence of any machinery for determining clearly what is aggression and what is not, and the absence of any means of protection save Germany's own preponderant strength. And until international organization of some kind has filled those needs—until an European parliament of some kind has assured that public airing shall be given to bargainings and dickeringings like those which went on for years about Bagdad and Morocco; until refusal to submit a difference to adjudication or conciliation by an international court or council shall furnish an easily recognizable criterion of aggression, and until a general alliance has replaced the balance of power as the

basis of security, it will always be possible for a ruling order to persuade a people that the cause for which it is asked to fight is a good and sacred one, when as a matter of fact it is unjustified aggression.

Until we have that condition it will be useless to talk of punitive justice for a whole nation. You will be punishing that nation for doing what it believed, however mistakenly, to be its duty. "Punishment" in that case would have an effect exactly contrary to that desired.

• Provision for the criminal's protection is related in another way to the efficacy of punishment.

A German has been imagined as talking thus:

You say that the destruction of German militarism does not mean the destruction of all means of German defence; that surrender to the Allies does not mean the surrender of our prosperity, our means of livelihood even. Very well. What proposal have the Allies ever made to ensure our due protection when our armies are reduced or destroyed?

You say we shall not need protection from them. Then do they propose to abolish their armies if we abolish ours? They do not. They profess to be able to reduce us to nothingness in a military sense. Then against what are they maintaining their armies? Against one another. Then, though they need protection against each other, Allies as they are, we do not need protection against any of them, though they are our enemies and declare that our conduct of this war has given them just grounds of hatred and vengeance. What do they propose for Germany's national defence as a substitute for German arms? We have asked this question again and again. We have never had an answer.

You say that we have brought it all on ourselves and that we must accept our punishment. Very good. Let us assume that the world is divided into good people who are entitled to certain rights such as the protection of their nationality and access to the trade and opportunity of the world, and bad people who do not deserve these things; that the good people are the Serbians, Montenegrians, Japanese, Italians, Portuguese, Roumanians, Russians, French, and British, and that the bad people are the Germanic peoples, the Austrians and their allies. These must be punished. Very well. Which of them will the policy of the Allies mainly punish? Those who made the war and

those who have fought in it? This generation of Germans, in other words? Not at all. They, alas! are punished already. There is not a German family of our time that has not already taken its punishment, that has not demonstrated the "cupidity" of which our enemies accuse us by pouring out its wealth like water; that has not demonstrated its "blood lust" by pouring out its own blood, that has not proudly given its son or its father to this cause that you tell us is so wicked. It is little that the enemy can do that will add to the "punishment" of these. Those responsible for this war will not retrieve what they have sacrificed in their lifetime. No, those whom the policy of the Allies • will punish, will expose to danger and poverty, are the German children of today—the babies in our homes. Do you seriously propose that we should accept this punishment for them? Babies are neutral. Even if we are responsible for this war, our enemies have no right to ask that our children shall suffer for our mistakes. But that is precisely what they are asking and attempting to accomplish.

- Any attempt to settle questions of nationality without taking into account the two dominant motives which determine the policy of

the great Powers is bound to fail. Those two dominant motives are first security, and secondly vital economic interest. At present the great Powers have no security but their own strength, actual and potential. That compels them, not only, as already indicated, to violate the principle of nationality in order to secure strategic frontiers, but to add by annexation to their own forces human and material, and to weaken those of a possible enemy; while the economic motive pushes to the same violations in order that the possession of a given territory may secure freedom of economic movements to the sea, or access to raw materials or markets.

The danger of these violations is not confined to the Central Powers. The same considerations have stood for generations, and stand today, in the way not only of an independent Ireland, but of an Ireland having the same autonomy as a British self-governing colony. Mr. Brailsford¹ notes some of the other Allied cases:

¹ In *The League of Nations*.

Italy, in order that she may have unchallenged naval control in the Adriatic and certain ports for commercial purposes, is claiming the larger part of Dalmatia, where the Italians are outnumbered more than ten to one. Thus, not only would Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs be placed under the government of a tiny minority of aliens, but the retention of this country by an alien clique might shut out from free access to the sea more than fifty millions of Germans, Magyars, and Slavs.

• Take the case of an independent Bohemia. One third of its population would be Magyar or German—a far more important minority than that of Ulster which has so long helped to make the settlement of Ireland impossible; and in the case of Bohemia it would be complicated by the language question, which does not exist in Ireland. And whereas Ireland is at least open to the world by her ports, Bohemia is wedged in territorially between her enemies, whose access to the sea her allies would be blocking.

Roumania in entering the war laid claims to Austrian territory which as a whole would contain as many Magyars and Germans as Roumanians. In the case of one district the Roumanians would be a tiny minority.

The Allies, in order to weaken Bulgaria, proposed to reconquer Macedonia for the Serbs, although the greater part of the country is emphatically and even fanatically Bulgarian by allegiance and choice, and although the Powers previously allotted the country to Bulgaria, and although the second Balkan War was due to Serbia's refusal to give effect to the European decision.

And these are but samples on the Allied side of the fence. If the Allies, who proclaim themselves to be fighting for nationality and the rights of all people to their own government, feel themselves justified on behalf of security in violating their own principles to that extent, what may we not expect from Germans and Austrians who do not emphasize that purpose? If the need for security justifies it, the Germans, who will be the weaker

and more unpopular group, will be able to invoke it with very much greater force.

We are still, as nations, a very long way from the conception that our national independence must be limited by our international obligations. The old nationalist notion that there is something derogatory and unpatriotic in ceding any part of our national sovereignty or independence has still an almost fanatical strength. And we have no clear idea of just how far that sovereignty and independence must be ceded for the purpose of international organization for security. It is these two things mainly—the force of the old conceptions and the lack of any definiteness of a newer principle—which stand mainly, and will stand at the peace, in the way of settlement.

On the side of the English and the Americans a League of Nations is conceived mainly as a means of coercing disturbers of the existing order. And they so conceive it because the existing order of the world, with the great undeveloped spaces in their possession and

few historical grievances to redress, is for them, on the whole, a very satisfactory order. But to certain other peoples, and notably the peoples of the Central Empires, the mere crystallization of the existing order may represent nothing more than the confirmation of the privileges of triumphant force which they are entitled to upset by a "righteous rebellion" whenever the opportunity should present itself. Until we have taken more fully into account the weight of this consideration, and all that is implied in it, we shall fail to win the peoples of the Central Empires to real co-operation in lasting peace. So far, almost all the plans of Anglo-Saxon origin, for the maintenance of peace, are marked by this outstanding characteristic of early methods of maintaining peace within the state—an emphasis on repression as the first and last need. Having drawn a new map, we are to see that respect for it is enforced by preponderant power. Such a conception, of course, implies, not only that the world as now organized internationally, or with such

redistribution of territory as the Allies may enforce at the peace, retaining the currently accepted principles of national rights, economic and political, is in itself just, but that it will remain so permanently.

The solution lies not so much in the direction of map drawing, as of modifying the rights which have heretofore attached to national sovereignty. M. Ribot says Alsace-Lorraine "belongs" to France; Bethmann-Hollweg that it "belongs" to Germany. But if we could imagine the provinces being handed over to France, and France exercising the rights of "proprietaryship" hitherto recognized as belonging to national proprietaryship, and shutting out Germany from access to the ore fields of Lorraine (thus depriving her of a necessary element of her economic welfare), we have merely created conditions morally certain to render impossible that reform of the German spirit which we all admit to be indispensable to the destruction of German militarism and to the permanent peace of the world. On the other side, so long as Germany regards her

sovereignty in Alsace as an absolute thing not to be limited by definite obligations to the peoples of those provinces and to the world, France will oppose any real reconciliation with Germany, and make our League of Nations a fiction. No mere manipulation of the map will save us from either horn of the dilemma.

The question we have to answer is: "Under what political and economic conditions would the creation of a League of Nations be a hopeful venture?" Whatever the answer, it must include a very great change in our conception of national right and international obligation. The independence and sovereignty of states must no longer, for instance, include the right to block the necessary access of other states to the seas, or, in certain cases, to raw materials and markets. The whole question of sea law and belligerent rights must be approached from a new angle. There must be some means of change, even of frontiers, without war. A League to Enforce Peace that enforced the resolutions of the

Paris Conference, sustained the right of one empire to make a preserve of its dependent undeveloped territories, of some small state to block the natural economic highway of a large one, would really be one group of nations maintaining by force special privileges as against another group excluded from them. It would merely be the old conflict of Alliances or Balance of Power in a new form.

Yet we are not ready for the very profound modification of political ideas touching national independence and sovereignty necessary to make a League of Nations workable, and consequently any settlement a very hopeful one. For the League of Nations must be an integral part of the settlement, if even on its territorial side it is to offer hopes of permanence. The prevailing conception of the League to Enforce Peace, even among supporters, is that of a piece of machinery to be brought into being after the war, not at all a part of the problem of the war itself and related to its conduct and conclusion. Yet, if it is not a reality to the extent of being a

living policy with obvious chances of success, when we come to make peace the parties to the settlement will be concerned mainly to secure their own safety by preponderance and "strategic frontiers." And the necessary violation of national rights involved in that will condemn any subsequent League to failure. "The two questions," says Mr. Brailsford most truly, "must be solved as a whole. The settlement must be the preparation for any future Society of Nations. The stability and efficacy of a League of Nations depend not merely on the wise drafting of its constitution, but also on the solution reached in the war settlement of our problems of nationality, colonial expansion, international trade, sea power, and alliances."

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAN MINIMUM AT THE PEACE

Some notes on the relation between the demands of America at the peace, the future of neutrality and sea law, their relation to the society of nations and its coercive power.

AFTER the defeat of Germany what demands will the United States make upon her? What will be the terms of the settlement which will ensure that in future no American travellers are drowned at sea, no mines are sown, no merchant ships sunk without warning?

It is at that moment, in the Conference room, that there will be revealed a suggestive difference in the nature of the demands being made by America and those being made by her co-belligerents. For the things which the Allies are demanding—transfer or evacuation of territory, indemnities—can actually be delivered. But what will America be

demanding? An undertaking for future good behaviour at sea? But how does she know that she will get what she is asking, that the undertaking will be kept? There is only one possibility of that: the creation of better international conduct; a more dependable international order. That means, of course, a League of Nations, either formal or informal. If she does not secure that by her war she will have secured nothing.

For all the European Powers of the Western Alliance—except Belgium—there will be some compensation though all hopes of a better international order fail. Even France will get her Alsace and Syria and Britain vast additions of empire in Africa and Asia. That better world order of which Mr. Asquith spoke may not be realized; but there will be consolations. But in the case of America there is no unredeemed territory to fight for. Her natural expansion is in the New World, which she already dominates: not in the old. And even in the New World it would seem that she has ceased to seek territory. Her deci-

sion appears to have gone definitely against empire. Cuba was not retained as so many believed it would be. The attempt to fit the Philippines for self-government is real, and their independence not a thing Americans oppose but desire. Whatever criticism one may make of America's conduct towards Mexico, it is impossible to accuse it with justice of having been too aggressive.

At the height of the *Sussex* crisis when it seemed that rupture with Germany was then inevitable, the *New Republic* which was believed at the time to have close relations with the White House, printed an "appeal to the President," which is significant as showing how the minds of American liberals were working in a situation which was merely that of February, 1917, in an undeveloped form. The *New Republic* at that time said:

Can we by going to war with Germany obtain the kind of guaranty which we desire? Suppose that in conjunction with the Allies we beat Germany to the ground and are in a position to dictate the terms of peace. What guaranty can we ex-

tract from Germany which will prevent for the future such crimes as the sinking of the *Lusitania*? We can obtain a promise from Germany. Nothing more. But promises we have already had and the reason we are now in a crisis with Germany is not that she will not promise but that she will not fulfil her promises.

Moreover, if you break with Germany now, if you declare war upon her, on what terms will you resume relations, on what terms will you make peace? How will you know when you have got what you are contending for? When Germany sues for peace, offers apologies and reparation, and makes promises for the future? You have had all these things from Germany and the fearful fact is that when military necessity is great enough, the promises are worth less.¹

We see from the situation here exposed that the advocacy by the President, in advance of other chiefs of states, of a "League of Nations," is to be explained, not merely on humanitarian and idealistic grounds, but on very tangible grounds of national policy as well. America's special interests are associated with it in the

¹ April 22, 1916.

same way that British interests in the past have been associated with the maintenance of a continental Balance of Power or are today associated with the "cutting of the corridor." The American promotion of the League of Nations has a basis in "realpolitik" as well as in "sentimentalpolitik."

It has been argued, it is true, that in future, if a belligerent knows for certain that the misuse of mine or submarine will bring the American navy into the seas against him, he will be checked in his violation of law. Then why does it not check him now? More, if the threat of one navy is to have such restraining effect how comes it that the very thing which has brought America into the war is a ferocity the growth of which the armies and navies of half a dozen powers have not been able to restrain? The most cursory examination reveals the fact that international justice is not merely the predominant, but the only American interest as the settlement.

America is therefore committed to an abandonment of neutrality in future wars, not by

virtue of any special declaration or policy but by virtue of the very *raison d'être* of her belligerency.

The President has said:

No nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. . . . The nations must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted.¹

This is the last war of the kind, or of any kind that involves the world, that the United States can keep out of. I say that because I believe the business of neutrality is over. . . . War now has such a scale that the position of the neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. . . . We have not yet a society of nations. We must have such a society, not suddenly, not by insistence, not by any hostile emphasis upon the demand but by the demonstrations of the needs of the time. . . . The world's peace ought to be disturbed if the fundamental rights of humanity are invaded, but it ought not to be disturbed for any other thing that I can think of.²

¹ Speech on accepting renomination as Candidate of the Democratic Party, Sept. 2, 1916.

² Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916.

Now ultimately, such a position on neutrality means an abandonment of the whole conception of the "sovereign and independent state." States in future will not be able to go to war without America having something to say about it. But that means that America will not be able to go to war without others having something to say about it. Let us see how the very revolutionary position taken by the President on neutrality affects the approach to a Society of Nations—and the sanctions upon which it will be able to count.

Notwithstanding the revolutionary repudiation of the doctrine of neutrality contained in the President's declarations, it is defence of a "neutral" right that has brought America into the war. That inconsistency—as I shall attempt to show presently—has been justified on America's part, but it suggests vividly the outstanding dilemma of international law as we know it, particularly of sea law which, in contrast to the law of war on land, is mainly a problem of the neutral.

Complex as is sea law in its details, the

ultimate alternatives of its maintenance can be very simply stated. The regulation of sea-warfare in neutral interest is impossible without a strong and widespread international organization; such organization is impossible without an obligation on the part of all nations to participate in any dispute in which the general law framed to protect the interests of the whole is menaced. And that participation destroys neutrality. Or to put it more briefly, without internationalization there can be no protection of "neutral" rights; with internationalization there can be no neutrality.

Clearly, "neutrality" directly contradicts the conception of the nations of the world as a society, a community. No society can be unconcerned, neutral, when one of its members is attacked, or threatened by a violation of the law which the society has framed for its common protection. Unless the whole unite in the vindication of that general law it will protect none of them. Yet in the international field the law designed to protect the neutral is based on the dumbfounding

principle that it shall cease to operate if the aggressor chooses to destroy the neutral by turning him into a belligerent! If we follow up the implication of this we shall see that no hope of a reliable international law is possible until we get away from this principle and replace it by the opposing one that a violation of the law is wrong done, not merely to the immediate sufferer, but to all who desire to live under the law's protection: to the community. If the world accepted this principle there would be no neutrals when one power attempted to impose its will on another in defiance of some such fundamental law as that a nation must submit its differences to enquiry and third-party judgment. In the face of such defiance all would-be belligerents and the problem of the neutral would disappear.

But the present conception of neutrality implies something more than a mere failure of social obligation. It may well in certain circumstances become a positive stimulus to aggression and threaten in a substantial

way the security of nations, particularly of certain nations. In their case the more the defence of existing neutral rights is upheld the more will their existence be menaced; the more neutral right on the present basis expands the more dangerous would that right become to them.

For the purposes of illustrating the point let us imagine a war like the present, save for the fact that the German invasion of France had only taken place a month or so after the war began. Germany, let us say, having desired first to reach Petrograd and to deal with Serbia and desiring to keep France neutral during that period, had refrained from declaring war upon her. Assume that during that month America had asserted herself with other neutrals for the defence of sea law as defined by the Declaration of London. In that case she would strenuously have resisted, say, the seizure by Germany or Austria of a French ship carrying food or cotton to Salonica for possible shipment to the Serbian Army; or the stoppage of a French ship for

the purpose of removing Serbian passengers. These rights of French trade and movement at sea would, while France remained neutral, be strenuously defended. But from the moment that the Germans declare war on France, invade and seize the country and its ports, America has not a word to say. Neutrality prevents it.

When once the Germans have put an end to neutrality by declaring war on France they are perfectly entitled under international law not merely to stop but to confiscate all French ships and imprison their crews and neutrality would forbid America or any other neutral from supporting France. Thus America, or any league of neutrals, would take action to prevent French cargoes being seized or to protect French mail—but is quite indifferent if France itself is reduced to ashes and its neutrality destroyed! It would then, on behalf of neutrality, be obliged to see that French resistance to Germany was in no way assisted.¹

¹ Senator Root who thinks President Wilson should have intervened under the neutrality clauses of The Hague Conven-

Take another illustration. Germany would in the imaginary circumstances just indicated break the law and expose herself to all sorts of demands from America by seizing cargoes bound to Rotterdam which she cannot blockade; but America would not have a word to say under the existing law of neutrality if Germany so develops her quarrel with Holland as to declare war and so makes Rotterdam an "enemy" port.

Under present conceptions of neutrality, the law says to the belligerent: "The nations will compel you to respect the rights of neutrals except the neutrals' right to existence, which the law permits you to violate with impunity. You must respect this individual's rights unless you destroy him altogether; and then you will be exonerated." Thus does existing international law protect the vital interest of nations. What nation in its senses would take any risk or assume any real obligation

tion says, nevertheless (Feb. 15, 1916): "There was no question of our interfering in the quarrels of Europe. We had a right to be neutral and we are neutral as to the quarrel between Germany and France."

on behalf of it? It would be assuming serious obligations for a protection which ceased immediately it became most needed.

The analogy in municipal law would be this: If Smith and Brown in their "shooting match" in High Street should so block the sidewalk as to compel Robinson to walk round the other way, all the majesty of the law would come to the support of Robinson in his right to walk to his office on just that sidewalk; and the community would pay its taxes and support its jails and police to vindicate such right. But if Robinson, desiring nothing better than to be left alone, is deliberately attacked by Smith or Jones and killed—the law has nothing to say. The community is "strictly neutral" and will on no account come to Robinson's support. Who would be safe in such a community? And who would care twopence whether the law were supported or not.

Early in 1915, in his interesting book, *The Economic Aspects of the War*,¹ Professor

¹ Yale University Press, 1915.

Clapp of Yale made a suggestion by which he believed America could preserve her sea rights as she had heretofore conceived them. He said:

If we are ever to learn by experience, we have learned that some action is necessary in order to safeguard our nation's rights. In two strong notes of protest to Great Britain, we stated her violations of our rights. She prevents us from shipping non-contraband to Germany and receiving any goods from Germany at all, in defiance of our right to enjoy such trade via neutral countries even if Britain were to establish that her blockade of German ports is effective. Britain has seriously deranged our trade with the little neutral nations of Europe upon the suspicion that some day the trade may be going through to Germany. We have seen in great detail how deeply these violations of our rights affect our material interests, how little submission to them would accord with our history or our rank as a leading neutral, and how dangerous is such submission for our future welfare.

In every note that Germany has written she has emphasized that the submarine campaign is a retaliation for the unlawful British measures in holding

up food and raw materials for Germany. When both belligerents are breaking the law and each is claiming the acts of the other as justification, the pressure of neutrals must be applied to the one which refuses to join in a return to law and order. Our problem is to compel that joint acceptance of a compromise which we proposed in our note to the belligerents in February . . . Germany is ready for acceptance; the pressure must be applied to England.¹

He proposed to enforce American rights by a method which he justifies from the clause in the 1907 Hague Convention which allows a 'change of rules as to the export of munitions during a war "in case where experience shows the necessity for such action in order to safeguard a nation's rights." He concluded as follows:

With the attainment of this end—the acceptance of the Declaration of London and its contraband list by England and Germany and the return by Germany to lawful use of her war vessels—both belligerents return to the limits of law. Neutral

¹ Pp. 307-308.

trade rights are recovered and established for all time. Our excuse for stopping the export of arms ceases. In unhindered access to the arms supplies of the oversea world, barred to Germany, England enjoys a great advantage from her sea power, the only advantage which she can be allowed to enjoy without destroying the rights of those who have had no part in making or prosecuting this war.¹

I ventured at the time of the publication of Professor Clapp's book to suggest that this proposal was outside the bounds of practical politics and would never be adopted. Not because it would not have been momentarily effective perhaps, but because the American people had decided it to be undesirable. They realized that an action designed to give protection to certain American interests now, would do so at the sacrifice of immeasurably greater American interests later if that action aided Germany's victory. The action recommended by Professor Clapp could not be taken because America did not desire the victory of Germany and believed that its

¹ P. 309.

interest in helping to prevent that was greater —immeasurably greater—than the interests injured by England's alleged lawlessness. Professor Clapp asks in his book: "Is it the business of a neutral to worry which side wins the war?" Well, in certain circumstances it most decidedly is.

This touches the crux of the whole problem. We are maintaining a legal fiction if we pretend that nations outside the actual military conflict have no interest in the outcome when it may have originated in the violation of principles essential to the safety of all nations. The object of whatever America does is to give security to American citizens and their rights; but to ignore inexcusable aggression is to place them in the very greatest jeopardy. Though nations may not be directly or immediately involved, they can no more be indifferent to the success of menacing military aggression than the individuals of any community could remain indifferent to the murder of one by another of their number. If they did remain indifferent and treated both com-

batants alike, they would be undermining their own security; none of them would or could be safe. They would be on the way to an anarchy that would threaten all. Any system really establishing security would involve the abandonment of "neutrality" in murders. Neutrality when a law vital to society is violated, is incompatible with the establishment of any society.

There is the fundamental defect of our present method of trying to make international law reality. In the attempt to attach to itself a large body of interests, it ignores the supreme interest: the right to existence.

The individual within the state has achieved the protection of his rights only by virtue of a course of action towards others the exact contrary of that which America in common with other states has heretofore adopted as the basic rule. The law within the state is worth the individual's support because his own security is bound up in it. He contributes to its cost because the community will enforce it for his protection. Security

for the individual is achieved only by making an aggression upon his rights under the law equivalent to an aggression upon the rights of all. A municipal community which remained "neutral" when one of its members was the victim of such aggression would have surrendered its law and disintegrated into chaos.

But that is the prevailing conception of international relationship. A violation of the general rule or law is not considered as an aggression against those who have subscribed to it. That has been America's position until today. She is not concerned in the violation of sea law, say, until an American citizen suffers. The President has realized that until America abandons this principle and stands not only for her own particular right but for the observance of the rule which formulates it, the particular right will never be secure.

But "neutrality" is something more than a mere negative unfulfilment of community obligation. It may well be a positive and substantive premium upon aggression. Let us see in what way.

“Neutral right”—the right that is of neutral trade and freedom to be as little affected as possible by belligerent need, and to continue in war time as far as possible as in peace—implies the continuance of all the old efforts towards immunity of private property from capture, “free ships, free goods” (a battle-cry of two hundred and fifty years ago as far as ever from success) and other restrictions of belligerency. But if these restrictions are to work with any impartiality, with anything like equality of treatment for both belligerents, to be in fact “neutral,” the restrictions heretofore attempted (and which have been the goal of American effort in this field in the past) will have to be very greatly enlarged.

But, assuming that were possible, is the “right of commerce to continue in war very much as in peace” morally acceptable? The furnishing of ammunition is entirely equivalent in modern war to the furnishing of soldiers. More and more will wars become wars of industry, and to proceed on the assumption that the extent and destination of our assist-

ance should be determined merely by the capacity of the belligerents to pay is to put nations in the position of the old Swiss mercenaries: ready to give victory to the side that will pay most, or to allow the thing to be determined by geographical accident.

The doctrine of Neutrality, as it has grown up in international law since the time of Grotius¹ compelled America, during the first two and a half years of the war, in her discussions with Austria and Germany on the question of the shipment of munitions to take this attitude:

"Since we are neutral, the American Government is perfectly ready to sanction the shipment of munitions and material to yourselves if you can come and fetch the cargoes."

And America's entrance into the war has

¹ Though Grotius himself clearly foresaw the need of a differential neutrality. He summarizes his doctrine of neutrality as follows: "It is the duty of those who stand apart from a war to do nothing which may strengthen the side which has the worse cause or which may impede the motions of him who is carrying on a just war; and in a doubtful case to act alike to both sides in permitting transit, in supplying provisions, in not helping persons besieged." (Lib. iii., cap. 17.)

—diplomatically—no relation to anything that happened to Belgium or Serbia, or the nature of German aims in the world, but is due to the violation of a right of neutrality—the right of neutrals to travel on belligerent merchant ships secure from sinking without warning.

If, therefore, after this war, the doctrine of neutrality as we know it, remains unchanged, the Germans will be able to argue—and they will do so on the strength of the position maintained heretofore by the American Government—in this wise:

“If we could have commanded the sea not only would the conflict which actually brought America into the war not have arisen, but we could, from the first, have transferred the economic alliance of the Americans—of the whole overseas neutral world indeed—from our enemies to ourselves. The vast resources in food, material, munitions (in modern war the equivalent of troops), would have been taken from the enemy’s side of the scale and put into ours. The important

thing, therefore, is not to worry about respecting international obligations like the Belgian treaty, but to command the sea. If you can do that, the national resources of America are at your disposal whether your cause be good or bad, aggressive or defensive. We have the assurance of the American Government on that point, or had, until the action which was thrust upon us because we could not command the sea brought America into the war. There is, in consequence, hope for us in the future. If naval construction should henceforth develop in the direction of the submarine rather than the surface craft; and if the submarine cargo boat can be developed, there is still a hope of shaking British maritime supremacy and achieving that virtual alliance of the neutrals that goes with sea command or just the capacity to fetch the cargoes."¹

And any other prospective belligerent, a

¹ The position here outlined is also sketched in a published address of the present author: *The Dangers of Half-Preparedness*, Putnams, N. Y.

Japan, say, in a war of conquest waged against China, would argue in the same way. So that the vast national resources of America would, with the preservation of the existing law of neutrality, act as a silent pressure on the side, not of the good behaviour of nations, and respect of treaty right, but on the side of naval rivalry, irrespective of right or treaty obligation.

It would always be open, of course, to America to refuse to supply a country in the position of Germany even if it did command the sea, but so long as the prospective belligerents *do not know beforehand* what, in America's view, will constitute good or bad behaviour; what she will regard as aggressive and menacing, and what defensive, they will always assume that the chances are on the side of their being able to buy the munitions and supplies if they can fetch them. A nation's policy always looks defensive and defensible to itself. No people is able to take a very accurate view of foreign opinion of its own conduct. Seventy million Ger-

mans, including men of great intellectual equipment, are still marvelling why it is the world cannot see that they are fighting a purely defensive war forced upon them by the unprovoked aggression of jealous and truculent neighbours. Unless there is some definite and unmistakable criterion of what constitutes an unjustifiable war, they will always count upon being able, once they command the sea, to command also that economic alliance of neutrals which at present goes with it. Unless prospective belligerents know that war under such and such conditions will definitely close neutral ports to them, the neutral resources of the world will be a prize offered to predominant naval power, a premium upon naval rivalry, instead of being used to encourage the observance of certain rules and principles essential to the protection and ultimate safety of neutral rights and the security of all nations. Until we get an international rule of some kind this unhappy position for America is inevitable.

Suppose that twenty years ago America,

desiring to attach to international law some great interest which would tend to make its observance obviously to the interests of the nations, had said that any nation proceeding to hostilities against another without first having submitted its difference at least to enquiry and with such and such delay, would be unable to secure American supplies, munitions, or credit for the purposes of war, whether it obtained command of the sea or not. If we could imagine such a policy to have been adopted even by the United States alone, every prospective belligerent would have desired to observe the rule and to put itself right with America by so doing, whether it expected to command the sea or not. If it possessed sea control it would have wished to take advantage of that command to the full, and secure the economic allegiance of America to its cause; if it did not command the sea, it would equally have desired to observe the rule in order to deprive its enemy of most of the advantages of such command; in other words, in order to have America do what the

Germans at the beginning of the war so keenly desired to have her do, place an embargo on the export of supplies and munitions. Thus, with such a policy in effect, there would be for all belligerents—prospective commanders of the sea or not—a strong incentive to submit their case to enquiry and delay, a behaviour which would prevent most wars and give international organization and machinery a chance. There would be set up a strong tendency to international arrangement, which would have behind it the push of a great material advantage; America's economic alliance, or its refusal to the enemy. Respect for the rights of others, and for some means of determining those rights, would for the first time in history be a definite and visible military asset. America's enormous resources would then be acting as a silent and potential power for peace.¹ Such an arrangement does

¹ The working of such a differential neutrality, and the motives it would favour and discourage, do not strike one as very difficult to understand. Yet an English critic—*The Westminster Gazette*—says of this proposal: "Such a weapon would have no terror for our enemies who are cut off from the sea, and could only be used with effect against the Power that commands the

not compel American—or any other—opinion to decide on the merits of a complex international quarrel. Which is defence and which is aggression would be settled by a simple test—adherence to a rule that is the first essential in the establishment of any society of nations, without which all laws, however, cunningly devised, all schemes for the protection of neutrals, must fail. If general, the arrangement would of course abolish absolute neutrality in war. Problems of blockade and contraband would be solved by disappearing. If no nation would export to the recalcitrant member, questions of blockade could not well

sea—*i. e.*, ourselves." A truly amazing comment in view of the explanation just given. I have shown surely that it could be used with effect against powers that even do not hope to command the sea, to say nothing of those who may be struggling to wrest command from us. This in two ways: (*a*) by inducing them to delay war and submit their cause to enquiry in the hope that the enemy's refusal so to do would deprive him of the economic resources of neutrals and (*b*) by showing that even if command of the sea could be wrested from Britain it would not carry with it the advantages Britain derives from it unless the new commander of the sea were prepared to submit his case to judgment. If it be argued with reference to (*a*) that Britain would never refuse to submit her case to enquiry or delay, then the whole objection to the plan from her point of view falls to the ground because she would never suffer the penalty under it.

arise; if no goods could go to him because no nation would sell them, it would not greatly matter what the contraband list was.

Sea law would then be the police law of organized society. The nations of the world would have surrendered their "neutral" right of trade in war in exchange for a definite organization of the world which would give protection to a right much more important, and would diminish the risk of war, and the damage which in any case war now entails upon them.

The alternatives are simple. We may follow the old attempt to protect the neutral by the limitation of belligerent right, the kind of limitation attempted in the Declaration of London. The history of "Neutral *v.* Belligerent" during several centuries has left us now very little doubt as to the fate of that method. The other alternative is to abolish the neutral by securing his formal co-operation in the exercise of sea power by those belligerents, which in return for his co-operation, undertake to use their power

against the nation that may threaten his national interests or existence.¹

Let us recall certain facts of the situation that will exist at the end of the war.

The nations actually involved in resistance to Germany counting the actual belligerents, those who have broken off relations with the Central Powers, or new states that will arise as the result of Germany's defeat, will number more than twenty. The list includes a large number of small nations, and to small nations the Allies have promised the things embodied in these declarations:

An equal level of opportunity and independence as between small states and great states—as between the weak and the strong.²

¹ If we can imagine wars of the future in which the world as a whole is not concerned—private international wars fought outside the League of Nations—it is altogether possible that the nations as a whole would limit the exercise of such belligerent powers at sea and by a wide international combination enforce some such code as the Declaration of London. But most of this is written on the assumption that we may expect war if it comes at all in the future to be as world-wide as this has been. That assumption will surely dominate international policy of the near future.

² British Prime Minister, Aug. 4, 1916.

Room must be found and kept for the independent existence and free development of the smaller nationalities. . . . They must be recognized as having exactly as good a title to a "place in the sun."¹

Governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed. No right exists anywhere to hand peoples from potentate to potentate as if they were property.²

Inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development to peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.²

• Now the rights there promised will not be easy to determine. Sometimes claims will be in conflict. Third parties will be involved. The first settlement may not, almost certainly will not be, satisfactory. And even if it were, conditions would change, for the world is not a fixed but a changing thing.

• Nor will the relation of the larger states be less difficult. For them, if constant friction is to be avoided, we must find means of

¹ British Prime Minister, Sept. 25, 1914.

² President Wilson, Jan. 22, 1917.

assuring economic rights-of-way — access in certain cases to the sea without the need of having to conquer the territory leading to it, economic access by rail across territory that may intervene between a highly industrialized and an undeveloped people. In the case of the Colonial Powers there will be such questions as the free access to raw materials.

We get here, by universal consent, certain indispensable conditions to a peace which shall be both just and permanent:

The recognition of the principle of nationality; the right of civilized peoples to determine their own government, limited however by,

The right of all peoples to certain freedoms of economic movement—access to the sea, to great sources of raw material, to undeveloped areas.

Some means of organic change without war.

Sanctions—a means of enforcing respect for the general interest.

How do we propose to approach the solution of these complex problems? Shall we, as a first step towards securing that equality of right for small states for which the war was

in such large measure fought, refuse a round score of vitally interested minor states a place at the Conference which is to decide the fate of some of them? Or, admitting them, so emasculate the scope and functions of the Conference that they are reduced to powerlessness? That, in the face of our professions would not be possible.

Then you have an international body not much less extensive than were the Hague Congresses. One may refuse to give it President Wilson's title of "a universal association of nations," but whatever the name, and however much the name and the idea may excite hostility and derision, that thing is precisely what will follow the peace; or it will be no peace, or a peace dictated by Teutonic might.

CHAPTER VII

PUBLIC OPINION AS THE DECISIVE FACTOR

The maintenance of the old disruptive policy in the Alliance due to the fact that public opinion was not—and is not—ready for the new policy. The process of control of policy by opinion in war and peace. The old and the new political religion. The conspiracy to sustain the old and oppose the new. Why a “truce to discussion of terms” is always broken by those who demand it. Experience on that point in England and America. The moral cleavage and the Bolshevik menace. Shall we be as unprepared for peace as we were for war?

BUT does public opinion matter, after all? Does it really determine policy, and if so how?

For the whole idea that civilian opinion during a war can have any real effect upon the waging of it, or its result, is often challenged as absurd. “What does the public know about policy anyhow? It is quite content to leave all that to the President. It will accept anything he cares to hand out. And the government knows it very well. And as for

the peace, it is far better to leave it to the experts who know the facts; public opinion won't affect it in the slightest degree." One may frequently hear that stated with a dogmatism which implies that to challenge it is to fly in the face of obvious fact and common sense.

We are agreed by this time, perhaps, that the military success of the Allies depends, not alone upon purely military factors, but also upon certain non-military factors, like the solidarity of our alliance, upon such purely political things as the policy we adopt towards Russia, Japan, Italy. Suppose we extend the implied proposition in this way:

Those non-military factors, which are indispensable to military success, depend upon good management by the civilian rulers, the politicians.

Effective civilian rule depends upon civilian public opinion. It is civilian opinion and civilian opinion alone which, for instance, in Europe deposes one government, like that of Mr. Asquith in favour of another, like that of Mr. Lloyd George. If that change was wise it must greatly have facilitated the task of the soldier, if unwise greatly have hindered it.

Now, stated in that form those propositions are almost truisms. Yet they run directly counter to the position that the public can have nothing to do with policy because it knows nothing about it; that it can have nothing to do with the peace because it will prefer to leave it to those who know the facts.

I shall attempt to show that public opinion is indeed today, in Western Society, the determining factor in policy, though that factor itself may be the product of governmental or class influences; that it has accounted for the outstanding failures of policy in the Alliance, and that it will determine the character of the peace.

There is one confusion in this connection that should be anticipated. We know that in war time feelings run very high—naturally and excusably so. And it is very common to hear the statement that at such times therefore “cold logic” and argument are out of place; and that patriotism demands we should show ourselves “men of feeling.”

Now no one could have a profounder sense

of the fundamental irrationality of men, of their prevailing failure to act from reason and logic, than I happen to have. It is, I think, literally true, as a great English philosopher has said, that men in the mass would far rather die than think. That is why I shall attempt tonight to apply reason and logic to this situation, and shall urge you to think. If it were entirely "natural" for us to do these things without effort, there would be no particular sense in our concerning ourselves with them. They would come right of themselves, without any intellectual effort of ours. But civilization is mainly based upon our learning to do the things we don't do naturally, upon the slow conquest of the desire to act upon the first instinct. When you first play tennis you can't get a ball over the net because you do the "natural" thing, which is to rush into the balls as they come at you. When you have a grain of sand in your eye and someone screws up a handkerchief to get it out for you, you promptly help him by closing your eye. It is the "natural" thing to do. The "natu-

ral" and human thing to do when someone cries "fire" in a crowded theatre is for the whole audience to rise and rush. And unless they have learned previously through a certain intellectual discipline to restrain their natural impulses they will destroy themselves. Their lives depend upon being quite unnaturally rational. An unreasoning yielding to instinct may be suicidal, and we can only save ourselves by an intelligence which directs instinct through foresight of consequence. Yet I have been told a hundred times that the kind of thing we are engaged upon tonight is utterly futile because when it comes to the crisis men will not act from reason. Well, that fact, that inherent irrationality, far from condemning our endeavour, is the very thing which justifies it; which proves its need.

We have seen that at the bottom of those "imperialist" claims of various members of the Alliance which proved so disruptive an element in it, lay the natural instinct of national self-preservation. Invective about wicked imperialism is in such a situation worse

than useless. Self-preservation is the law of life, and nations, even unconsciously, will yield to it. Imperialism itself, derives its force and danger from this instinct, the desire to be strong at all costs because in anarchy strength is the condition of life; and it is the struggle for individual strength overriding all other considerations which makes anarchy.

And the conclusion amounts to this: Unless we can learn to control that instinct by foreseeing the consequences of yielding to it, the outcome will be as disastrous as yielding to undisciplined instinct when "fire" is shouted in a crowded theatre.

Let us examine the part played by public opinion in certain errors of past policy already dealt with.

Take the case of the undertakings to Italy.

Here, were the British and French governments in 1915 faced by a problem and a condition, not a theory. The participation of Italy had to be secured. If the Alliance had offered Italy or Roumania nothing more than a place in a League of Nations they would

never have joined the Alliance. And even if membership of the League meant recovery of territory it would give no assurance of sufficient motive for a dreadful and devastating war. To ask men to suffer and to give their lives, not for their country, not for its greatness, not for something rooted in history and tradition, rallying to it the strong passions of race and nationality and patriotism, old and profound loyalties,¹ but for this dry nebulous thing of the study, this paper plan—which tomorrow may prove a scrap of paper plan—new, and full of difficulties and not very easy to understand; to ask men to leave their shattered bodies upon frozen mountains, not for hearth and home, not for king and country, not for Old Glory, la Patrie, Italia Irredenta—not for these things, but

¹ What, however, does the Alliance "offer" America in the way of territory? Parenthetically I would like to say that as a simple explanation and justification of the Allies' conduct, I accept the above absolutely. I cannot too often emphasize the fact that nothing here is intended as an attempt to censure Italy or the Allies. They did the best they could. But errors were made and our business is to try and profit by them, to see if there is any means by which they can be avoided in the future. That alone is the object and intention of this argument.

for The Revised Code of International Law as drawn up by the best legal talent, a New Hague Court of Conciliation and Arbitration—to ask that, you will say, is to give proof of detachment from the world of realities, of men and nations and the motives which actuate them. You approve of that view. If you were impolite enough you would probably cite such a suggestion as that Italy would have entered the war on behalf of a League of Nations as explaining why it is that we internationalists and similar intellectuals have no influence worth mentioning; of the fashion in which we theorize and theorize and draw conclusions and are argumentative and logical—and utterly ignore the real springs of human action, ignore the way in which men act in the mass and give expression to their hopes and dreams and hates and loyalties.

I am glad that so many of you applaud that sentiment—and that some of you don't; for that is proof of what I want to submit in this connection. First that great and powerful sections of Western Society, largely the ruling

order, simply do not believe in the feasibility of the League of Nations. They have not the "Will to Believe" as William James would have it, and that, in this case, means that they do not desire it; that it runs counter to too many old emotions which are luxuries—emotions that are almost religious emotions. And the silence on the other side is witness of the fact that a minority are starting a new tradition one day destined to replace the old.

Oh! Certainly you will resent energetically the implication that you don't really desire the League of Nations. You will say you do desire it; you are not opposed to it at all. You simply don't believe it feasible. Yes, that is the attitude of European statesmanship.¹

¹ Replying in Chamber to Pierre Forgeot who asked what he thought of a Society of Nations M. Clemenceau said:

"Ah yes. I know we live in a time when the word is a great power. There are many, including even men of great mind, who believe that the words have power to liberate.

"But no. The same words have been discussed by humanity since the beginning of its existence. Many thinkers, philosophers, deputies, senators, politicians, and Frenchmen are convinced that some miracle will suddenly produce the Society of Nations. I do not believe that the Society of Nations is the necessary

The German Chancellor even tells us Prussia is quite in favour of a League of Nations. Not only in favour of it but prepared to lead it! He, at least, can be quite liberal-minded about it, because he probably does really believe the whole thing pure chimera. If he thought it possible he would bitterly oppose it; for he knows that it would be the end of the German system. Everybody can approve it so long as there is not the slightest chance of it being put into effect.

You get this situation, this contradiction then. On the one hand you say that it can all safely be left to the government; that the public, the people will carry out any policy upon which it may decide, and that this need for education is all bunk. Then

conclusion of the present war. *One* of my reasons is that if you propose to me tomorrow to bring Germany into this Society of Nations I would not consent to do so. What guarantee would you offer me? You would offer me the guarantee of a signature. Germany's signature cannot be trusted. You ask what my aims are. My aim is to be victor. You demand that we undertake engagements when we cannot do so without detriment to the spirit that enables us to continue the war."—*New York Times*, Nov. 22d.

there comes a situation—like the participation of Italy in the war—in which the Alliance has before it two courses, one full of danger, certain sooner or later to precipitate the old troubles, and one full of hope. Then you immediately declare that the one “theoretically best” is impossible because public opinion is not ready for it; because it does not inspire enthusiasm; because men would not fight for it, because in other words the public would *not* carry out such a policy if the government did decide on it. You aver with a sort of triumphant dogmatism that the passions of nationalism will always defeat attempts to solve the problem on internationalist lines, and in the same breath declare that the common passions of men—the most important part of “public opinion”—have nothing to do with the matter.

We shall not grasp the relation of public opinion, of the feeling of the mass, to policy, until we realize something of the way in which public opinion is brought to bear on public affairs.

When a nation is faced by some step in policy—an offer to be made to an Italy or a Roumania, a reply to a proposal of peace from the enemy, a statement of war aims, the grant or refusal of passports to socialists for an international conference on war aims, the course to be adopted towards a Bolshevik or counter-revolutionary Russian Government—the public, whether expressing itself through the press or its popular public characters, through trade unions or political parties, does not arrive at its decisions by a careful, elaborate, rationalized balancing of all the facts pro and con in the particular problem under consideration. That, for reasons of a whole group of facts I have dealt with elsewhere, is out of the question. What happens is that a general attitude or state of mind, due to the sum of the preponderant influences that have previously been at work, prompts a given decision. The war news headlines of a year or two having produced in the case of a given individual—say an ordinary business man—the impression that

complete "annihilation" of Germany is certain; a course of reading in German atrocities the impression that it is indispensable; a measure of personal commercial success qualified by difficulty with discontented workmen the conviction that Socialism is seditious immorality and the Russian Bolsheviks a set of lunatics led by rascals—given such a preparation during a year or two the proposal to accord passports to Socialists to go to Stockholm say; or the proposal that the Allies should state their terms for the purpose of dispelling suspicion in Russia, is not going to be examined as a jury would examine a case at law. A general state of mind and feeling, when it comes to the collective decisions of busy millions, is the main factor of decision and is the thing by which in the last resort statesmen must be guided.

The elements of these decisions of the public, however, do not come from Mars. They come from the wills and acts of definite men, here on the earth. You and I and a few hundred million like us are public opinion—

shaping it, changing it, modifying it, the whole time, now, as I speak and you listen.

The protagonists of the old order say they do not believe in this internationalism because it is impossible to induce men to act other than in the old way—reacting emotionally to the old symbols of Flag, Fatherland. But the real feeling of these anti-internationalists, that part of their motive which they will not look in the face and examine, is, not the fear that those old nationalist emotions are unchanging and everlasting, but the fear that already men are changing them too much. The majority which stands by the old order is, consciously and unconsciously, organizing itself to resist those changes which they fear that the minority may introduce.

Let us see how the process operates.

In every country at the beginning of a war, the authorities, supported by public opinion as a whole, nearly always proclaim, in one form or another, a truce to all political discussion, particularly discussion of the future peace and its terms. "Germany will never

be conquered by talk" seems the usual argument. "Now is not the time. When the house is burning down is no time to talk of theories of combustion or methods of fire prevention." Let us win the war first, and then will be time enough to talk about the settlement and its conditions. Discussion of such things during the war can only serve the purposes of the enemy. It diverts our energy from the prosecution of the war itself, and disturbs and distracts us. It might reveal differences with our Allies. The only war aim that we need concern ourselves with is victory. Clemenceau has the right slogan: "My war aim is to beat the enemy." We should leave policy to the government who know the facts better than we do. The American public have complete trust in the President and an ill-informed public should not interfere with him. And so on, and so on.

You know all these phrases. They are our daily fare.

Now if those who used them showed the slightest intention of abiding by them, I

think there would be a very great deal to be said for the policy they express. But it is these advocates of silence who without any sort of doubt talk most; it is precisely those who declare that peace terms should not be discussed who are continually discussing them in the most provocative form, and in the form most likely to aid the enemy; it is precisely those who tell us that the government should not be criticized who are the readiest to criticize it; it is those most insistent upon leaving policy to the President who are busy undermining the very foundations of the President's policy.

It is rather important to realize what the result of the attempt to refrain from any discussion of policy, of war aims, has been in Europe.

Take England. At the beginning of the war, public opinion and authority alike concurred in the rule that there should be no criticism of the nation's leaders—of the Premier, of Sir Edward Grey, of Lord Kitchener. One public man who seemed to have the

appearance of criticizing Sir Edward Grey was "tomahawked." The Liberal and Radical press was terrorized into silence—not so much perhaps by official authority as by general public feeling.

What happened? The rule was not adhered to. Who broke it? The Liberals and Radicals, those supposed to be lukewarm about the war? Not a bit. The "truce" was broken by the Conservatives, and by the fiercest, most belligerent, most fire-eating patriots; more particularly by the papers controlled by Lord Northcliffe. •

Now you will miss my entire point if you suppose I am blaming this newspaper intervention. For all I know Lord Northcliffe was entirely justified on the facts; his intervention as the representative of a great body of public opinion was certainly justified as a principle. The point it is necessary to bring out is this: that the very group which in 1914 was most insistent that there should be no criticism of Asquith, or McKenna, or Grey, were the very group whose criticisms turned

those leaders out of office! It is entirely true to say that while in 1914 it was accepted as proof of treason to say a word in criticism of (say) Grey; by 1916 it had become plain evidence of treason to say a word for him—and this while he was still in office!

Of two things one. Either the Northcliffe press was justified, in which case the nation was saved from catastrophe by public opinion abandoning this rule of silence. Or, the public judged wrongly, in which case we may conclude that it did so because the formation of opinion had been made on partial information; because it had not had access to facts and because its discussion of them had not been full and free. Either conclusion is strong argument in favour of untrammelled discussion of the issues of a war.

And there is this further point. If we decide that the public in throwing out Asquith and Grey and their associates were mistaken, it proves that the policy of silence, of withholding facts, does not prevent the formation of an opinion that insists upon making its

weight felt in government and policy—and insists disastrously. It proves pretty conclusively that democratic control will be exercised whether it has the facts and has considered them deliberately, or whether it has not; mischievously in the first case, beneficently in the second.

And there is this fact which may have a certain lesson for this country. The Asquith government was the victim of a policy with reference to public discussion which it had itself inaugurated. Early in the war it approved the policy of "silence on war aims and peace terms." The Liberal and Radical press suspended any discussion of the Liberal, Radical, or international case, either with reference to the settlement itself or to political strategy during the war. That press hesitated to criticize, with any vigour, such proposals for instance at the Paris Economic Conference and the general policy there forecast. But the Northcliffe press, as we know, did not keep silent on such measures. The "economic war after the war," the "punishment" of the

Germans, the need for punitive settlement, these things for two years were the daily fare of the readers of those newspapers. You got in fact the exact phenomenon which you now have here. For two years, that is, the British public only heard one side of a given case; did not hear the liberal and internationalist side at all. Again, it was not mainly a matter of argumentation, but of a certain selection of the facts to which public attention was daily called; a certain distribution of emphasis on those facts. The news of German atrocities of themselves carry the desire for punishment; news of the misuse of commercial power the desire for economic war after the war. Such facts excite an immediate emotional reaction far more readily provoked than the argument as to whether the steps which instinct prompts are likely to be effective either in bringing the really guilty to book or in preventing such horrors in the future. Such a thesis indeed savours immediately of pro-Germanism. So the Liberal press refrained from any expression of the policy for

which it stood. But Lord Northcliffe was as articulate as ever for the contrary policy.

The Liberal government, by suppressing, or discouraging the liberal interpretation of facts, had turned the control of opinion over to Lord Northcliffe. The early policy of "silence" did really impose a certain silence upon the *Daily News* or the *Manchester Guardian*; none whatever upon the *Times* or the *Daily Mail*. None of us can, day after day, be under the influence of such a process without being affected by it. The British public were affected by it. Sir Edward Grey's policy began to appear anæmic, weak, pro-German. And in the end he and his colleagues disappeared, partly at least as the result of the very policy of "leaving it to the government" upon which they had insisted at the beginning of the war.

It is not a matter of the mere personal inconsistencies of isolated individuals or newspapers; those inconsistencies arise from the very nature of the forces that make war.

Here for instance is a great New York daily

—a specimen of the most influential type of newspaper in America. It is positively ferocious in its condemnation of “talk,” of the unwisdom of discussing peace terms, and has been distinguished for its demand for merciless treatment of all who show themselves hostile to the declared policy of the government. In a leading article, which is entirely typical and characteristic, it says:

We shall not get permanent peace by treating the Hun as if he were not a Hun. One might just as well attempt to cure a man-eating tiger of his hankering for human flesh by soft words as to break the German of his historic habits by equally futile kind words. The way to treat a German, while Germans follow their present methods, is as a common peril to all civilized mankind. Since the German employs the method of the wild beast he must be treated as beyond the appeal of generous or kind methods. When one is generous to a German he plans to take advantage of that generosity to rob or murder; this is his international history, never more conspicuously illustrated than here in America. Kindness he interprets as fear, regard for international law as proof of decadence;

agitation for disarmament has been for him the final evidence of the degeneracy of his neighbours.¹

Is not that editorial a discussion of terms? It is a discussion, in very violent and provocative form, a form most likely to aid the enemy, of the thesis that on no account must the final terms of peace treat the German as a human being; that generous methods will utterly fail with him, and that he will interpret them as fear, and it at least implies that disarmament would be the most fatal mistake of all. It may all be perfectly true—I am not concerned with that in the least for the moment—but it is a discussion of the terms of peace in their most fundamental aspect, and it challenges the very basis of the President's policy.

The foundation of that policy is a differentiation between the German people and the German Government, and a clear explicit declaration that our victory will challenge no

¹ *New York Tribune*, Oct. 16th.

vital interest of the German people. Over and over again has the President declared that we are fighting for the freedom and welfare of the German people as much as our own, that we have no hostile feelings concerning them. These declarations are not mere political sentimentality; they are of the very essence of a definite and "realist" policy, indispensable to the whole political position and political strategy adopted by the American Government, and necessary to its purposes.¹ And the purpose implies as the ultimate solution of wars between peoples a great widening of the scope of international law and disarmament.

The policy may be as emasculate, utopian, weak-kneed, and mistaken as you like; but it happens to be that of the American Government.

¹ And unless that government is to be placed in an utterly false (and militarily disadvantageous) position with reference to the enemy governments, it is of the utmost importance to show that such policy is adopted, not as a piece of diplomatic camouflage, but as a sincere effort, representing the true feeling and aspiration of the whole American people; and that it will really be enforced at the peace if the German people should be disposed to forsake their government, to refuse any longer to make the vast sacrifices that they are making for its purposes.

And the whole effect of articles like that quoted from is to create doubt as to its genuineness of purpose; and it is this kind of evidence that best serves the purposes of the German Government in its efforts to persuade its people that unless they resist to the last they will be utterly destroyed by the very passion of their enemies; that they can expect nothing in the way of fair, still less of generous treatment if they are defeated, if, that is, they fail to uphold their military rulers. Thus is the enemy's resistance stiffened by our patriots; and thus do our lads pay in their lives for the consequent prolongation of the war.

Take another case illustrating this same phenomenon of discussion of peace terms by the very people who declare that any such discussion now comes near to treason—and, incidentally do so perhaps quite sincerely. (I doubt whether the editorial writer from whom I have quoted realized that he was discussing peace terms or undermining the President's policy.) Here is the report of

a great Madison Square Garden meeting. Colonel Roosevelt and Mayor Mitchel were the chief figures. But the hit of the evening, the report tells us, was the speech of an Australian officer part of which was as follows: "The men over there who are fighting for peace and giving their lives for it are the only ones who have the right to talk about the method of obtaining it. . . ." Colonel Roosevelt entirely approved: "The best speaker of the evening, right in everything he said," reads the report.

. The Colonel then proceeded, to the extent of a column, to lay down in great detail what the terms of peace ought to be. Down to the last detail apparently. He has disposed of the future of the Pole, the Finn, the Lithuanian, the Armenian, the Czech, the Slovak, the Croat, the Roumanian, the Italian. He lets Japan and Great Britain know just how they can divide the German colonies between them; and as for the fate of the enemy "the only peace that will make the world safe for democracy is a peace based upon the over-

throw of Germany and the dissolution of Austria and Turkey." International agreements in the future will at best play a very limited rôle. The lesson of this war is that in the past there have not been enough armaments. The world must remedy that in future. We shall then have peace. Oh, it is a very full programme—especially coming from a man who believes that only soldiers in the trenches have really the right to talk of the best way of securing peace. And I note that the Colonel has since added a few details as to the fundamental principles of peace and our relations with the enemy. He tells us in a newspaper article,¹ that "our war is as much with the German people as with their government." In fact in almost every fundamental principle the Colonel is doing his part to create an American public opinion which shall be hostile to the principles enunciated by the government as being those for which this country will stand at the peace. .

Now, I don't doubt the entire sincerity of

¹ Reproduced in New York *Evening Sun*, Nov. 13th.

those who tell us that in time of war all who oppose the policy of their government should be shot, or that all discussion of peace should be deferred till the war is over—and then immediately expose themselves to the penalty. As already noted, we have here a fact which is a great deal bigger than the mere personal inconsistencies of certain individuals. The phenomenon just indicated is explained by this: that you cannot from one day to another transform the springs of action of a whole people. If this nation, or the British nation, had a nature which made it possible to go on day after day, week after week, giving their life blood, the youth of a whole generation, the seed of the future, without enquiry or interest as to the ultimate purpose of such sacrifices, they would not be fighting this war at all; they would not be concerned in making the world safe for democracy for they would not be nor care to be democratized. For that docile acquiescence would only be possible in a people who were in their nature quite ready to surrender their fate without question

into the hands of others. And that kind of people would never have made democracy. And the inconvenience of having to explain why we are fighting is part of the price we pay for democracy, and to complain of it is like complaining that the rain which gives us the harvest also gives us damp and unpleasant days. You may have this "silent killing" in an autocratic Germany or a Czarist Russia, or a Turkey; you cannot have it in peoples nurtured by a thousand years of government by discussion.

And this the people who ask it know very well in their hearts. What they want is not a truce to discussion, but the exclusion from that discussion of all who have the insufferable impudence to disagree with them. They are of the type that war always brings to the front, possessing those qualities that make war—pugnacity, truculence, intolerance of the views of others, hostility to the foreign, that is the strange and unfamiliar. Such people—and they are generally admirable folk—can be depended upon to be in

favour of any war, for any purpose. And their truculence would be of undoubted use in war time if it could only be turned against the enemy. Unfortunately, they are very often sedentary and stay-at-home persons who turn it against their own countrymen in the name of national unity.

But note this: that while liberal contribution to the development of policy disappears, radical discontent and "revolutionary ferment" do not. And that fact is not accidental.

That part of the press and of organs of opinion generally, which remains vocal during a war and declines altogether to observe the "truce," bases its appeal to the impulsive, the emotional, and the pugnacious in us, elements much more easily aroused in us than reflection, the difficult and quite "unnatural" second thought, consideration of remoter consequences and restraint of instinct. As a consequence, in these times of stress there is a sifting to the top, of the Chauvinist on the one hand, and the revolutionary on the other, the violent minded at both extremes. What

happens as the result of a fictitious "truce to discussion" is that all those forms of discussion which depend upon rational thought are swept aside in favour of appeals to emotion—to moral indignation, to hate or fear, or prejudice. There goes on steadily and inexorably at one end that modification of public opinion and policy which must come from reading day after day and week after week the unending stories of German atrocities, of cruelty to our men in the field, of treason and deceit at home—all true no doubt, but not the whole truth; and those who might supply the missing part—which might help to point the right conclusion—are those that have been silenced. And there goes on at the other end, the argument of hunger and higher prices, the charges of profiteering, the "oppression" of the Capitalist—equally true no doubt but equally needing to be completed by certain facts that do not lie on the surface. Thus the public opinion which results is unbalanced, wayward, violent, and very deeply divided between two irreconcilable—and, let us

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whisper it—two equally impossible extremes. While the papers are not supposed to be discussing the settlement they are every day printing arguments in the shape of certain facts which can only result in most violent opinions concerning the settlement. What the “truce” prevents them from printing are certain other facts which might render those opinions balanced. The Socialists are not allowed to argue with one another in their papers; but arguments of facts, of their daily lives, ill-understood and unexplained, go on unchecked.

And thus is accentuated that moral cleavage within the Allied nations which has given us Bolshevism in Russia, disastrous mutiny in Italy,¹ and “revolutionary ferment” even in England. This moral cleavage within the nations of the Alliance, like the disunion, as between the States, is an element of disintegration, and is itself a part of public opinion.

¹ General Maurice has declared in his report on the Italian reverses that Revolutionary Socialism in the Italian army must be accounted as one of the great factors of the defeat.

The notion that we can successfully deal with this menace by mere repression has all the experience of this war against it—and most experience that preceded it.

After all the old Russian Government did try repression in a pretty thoroughgoing fashion. There were no half-measures and they had certain conveniences—Siberia, an elastic law when it came to dealing with rebelliously minded folk, acquiescent officials, complete powers over the press in peace as in war—which we western democracies lack. Yet despite all these advantages the method of repression cannot be said to have been, from the point of view of the old Russian Government, an unqualified success. It did not stamp out the Socialist, as we know. It merely turned him into a Bolshevik. That is what repression generally does. If, during the last half-century the wild theories of the Russian Maximalist had been exposed to the light and air of public discussion, most of the more unwholesome germs would have perished long since. But, driven underground,

having to meet, not the exposure of reason and sanity, but the ferocity of persecution, we know how the Russian revolutionist developed. He had no need of rationalism, reason, capacity to demonstrate the feasibility of his theories. That was useless because it was impossible for him to employ his arguments. What he needed was a fierce courage in the use of violence. That mainly is how he kept his movement alive; and that is why during half a century there developed in Russia that with which the latest of the Russian governments has made us familiar.

In the Western Democracies we have had during the war a repression of the radical and socialist which does not exist during peace. And it is during the war, according to such testimony as that of the commissioner appointed recently by the *London Times*, that Maximalism in England has become a public danger. The repression of war time has not stamped out the socialist ferment. It has rendered it of an explosive and dangerous type.

We are confronted by two mutually exclusive policies. On the one side is the old group of feelings—nationalist, ready to expand into imperialist, looking to the military strength of the state as the means of security; on the other side, a newer group of feelings looking to co-operation between the peoples for security. The two cannot be reconciled. If Italy stakes her future security upon sheer preponderance of military power, which means necessarily the denial of the right of "self-determination of peoples," she cannot, at the same time—as the event has unhappily so sweepingly proved—support the co-operation of European democracies for common security. This latter policy, if it is to succeed against the immense momentum of the old, will demand bold experiment, resolute faith, and the reciprocal confidence that comes of intense conviction.

The future rests on the answer to this question: On the side of which of these two mutually exclusive policies will the larger weight of feeling be thrown? Again, it is not a question

of judicious and fine-spun argument on each detail of policy as it comes up. The mass will plump for one or the other by virtue of its general state of mind and feeling towards very broad principles. Upon which side will the great body of prejudices, habits of mind, fears, hates, hopes, expectations descend? And that amalgam is daily forming, by what we read, say to one another, or fail to read or fail to say to one another.

Abstract approval of the President's policy means nothing at all. It is like the common expressions in favour of peace. The Kaiser has made eloquent speeches in favour of peace, and I daresay he was sincere, because what he meant by being in favour of peace and desiring to see it preserved, was that all other nations should give way to German ambitions without question. Then Germany would not go to war—she would not need to. We are all in favour of friendly agreement if only everybody else will do exactly what we want and make all the concessions.

So in the matter of the League of Nations.

The question is not whether you are in favour of this new method of international politics; of course you are in favour of it "in the abstract"—as the Kaiser was in favour of peace. The whole question is, how much are you in favour of it as against the older methods; on which side are you going to throw your influence as a whole? Are you, while proclaiming your intense devotion to internationalism going to take a line of action which renders internationalism impossible? Have you really examined what internationalism is going to ask of you, what surrenders of national independence and sovereignty you will have to make in order to render it workable?

Let us examine it a little.

The highest justification of this war which we are fighting is that it is an assertion of the rights of small states. The war arose out of the defence of Serbia by Russia, and derived moral force from the defence of Belgium. Our principle is that the small weak state is as much entitled to national life and full rights

and opportunities as the great, and that the nations as a whole should exact respect for those things. It is the duty of civilization to ensure, and to demonstrate, that mere strength confers no rights that do not belong equally to the small and the weak. Such is our case, and it is a great one. It is internationalism, unadulterated; and it implies a Society of Nations.

And that implies the surrender of very much that in politics has moved nations in the past. This struggle for power, expansion, and dominion, for advantage and success through national strength—that in large part will have to be surrendered if the weak are to have equal opportunity with the strong. If there is to be equality of opportunity as between weak and powerful, much that we have heretofore regarded as attaching to independence and sovereignty will have to be given up. In vast territories over which our race holds sway—in India, throughout Asia generally, in Africa—the world must, commercially, be admitted on equal terms. You may have

to admit Japan to the Philippines on those terms. To very many this equality of weak and powerful will be like an attempt to upset the laws of nature, or of evolution; the law of survival of the strong. And some of the strong won't like it.

In addition to protecting the small states we are to settle our relations with them on a basis of democratic equality; to subject matters which heretofore we have decided by simple virtue of our power to conference and discussion, and to abide by decisions in which we have been merely one of many parties thereto. If all this is to take place—and nothing less can make a Society of Nations a reality or workable—we shall have to face very great constitutional readjustments. Yet I have heard a very “practical” American statesman declare that Mr. Wilson's League of Nations plan would have to be revised and watered down, because, as it stood, it would interfere with the prerogatives of the Senate. Think. Tens of millions of our generation have offered up their lives on the altar of a

new ideal—a new and altogether different, a revolutionized world; one that has broken with the past because mankind is feeling dimly that the past won't do. For this ideal a world has sweated bloody sweat and groaned in travail and in agony; and millions of mothers and widows and fathers will never know happiness again. But we must all—young America, and France, and England, Italy, the new Russia, the new Belgium, and all the small states—surrender our dreams because they might disturb the Senate!

•A remark like that reveals just about how much in earnest we are; how little this thing has moved us. And while our feeling for the new is so feeble, that for the old is intense. We agreed just this minute that there are powerful currents, having deep sources in age-long loyalties, running strongly against the new policy. These appeals to a man's flag, the interests of his country as against those of the foreigner, the whole symbol of the fatherland, can secure a response immeasurably more ready and more intense than at

present we can get for this pale thing, the Society of Nations, the Rights of Humanity. And often the two will be, or appear to be, in conflict. Which is going to win?

And yet you tell me that public opinion is perfectly ready to give Mr. Wilson all the support he needs for his League of Nations. In the next breath you tell me he will never get it.

It is one of the tragic humours of this situation that in large part we neither believe in nor desire the thing for which we are supposed to be fighting; large numbers of us go in quaking fear that we should be suspected of real belief in it.

A couple of years ago a few of us in England attempted to organize an expression of public opinion on behalf of this plan, now endorsed by Mr. Wilson. We went to certain eminent public men, having the kind of "distinguished names" that one always gets when one forms a Society. Yes, they all agreed in principle of course; but "now was not the time"; public opinion was not favourable to such an

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idea. (That of course was why we were forming our Society. If public opinion had been favourable there would be no need of, nor sense in, our agitation.) Very nearly every man we went to was in mortal fear that the public should think he favoured this idea. It might be mistaken for pacifism, or pro-Germanism. "Yes, of course, properly understood it would be a good thing for the Alliance, and help the war; but the public—and the papers—might misunderstand it." And so it was better, these distinguished gentlemen concluded, that the press and public should go on misunderstanding it, than that they, the great ones of the earth, should be tainted by association with a policy of this kind. Public opinion was so touchy, so apt to misinterpret. It was. But public opinion would have been something quite different, if each one of these great personages had made, as his contribution to it, not what the public wanted to hear—which was the contribution each was careful to make—but what each knew to be the truth, which each

freely expressed in private, but was particularly careful to give no expression to in public. "I am not so much interested in public opinion," said Emerson on one occasion, "as in private opinion." When the two do not coincide—and that is coming to be the case more and more—it means that public opinion represents in part at least, men's civic poltrooneries; something made up of the attempt to hide the most important truths of all, those which we know to be true but are afraid to pronounce out loud, those which if allowed to escape from their cage would demolish certain falsehoods by which we have come to set great store.

When Mr. Wilson came out in favour of a League of Nations as the future to which America looked and would work, the *London Times* took the line that while, "in the abstract" the idea was admirable, it would be disastrous if the English people allowed themselves to think about it or concern themselves with it in any way. It would detract attention from the war; and it was the duty of

Englishmen to concentrate everything on that.

When this was written the *Times* had for months previously been approving of the Economic Inter-Allied Conference, just held for the purpose of devising the economic war against Germany which should succeed the military war. That Conference had nothing to do with the waging of the war proper; it quite definitely added to its difficulties, for the reasons I have already indicated. But the *Times* approved of the Conference. There were also at that time in England some hundreds of "Reconstruction Committees"—bodies concerning themselves with the conditions which should succeed the war, dealing with problems of demobilization, housing, employment, education, maternity, a thousand and one matters connected with the condition that would face the nation when the war was done. But the most profound problem of reconstruction of all, that upon which all the others depended, the political reconstruction of Europe, the foun-

dation of the whole structure was a matter with which the public should on no account concern itself.

Please don't suppose that this is peculiar to England. It is just the same here. A friend of mine, a writer whose books have heretofore had a large sale in America, sent his publisher one dealing with a phase of this very effort—the conditions necessary to give a League of Nations, Mr. Wilson's policy,—some hope of success in the future. His publisher replied that "in view of the prevailing state of public opinion" he could not think of publishing such a book at this time. And I have known of Peace Societies, whose purpose in life it is to unravel, to make clear to the public, the means and methods by which men can live together in the world, by which our planet can be so organized as to make the thing we are fighting for possible, announce that they have suspended all activities until after the war; that is, until after the settlement is made. Which is exactly as though a Republican or Democratic Electioneering Committee

should announce, as soon as an electoral campaign opened, that it had suspended all activities until after the election!

Is this policy of the President's going to be an easy thing to enforce that we need no preparation for it? Why, we know that it is going to be the most difficult thing in the world.

How are the principles enunciated by the President to be put into practice? Victory of itself, however complete and overwhelming, will not answer that question. Even though not a single German soldier remained alive it would still be a vast and thorny problem to secure safety and equal rights for each nation, to maintain economic freedom and rights of way, to reconcile national right with international obligation. If we are to find a solution at all, many old conceptions must be vastly changed, and that change can only come as the result of widespread and thorough discussion.

And that can only come as the result of a moral and intellectual ferment set up by the

minority which desires to break with the past in this respect; which has a new vision. Through such minorities only can we establish new ideals and aspirations. All that we gained as the outcome of the French Revolution, when men acquired new ideals and new loyalties, we owe to the work of a minority. The old dynastic loyalties melted in the revolutionary cauldron, and formed in the mold of men's minds a new shape, that of loyalty to peoples, and—later, in the struggles of nationality—to nations; so now, the loyalties to nation—to one group as against other groups—must expand into the larger loyalty to all men, to the common need for universal laws of national life.

And unless this new experiment of ours can rally to itself some such loyalties, it will fail. Without any sort of doubt it will fail. ⁴

At a dozen junctures its success or failure will depend upon whether the old ideal or the new has the stronger appeal; and action in those junctures will depend, as I have said, not upon a highly rationalized intellectual analysis of the details of each case—our quick

newspaper judgments which so often determine these things do not permit of that kind of judgment—but upon the prevailing public temper and atmosphere; upon whether the older or the newer policy has the greater emotional impulse behind it.

Very shortly now—in a few months perhaps, or a year or two at most—the nation will be faced by these problems, vaster, more difficult, containing more possibilities of disastrous mistakes, than any which have heretofore confronted the statesmanship of the world. It is our duty to see, if our people are not to have fought in vain, that we do not drift to that decision unprepared, our statesmen unguided by any informed opinion, or worse still, harassed by one that is fickle and unstable, with understanding clouded and power of thought submerged by momentary passion, crude herd instinct, or the momentum of old prejudices and obsolete conceptions.

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